Pruitt v. State

• Decision Date: 16 May 2017
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 15A05-1606-CR-1235
• Citation: 78 N.E.3d 14
• Parties: Tommy R. PRUITT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

78 N.E.3d 14

Tommy R. PRUITT, Appellant-Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

Court of Appeals Case No. 15A05-1606-CR-1235

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 16, 2017

Attorney for Appellant : Leanna Weissmann, Lawrenceburg, Indiana

Attorneys for Appellee : Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, James B. Martin, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IndianaKirsch, Judge.

[1] Tommy R. Pruitt ("Pruitt") was sentenced to death in 2003 for the murder of a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ("Seventh Circuit") granted habeas corpus relief, vacated Pruitt's death sentence, and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors and resentenced Pruitt to a term of sixty-five years for the murder, to run consecutive to his 115-year sentence, previously imposed for other related offenses, for an aggregate term of 180 years. Pruitt appeals raising the following restated issues:

I. Whether the sentence of sixty-five years for murder was prohibited under Blakely v. Washington ;¹ and

II. Whether Pruitt's sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Our Supreme Court, on direct appeal, set forth the facts regarding Pruitt's crimes as follows:

On June 14, 2001, Morgan County Deputy Sheriff Daniel Starnes was driving his unmarked patrol car on a routine assignment serving warrants. His son, Ryan Starnes, accompanied him as part of a college internship. A car driven by Pruitt caught Starnes's attention and Starnes followed Pruitt for some distance, observing increasingly erratic driving. Eventually Pruitt came to a stop and Starnes pulled in behind Pruitt's car, turned on his flashing lights, and approached Pruitt's vehicle on foot. Starnes obtained Pruitt's driver's license and registration and returned to his vehicle to call the information in. In response, Starnes was told that a recent robbery report suggested Pruitt might be in possession of stolen weapons. As Starnes approached Pruitt's car for a second time, Pruitt emerged with a handgun and the two exchanged gunfire. Pruitt was shot at least seven times and Starnes was struck by five shots. Pruitt also fired at Ryan Starnes, who had remained in Starnes's car.

Pruitt v. State , 834 N.E.2d 90, 98-99 (Ind. 2005).² Deputy Starnes ultimately died on July 10, 2001, and Pruitt was charged with numerous offenses, including murder.

[4] In 2003, Pruitt was found guilty of murder,³ attempted murder, possession of a handgun without a license, resisting law enforcement, and four counts of receiving stolen property. Id . at 99. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Pruitt killed a law enforcement officer acting in the line of duty and recommended the death penalty. Id . The jury then reconvened for a third phase of the trial and found Pruitt guilty of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon as a Class B felony and possession of a handgun without a license as a Class C felony. Id . The jury also found Pruitt to be a habitual offender. On November 21, 2003, the trial court imposed the death penalty for the murder and sentenced Pruitt to an aggregate term of 115 years for the remaining counts.

[5] Once Pruitt exhausted state court remedies (see Pruitt I, 834 N.E.2d 90 and Pruitt v. State , 903 N.E.2d 899 (Ind. 2009) ), he sought federal habeas relief challenging the imposition of the death penalty. After Pruitt had been denied relief in federal district court, Pruitt v. Wilson , No. 3:09-CV-380-RLM, 2012 WL 4513961 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 2, 2012), rev'd sub nom , Pruitt v. Neal , 788 F.3d 248 (7th Cir. 2015), the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and vacated the death penalty, finding that: (1) the Indiana Supreme Court's decision that Pruitt had not shown that he is intellectually disabled was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts; and (2) Pruitt had demonstrated that he is intellectually disabled and constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty. Pruitt v. Neal , 788 F.3d 248, 270 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1161, 194 L.Ed.2d 240 (2016). The Seventh Circuit granted a conditional writ of habeas corpus and ordered the State of Indiana to either initiate a new penalty-phase proceeding or release Pruitt. Id . at 276.

