Davis v. Beeler, Civil Action No. 96-042.
| Decision Date | 29 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 96-042. |
| Citation | 966 F.Supp. 483 |
| Parties | John M. DAVIS, Petitioner, v. Arthur F. BEELER, Warden, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
John M. Davis, Springfield, IL, pro se.
Frances Catron, Shelley Darrell Chatfield, U.S. Attorney's Office, Lexington, KY, for respondent.
The petitioner, John M. Davis, a federal prisoner, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Davis challenges that duration of his physical confinement. Specifically he alleges that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") has unlawfully determined that petitioner has been convicted of an offense which is violent, thereby making petitioner ineligible for early release pursuant to the early release provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 ("VCCLEA"). Consistent with local practice, this matter was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for development of the record.
The Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation on December 20, 1996 [docket entry 26]. In her Report, the Magistrate Judge set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history of the abovestyled case.
In 1990, Davis pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois to the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He was sentenced to a term of twenty-seven months imprisonment. The sentencing judge recommended that Davis be placed in a facility where he could obtain counseling and treatment for his obsession with guns. Accordingly, Davis completed a BOP Drug Education Program while incarcerated at FCI-E1 Reno. Said program was implemented pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2), after a prisoner has successfully completed a treatment program, the BOP may reduce the prisoner's sentence by not more than one year from the term that the prisoner must otherwise serve if the prisoner has been convicted of a nonviolent offense. Because the BOP classifies a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as a crime of violence, Davis is not eligible for early release. Davis exhausted his administrative remedies by challenging the inclusion of the crime for which he is presently incarcerated within the definition of a crime of violence. Subsequently, Davis filed this writ of habeas corpus.
The Magistrate Judge found that the substantive decision of the BOP to grant or deny early release to a prisoner is precluded from judicial review by statute. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3625; Sesler v. Pitzer, 926 F.Supp. 130, 132 (D.Minn.1996). However, the Magistrate Judge found that this Court does have jurisdiction to review whether the agency's interpretation of the statute under which it makes said decision is contrary to well-settled case law. Neal v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 116 S.Ct. 763, 768, 133 L.Ed.2d 709 (1996).
The Magistrate Judge notes that neither the Supreme Court nor the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is a crime of violence in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 3621. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge notes that those courts which have addressed said issue have not done so in the context of post-sentence classification of a defendant for early release consideration, but rather for the purpose of deciding whether to impose the sentence enhancement as contemplated by 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e) and 924(c)(3). See e.g., United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir.1993); United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 224-226 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Chapple, 942 F.2d 439, 442 (7th Cir.1991).
The Magistrate Judge submitted that "in the absence of a relevant body of binding case law, this Court must uphold the BOP action so long as it has not exceeded the discretion given to it by Congress." Crooker v. Morris, 1996 WL 608553 (D.N.J. October 17, 1996). In considering potential case law on this issue, the Magistrate Judge found that Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662 (9th Cir.1996), which holds that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is a nonviolent offense for purposes of BOP post-sentence reduction, does not bind this Circuit. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge found that the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("USSG") §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2(1), which state that a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) is not a crime of violence for sentencing purposes, does not constitute a relevant body of binding case law for purposes of the BOP's determination. Finally, the Magistrate Judge found that the BOP is not bound by prior case law from outside the Sixth Circuit which interprets 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(3) and (e) as defining an 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) offense as a nonviolent crime for sentencing purposes, as the context is completely different from the case at bar. Thus, the Magistrate Judge concluded that in the absence of binding precedent in this Circuit holding that a § 922(g) offense is not a crime of violence, the BOP's action challenged herein cannot constitute an abuse of its discretion and, therefore, this Court must uphold the BOP's definition.
In light of the analysis set forth above, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Davis' petition be denied, that the same be dismissed with prejudice, and that this action be stricken from the docket.
After one extension, Davis filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation on January 16, 1997 [docket entry 28], to which Beeler responded on January 24, 1997 [docket entry 30]. This Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This Court finds that in his Objections Davis merely rehashes previously raised arguments which were addressed in full by the Magistrate Judge.
The Court, having examined the record and having made a de novo determination, is in agreement with the Magistrate Judge's finding that the BOP lawfully defined 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) as a crime of violence for post-sentencing reduction purposes.
Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS:
(1) the Objections of the petitioner, John M. Davis, to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [docket entry 28] are OVERRULED;
(2) the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation [docket entry 26] is ADOPTED as and for the opinion of the Court; and
(3) a Judgment will be entered contemporaneously with this Opinion and Order in favor of the respondent, Arthur F. Beeler, Warden.
Petitioner, John M. Davis, a federal prisoner, who is incarcerated at FMC-Lexington, has filed herein a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Record No. 3]. The writ of habeas corpus is an available remedy for federal prisoners who challenge the fact or duration of their physical confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973). In this action, Davis challenges the BOP's decision to classify his crime, felon-in-possession of a firearm, as a crime of violence because only nonviolent offenders are eligible for early release of up to one year upon the successful completion of a drug rehabilitation program. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2)(B). If Davis were a nonviolent offender he would have a chance at early release. Therefore, his claim is a challenge to the length of his confinement. See e.g., Crooker v. Morris, No. CIV. A. 95-2820, 1996 WL 608553, at n. 1 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 1996).
The essence of Petitioner's claim is that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has unlawfully determined that he has been convicted of an offense which is not nonviolent, thereby making him ineligible for early release pursuant to the early release provision of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA). Currently ripe for decision, this matter has been referred to the undersigned for initial report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A).
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois to the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and on October 15, 1990, he was sentenced to a term of twenty-seven (27) months of imprisonment. The sentencing judge recommended that Petitioner "be placed in a facility where he may obtain counseling and treatment for his obsession with guns." [Record No. 3, October 15, 1990 Judgment]. Petitioner was initially incarcerated at FCIEl Reno, Oklahoma, where he completed a BOP Drug Education Program, implemented pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b). He was then transferred to FCI-Ashland, Kentucky, and is presently incarcerated at FMC-Lexington, Kentucky.
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (VCCLEA), 18 U.S.C. § 3621(e)(2) provides as follows:
2) Incentive for prisoners' successful completion of treatment program. —
(A) Generally. — Any prisoner who, in the judgment of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, has successfully completed a program of residential substance abuse treatment provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection, shall remain in the custody of the Bureau under such conditions as the Bureau deems appropriate. If the conditions of confinement are different from those the prisoner would have experienced absent the successful completion of the treatment, the Bureau shall periodically test the prisoner for substance abuse and discontinue such conditions on determining that substance abuse has recurred.
(B) Period of custody. — The period a prisoner convicted of a nonviolent offense remains in custody after successfully completing a treatment program may be reduced by the Bureau of Prisons, but such reduction may not be more than one year from the term the prisoner must otherwise serve.
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