Davis v. Andrews

• Decision Date: 28 September 1962
• Docket Number: No. 16036,16036
• Citation: 361 S.W.2d 419
• Parties: Aria DAVIS et al., Appellants, v. Linnie Lee ANDREWS et al., Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 419

361 S.W.2d 419

Aria DAVIS et al., Appellants, v. Linnie Lee ANDREWS et al., Appellees.

No. 16036.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Sept. 28, 1962.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 19, 1962.

Reeves & Reeves, Tyler, for appellants.

Clemens, Knight, Weiss & Spencer, San Antonio, Harold B. Sanders, Dallas, Enoch G. Fletcher, Grand Saline, and L. F. Sanders and C. L. Stanford, Canton, for appellees.

WILLIAMS, Justice.

This is an interpleader suit involving the construction of a mineral deed. By deed dated June 2, 1930, Henry York, and wife, Ola York, Mrs. Ella York, a widow, G. N. York and wife, Dennie York, and Aria Davis joined by her husband L. L. Davis as grantors, conveyed, subject to oil and gas leases, a 1/32nd of 1/8 mineral interest in 50 acres of land of the John Walling Survey in Van Zandt County, Texas. ¹

This deed, omitting immaterial portions, as well as the description of the land, reads as follows:

'We, Henry York and wife, Ola York and Mrs. Ella York, a widow, of Smith County Texas, G. N. York and wife, Dennie York of Wood County, Texas, and Aria Davis joined by her husband L. L. Davis of Van Zandt County, Texas, for and in consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) cash in hand paid by J. T. York, hereinafter called Grantee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, conveyed, assigned and delivered and by these presents do grant, sell, convey, assign and deliver unto the said Grantee an undivided 1/32nd of the usual one-eighth interest in and under, and that may be produced from the following described land situated in Van Zandt County, Texas, to-wit: * * *

'This conveyance is intended to cover the above described 50 acres of land and does not affect interest in any excess acreage there may be in the above described tract of land together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling and exploring said land for oil, gas and other minerals and removing the same therefrom.

'Said land now being under an oil and gas lease executed in favor of F. L. Luckel it is understood and agreed that this sale is made subject to the terms of said lease but covers and includes one-thirty-second of all the oil royalty, and gas rentals or royalty due and to be paid under the terms of said lease, in so far as it covers the above described property.

'It is understood and agreed that none of the money rentals which may be paid to the said Grantee and in event that the above described lease for any reason becomes cancelled or forfeited then and in that event undivided one-thirty-second of the lease interest and all future rentals on said land for oil, gas and other minerals privileges shall be owned by said Grantee herein owning 1/32nd of all oil, gas and other minerals in and under said lands together with 1/32nd interest in all future rents.

'To have and to hold the above described property, together with all singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in any wise belonging unto the said Grantee herein, his heirs and assigns forever; and we do hereby bind ourselves, our heirs, executors and administrators to warrant and forever defend all and singular the said property unto the said Grantee herein, his heirs and assigns against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming or to claim the same or any part thereof, for a period of 20 years from date hereof and no longer.' (Emphasis supplied.)

C. F. York and wife Lillian York executed and acknowledged the above deed, but were not named therein as grantors. On November 21, 1930, C. F. York and wife Lillian York, as grantors, executed and delivered a correction deed to J. T. York, in which the grantors recite the execution of the prior deed and the failure of that deed to contain their names as grantors. The correction deed does not anywhere contain that part of the quoted portion of the prior deed reading '* * * for a period of 20 years from date hereof and no longer'.

Oil was discovered in paying quantities on the land in question prior to 1930 and has been continuously produced therefrom to the date of the trial. The Pure Oil Company is the admitted owner of oil and gas leases on the property.

On October 13, 1958 The Pure Oil Company, as stakeholder, instituted this suit in the nature of a bill of interpleader naming therein a large number of defendants. Defendants aligned themselves in this lawsuit as follows: Aria Davis, and husband, L. L. Davis, and others (sometimes referred to as the York Group), and being the heirs of the grantors under the two deeds described above, as appellants; and Linnie Lee Andrews, and others (sometimes referred to as the Persons Group), being the remote grantees under J. T. York, as appellees.

