Davis v. Barnfield

• Decision Date: 19 April 2002
• Citation: 833 So.2d 58
• Parties: Louise DAVIS and Lucious Davis v. Willie James BARNFIELD.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

833 So.2d 58

Louise DAVIS and Lucious Davis v. Willie James BARNFIELD.

2001218.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

April 19, 2002.

James M. Barnes, Jr., Marion, for appellants.

Robert H. Turner, Marion, for appellee.

YATES, Presiding Judge.

Louise Davis and her husband, Lucious Davis,¹ appeal from a judgment in favor of Willie James Barnfield concerning a division of land pursuant to an oral contract. This case was transferred to this court by the supreme court, pursuant to § 12-2-7(6), Ala.Code 1975.

Louise Davis, Willie Barnfield, and Beatrice Barnfield are siblings. In 1992, Louise purchased a plot of land for $12,000. Willie accompanied Louise to the bank on the day of the purchase, and withdrew $5,000 from his personal account to pay the down payment on the real estate. He also withdrew $250 to pay for the deed. Willie co-signed the installment note with Louise and Lucious, and the settlement statement relating to the loan. The terms of the loan included a monthly payment of approximately $190. Only Louise's name appears on the contract for sale and the warranty deed.

Louise was not in possession of the land before the purchase, but subsequently, moved onto the land. Willie and their mother had lived on the land, in their own house. Willie had been leasing a house on the land for six or seven years preceding the purchase. After the purchase, Willie made five payments of approximately $190 each to Louise. There is no testimony in the record to indicate that the nature of Willie's possession changed after the purchase.

At the time of the purchase in 1992, Beatrice lived in Indiana; she subsequently moved her mobile home onto the land, at Louise's invitation. In 1995, Beatrice began making payments to Willie. She testified that she believed that he was making payments on the land for the three siblings. Beatrice kept a record of the payments made from March 10, 1995, to July 9, 1997, totaling $4,935.

The testimony was disputed. Louise testified that on five occasions, Willie gave her $190, and that Beatrice gave her no money. Although Louise claimed that Willie did not give her the money from Beatrice, Willie testified that he gave the money to Louise, and that he had accompanied her to the bank to deposit it each time he had given her a payment. Between them, including the down payment, Willie and Beatrice claim to have paid $10,885—over 90% of the purchase price. Louise asserts that she and her husband, Lucious, paid all but the $5,000 paid by Willie as a down payment and the five payments of $190.00 from Willie.

Louise testified that she told Willie he had a home for the remainder of his life and that she expected no money in return. Willie claims that Louise never told him he had a "life home." Louise also testified that she promised to give some land to Beatrice, but that she did not ask for any money in return.

On October 6, 2000, Willie sued Beatrice, Louise, and Lucious for partition of the land and division of the proceeds. On November 10, 2000, Louise and Lucious moved to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court found that a tenancy-in-common existed among the three siblings, that each possessed an undivided one-third interest in the property, and that the property could be divided without a sale. The court further ordered that Willie contact a licensed surveyor to partition the property, dividing it equitably in such a way as to protect the house site of each party. The court ordered that the necessary instruments of conveyance be executed, with each party sharing the associated costs equally, and bearing their own attorney fees and costs. Louise and Lucious appeal from that judgment.

The trial court is the trier of fact, and its judgment based on its findings of fact is presumed correct. Capitol Constr. Co. v. Alabama Exterior Supply, Inc., 696 So.2d 1087, 1089 (Ala.Civ.App.1997), citing Huprich v. Bitto, 667 So.2d 685 (Ala.1995). Based upon the record, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the court's factual finding that an oral contract existed between the parties.

The law clearly states that all contracts for the sale of land must be in writing, or they are void under the Statute of Frauds. § 8-9-2, Ala.Code 1975. There are two circumstances where an oral contract for real property will be enforced: where a party partially performed and took possession of the property, or where fraud existed from the inception of the agreement. Darby v. Johnson, 477 So.2d 322, 326-27 (Ala.1985).

To satisfy the Statute of Frauds, a writing may consist of a note or memorandum. Id. Willie argues that the settlement statement and loan papers he signed could be considered a note or memorandum within the Statute of Frauds, and that the agreement would, therefore, be enforceable. However, those writings do not contain the essential elements of the alleged oral agreement, namely, an offer and an acceptance, consideration, and mutual assent to the essential terms of the agreement; therefore, they would not constitute a note or memorandum under the Statute of Frauds. See Wilma Corp. v. Fleming Foods of Alabama, Inc., 613 So.2d 359 (Ala.1993); Capitol Constr. Co. v. Alabama Exterior Supply, Inc., supra.