[6] The case was remanded to the Dearborn Circuit Court for resentencing on the murder conviction only, and on April 20, 2016, that court conducted a new sentencing hearing. The parties understood that Pruitt was to be resentenced to a term of years for murder under Count I. Resent. Tr . at 4 -5.⁴ Pruitt raised no objections to either the original presentence investigation report ("PSI") or the probation department's 2016 update to the PSI ("PSI Update"). Id. at 7. During the resentencing hearing, Pruitt urged the trial court to make its findings from the evidence already in the record. Defense counsel stated:

[A]n extensive trial in this matter and an extensive litigation regarding ... the mental condition of our client, Mr. Pruitt[,] that occurred both prior to trial, at the penalty phase, and then at the Post-Conviction trial, which the Court also conducted. At this point, you know, that evidence is all actually already in the record before the Court. As we understand the decision of the [Seventh Circuit], essentially ... the death penalty sentencing was overturned because of what the Court felt [was] significant evidence of intellectual disability and/or mental illness of our client, Mr. Pruitt, at the time and before, you know, this incidence occurred. And we would ask the Court to specifically note the testimony that the Court actually issued a separate order regarding what was then called, I think, "mental retardation." At that time—and heard testimony, as we understand it, from Dr. Charles Golden, Dr. Brian Hudson, and Dr. George Schmedlen.

Id . at 7-8.

[7] Pruitt asked the trial court to consider and take judicial notice of the entire record, including the post-conviction proceedings, in order to find intellectual disability and mental illness were mitigating circumstances. Id . at 7-14. The State asked the trial court to consider the aggravating circumstance that Pruitt had a lengthy criminal history and that Pruitt killed Deputy Starnes in the course of his duties, the latter circumstance having been found beyond a reasonable doubt by Pruitt's 2003 jury. Resent. Tr. at 20. The trial court indicated that it would review the existing records from the years 2003 through 2016. Id . at 19.

[8] On May 2, 2016, the trial court reconvened for pronouncement of the new sentence which, as the trial court recognized, was required to reflect the sentencing scheme applicable at the time Pruitt committed murder. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 184 (Resent. Order at 2). Accordingly, Pruitt was eligible to be sentenced within a range that had a "fixed term of fifty-five (55) years, with not more than ten (10) years added for aggravating circumstances or not more than ten (10) years subtracted for mitigating circumstances." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a) (2001). The trial court reviewed the remaining 2003 convictions and their respective sentences, stating that, at that time, the circumstances "justified a finding of aggravating circumstances to aggravate those sentences and to run them consecutive [to] each other." Resent. Tr . at 25.

[9] The trial court "incorporate[d] all applicable findings contained in the original Pronouncement of Sentence dated November 21, 2003, for purposes of resentencing." Id . Pruitt did not object. The trial court stated,

The sentences and applicable findings in that Order are confirmed. In addition, the Court considers the [PSI] previously ordered and entered on November 21, 2003. As to the April 21, 2016 Sentencing, the Court considers the [PSI Update]. The Court also considers additional evidence presented in the victim's statement provided by Mrs. Starnes at that Sentencing hearing.

Additional factors considered in this matter, for purposes of Sentencing for Count I, Murder, are as follows. The Court has taken judicial notice of the evidence and trial proceedings. Evidence presented in the trial proceedings concluded in November of 2003. The Court considers the evidence presented at the hearing on Post-Conviction Relief, concluded in May of 2007. The Court considers the contents of the files in each cause of action. The Court considers the arguments and evidence presented on April 20, 2016.

Id. at 25-26.

[10] During resentencing, the trial court considered the following aggravating circumstances: (1) Pruitt killed Deputy Starnes while the deputy was acting in the line of duty; and (2) Pruitt had an extensive criminal history. Resent. Tr . at 20, 26, 27. Pruitt's criminal history included "five prior felonies, prior crimes of violence, including a Robbery and a Battery, two probation violations, and a prior firearms violation." Id . at 27. Pruitt had committed both state and federal crimes. Id . The trial court also took note of Pruitt's post-sentence behavior, as outlined in the PSI Update, which revealed a pattern of bad conduct while incarcerated, including "Battery with a Weapon, Bodily Fluid or Serious Injury, Fleeing or Interfering with Staff," and "Possession, Introduction, or Use of a Dangerous Weapon." Id . at 27. The trial court found that Pruitt's deliberate and unprovoked actions toward a uniformed police officer and his "history of criminal activity and behavior indicate[d Pruitt] is a substantial risk to commit future crimes and poses a substantial danger and threat to the public." Id .

[11] The trial court also considered that the nature and circumstances of the crime were particularly heinous and aggravating because: (1) Pruitt used a police scanner to hear radio traffic prior to his being stopped by...