The Pure Oil Company alleged that it had been confronted with conflicting claims of interest by the two groups of defendants named, said contentions growing out of the construction to be placed upon the two deeds described above, and asked the court to determine the respective interest of the parties and deliver to the rightful owner the proceeds of oil and gas that had been produced from said property for a long period of time preceding the filing of this suit.

The York Group (appellants) answered, contending that the deeds in question evidence limitation of the grant which terminated 20 years after June 2, 1930. In the alternative, they say that the conveyance of June 2, 1930 was ambiguous and that it was the intention of the parties that the interest conveyed would terminate after 20 years. Further, in the alternative, they alleged that through mutual mistake of the parties that the instrument dated June 2, 1930 did not convey the true meaning intended by the parties to limit the grant to a period of 20 years and therefore the court was requested to reform the instrument to correctly reflect such alleged intent.

Appellees, (Persons Group) answered, pleading that under the conveyance in question they were the owners in fee of the interest conveyed and that the limitation of 20 years applied to the warranty only. In answer to appellants' prayer for reformation, appellees pled the statute of limitations, the statute of frauds, estoppel on the ground that appellees were bona fide purchasers, stale demand and laches.

Appellants during the trial offered to introduce testimony of Mrs. Aria Davis, L. L. Davis and Mrs. Ola York, to the effect that some few days prior to June 2, 1930 J. T. York, a nephew of Mrs. Ella York came to the York family in an effort to purchase royalty under the 50-acre of land in question; that appellants advised J. T. York that they had sold some mineral interest under the land but that same had been limited in the grant for a period of 20 years and that they would not make another sale of royalty unless the grant was likewise limited. That thereafter, J. T. York had a conveyance drafted and returned to the York family with it, such conveyance being the one in litigation. That the York family, being inexperienced in the conveyance of mineral or royalty interest in lands, and since they were dealing with a nephew of Mr. Ella York and a cousin of her children, relied upon his assertion that the limitation following the warranty clause in the conveyance would be effective to limit the conveyance for a period of 20 years from the date of such instrument, and that such conveyance would expire on June 2, 1920; that the York family did rely upon such representations and but for them, would not have executed same. This testimony was rejected by the trial court.

At the conclusion of the non-jury trial the court rendered judgment decreeing that The Pure Oil Company be discharged from liability to all defendants; that the appellees should recover title and possession of an undivided 1/32nd of 1/8 mineral interest in and under the 50-acre tract of land subject to the oil and gas leases of The Pure Oil Company, together with the proceeds of the production of the oil and gas from said tract of land attributable to said interest; and denying all relief sought by appellants.

At the request of appellants the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it was found that the language in the mineral deed of June 2, 1930 is clear and unequivocally free of ambiguity; that the limitation contained therein applies to the warranty and not to the grant. The court concluded that the instruments in question were sufficient to pass fee simple title to the interest conveyed, subject only to the limited warranty of 20 years.

By their first seven points on appeal, appellants contend in essence, (1) that the deeds in question clearly reflect that the grant thereby made was limited to a term of 20 years from and after June 2, 1930; (2) that the court erred in finding that the interest conveyed by the deeds was unlimited and that the only limitation was as to warranty for a period of 20 years; (3) that the deeds in question were ambiguous and uncertain; (4) that since said instruments were ambiguous the trial court was in error in not permitting extrinsic evidence to be introduced to ascertain the intention of the parties; (5) that the court erred in refusing to permit appellants to introduce extrinsic evidence with reference to the circumstances surrounding the parties out of which the deeds in question arose to thereby correctly ascertain the intent of the parties.

OPINION

At the threshold of our determination of the inquiry presented by appellants' points, i. e., the construction to be placed upon the mineral deeds, we deem it advisable and proper to focus attention upon the cardinal objective which is to ascertain the intention of the parties to the written instruments in question. The first rule of construction of a deed is that the intention of the parties be ascertained and given effect. 19 Tex.Jur.2d Sec. 107, p. 391. Even this primary rule of construction must be immediately modified with the restriction that it is not the intention which ...