There is only one statutory exception to the provision of the Statute of Frauds relating to contracts for the purchase of land. If "purchase money, or a portion thereof is paid and the purchaser is put in possession of the land by the seller," then the transaction is excepted from the Statute of Frauds. § 8-9-2(5), Ala.Code 1975. Possession must stem from the alleged agreement, and must be a result of the agreement; in other words, possession must be "`referable exclusively to the contract.'" Smith v. Smith, 466 So.2d 922, 924 (Ala.1985), quoting Hagood v. Spinks, 219 Ala. 503, 504, 122 So. 815, 816 (1929). Louise and Lucious argue on appeal that neither Willie nor Beatrice took possession of the land in reliance upon an oral agreement.

In Smith, twin brothers owned adjacent plots of land. One brother conveyed his property to the other brother, with the understanding that the other brother would use the land to secure financing to purchase another plot of adjacent land. The first brother alleged that the second brother agreed to then convey to the first brother a one-half interest in each of the original two properties, so they each would own equal shares of the properties. Smith v. Smith, 466 So.2d at 923. The first brother testified that before the oral contract, he "farmed the land, cleared stumps, put in a temporary road, cleared a site for a lake, cut timber, maintained fences, `ran' cattle, and hunted on the land." Id. at 926. The first brother testified that after the alleged oral contract, he measured and marked the boundaries of the land he claimed, "grazed cattle on the land periodically, granted permission to third parties to hunt on the land, and cut timber on the land." Id. at 925-26. The supreme court found that the first brother's possession was substantially the same before and after the conveyance. Furthermore, the supreme court found that the relationship of parties could account for the first brother's occupancy of the land. Id. at 926; see also Nelson v. Miller, 479 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Ala.1985). The Smith court speculated that a brother might allow other brothers to possess land without intending to convey ownership, based upon their familial relationship. Smith v. Smith, 466 So.2d at 926.

"`[T]he possession must be referable to the promise and not to some domestic relationship of the vendor and vendee. Where the person having the legal title to land is in possession, it is well established that such possession will be referred to the legal title. Here, the title being in the father, and both father and son being in possession, the law refers the possession to the father. (Citations omitted.)'

". . . .

"`... If the possession ... could be accounted for just as well by some other right or title actually existing in the vendee's favor, or by some relation between him and the vendor other than the alleged oral contract, it is not such a possession as the doctrine requires.'"

Id. at 925 (citations omitted) (quoting Jones v. Jones, 219 Ala. 62, 64, 121 So. 78, 78, 79 (1929)).

In the present case, as in Smith, Willie's possession of the land did not change after he entered into the oral contract. He had lived on the land for six to seven years before the purchase, and he continued to live on the land after the purchase. There is no evidence indicating that his possession of the land was "referable exclusively to the contract." 466 So.2d at 924. Furthermore, his possession could be accounted for by virtue of his family relationship with Louise, as was the case in Smith. Although it might be argued that Beatrice took possession of her portion of the land after the parties had entered into the oral contract, her possession likewise could be attributed to a familial relationship. Therefore, neither Willie nor Beatrice meets the performance-possession exception to the Statute of Frauds.

In response to Louise and Lucious's arguments on appeal, Willie argues that equity demands that the oral contract be enforced, because, he says, Louise's actions constitute fraud.

"`"It is a most important principle, thoroughly established in equity, and applying in every transaction where the statute is invoked, that the statute of frauds, having been enacted for the purpose of preventing fraud, shall not be made the instrument of shielding, protecting, or aiding the party who relies upon it in the perpetration of a fraud, or in the consummation of a fraudulent scheme." 2 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. (3d Ed.) § 921, p. 1658.'"

Darby v. Johnson, 477 So.2d at 325 (quoting Deming v. Lee, 174 Ala. 410, 414, 56 So. 921, 922 (1911)). However, in order to defeat the Statute of Frauds, the claimant must show fraud, not merely a breach of an oral contract. Darby v. Johnson, 477 So.2d at 326-27. In Darby,...