Neal v. U.S.

Decision Date22 January 1996
Docket Number949088
PartiesMeirl Gilbert NEAL, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES
CourtU.S. Supreme Court
Syllabus*

When the District Court first sentenced petitioner Neal on two plea-bargained convictions involving possession of LSD with intent to distribute, the amount of LSD sold by a drug trafficker was determined, under both the federal statute directing minimum sentences and the United States Sentencing Commission's Guidelines Manual, by the whole weight of the blotter paper or other carrier medium containing the drug. Because the combined weight of the blotter paper and LSD actually sold by Neal was 109.51 grams, the court ruled, among other things, that he was subject to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v), which imposes a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence on anyone convicted of trafficking in more than 10 grams of "a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of LSD. After the Commission revised the Guidelines' calculation method by instructing courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight, Neal filed a motion to modify his sentence, contending that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was only 4.58 grams, well short of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v)'s 10-gram requirement, and that the Guidelines' presumptive-weight method controlled the mandatory minimum calculation. The District Court followed Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 468, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1929, 114 L.Ed.2d 524, in holding, inter alia, that the actual weight of the blotter paper, with its absorbed LSD, was determinative of whether Neal crossed the 10-gram threshold and that the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence still applied to him notwithstanding the Guidelines. In affirming, the en banc Seventh Circuit agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this.

Held: Section 841(b)(1) directs a sentencing court to take into account the actual weight of the blotter paper with its absorbed LSD, even though the Sentencing Guidelines require a different method of calculating the weight of an LSD mixture or substance. The Court rejects petitioner's contentions that the revised Guidelines are entitled to deference as a construction of § 841(b)(1) and that those Guidelines require reconsideration of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences. While the Commission's expertise and the Guidelines' design may be of potential weight and relevance in other contexts, the Commission's choice of an alternative methodology for weighing LSD does not alter Chapman's interpretation of the statute. In any event, stare decisis requires that the Court adhere to Chapman in the absence of intervening statutory changes casting doubt on the case's interpretation. It is doubtful that the Commission intended the Guidelines to displace Chapman's actual- weight method for statutory minimum sentences, since the Commission's authoritative Guidelines commentary indicates that the new method is not an interpretation of the statute, but an independent calculation, and suggests that the statute controls if it conflicts with the Guidelines. Moreover, the Commission's dose-based method cannot be squared with Chapman. In these circumstances, this Court need not decide what, if any, deference is owed the Commission in order to reject its contrary interpretation. Once the Court has determined a statute's meaning, it adheres to its ruling under stare decisis and assesses an agency's later interpretation of the statute against that settled law. It is the responsibility of Congress, not this Court, to change statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair. Pp. 765-769.

46 F.3d 1405 (C.A. 1995), affirmed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Donald T. Bergerson, San Francisco, CA, for petitioner.

Paul R.Q. Wolfson, Washington, DC, for respondent.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

The policy of sentencing drug offenders based on the amount of drugs involved, straightforward enough in its simplest formulation, gives rise to complexities, requiring us again to address the methods for calculating the weight of LSD sold by a drug trafficker. We reject petitioner's contention that the revised system for determining LSD amounts under the United States Sentencing Guidelines requires reconsideration of the method used to determine statutory minimum sentences, and we adhere to our former decision on the subject.

I

LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide) is such a powerful narcotic that the average dose contains only 0.05 milligrams of the pure drug. The per-dose amount is so minute that in most instances LSD is transferred to a carrier medium and sold at retail by the dose, not by weight. In the typical case, pure LSD is dissolved in alcohol or other solvent, and the resulting solution is applied to paper or gelatin. The solvent evaporates; the LSD remains. The dealer cuts the paper or gel into single-dose squares for sale on the street. Users ingest the LSD by swallowing or licking the squares or drinking a beverage into which the squares have been mixed.

In 1988, petitioner Meirl Neal was arrested for selling 11,456 doses of LSD on blotter paper. The combined weight of the LSD and the paper was 109.51 grams. Following a guilty plea in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, petitioner was convicted of one count of possession of LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841, and one count of conspiracy to possess LSD with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. At the initial sentencing, the method for determining the weight of the illegal mixture or substance was the same under the Guidelines and the statute directing minimum sentences. The determinative amount was the whole weight of the blotter paper containing the drug. See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1, Drug Quantity Table, n. * (Nov.1987) (1987 USSG). Because the total weight of the LSD and blotter paper exceeded 10 grams, the District Court found petitioner subject to the 10-year mandatory minimum sentence specified in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). Under the version of the Sentencing Guidelines then in effect, the indicated sentence was even greater than the statutory minimum: the quantity of the drugs and petitioner's prior convictions resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 188 to 235 months' imprisonment, even after an adjustment for petitioner's acceptance of responsibility for the crime. The District Court imposed concurrent sentences of 192 months imprisonment on each count, to be followed by five years of supervised release.

In November 1993, the United States Sentencing Commission revised the method of calculating the weight of LSD in the Sentencing Guidelines. United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, App. C., Amend. 488 (Nov.1995) (1995 USSG). Departing from its former approach of weighing the entire mixture or substance containing LSD, the amended Guideline instructed courts to give each dose of LSD on a carrier medium a constructive or presumed weight of 0.4 milligrams. Id., § 2D1.1(c), n. * (H). The revised Guideline was retroactive, id., App. C., Amend. 502, and one month later petitioner filed a motion to modify his sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). He contended that the weight of the LSD attributable to him under the amended Guidelines was 4.58 grams (11,456 doses x 0.4 milligrams). For that amount, the applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines would be 70 to 87 months of imprisonment. The 10-year statutory minimum of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v) was no bar to a reduced sentence, petitioner argued, because the presumptive-weight method of the Guidelines should also control the mandatory minimum calculation. The 4.58 grams attributable to him by the Guideline method would be well short of the 10 grams necessitating a 10-year minimum sentence.

The District Court, following our recent decision in Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991), ruled that the blotter paper must be weighed in determining whether petitioner crossed the 10-gram threshold of § 841(b)(1)(A)(v). It held that the mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years still applied to petitioner notwithstanding the sentencing range under the Guidelines. Since the Guidelines no longer authorized a sentence above the statutory minimum, the District Court reduced petitioner's sentence to 120 months on each count.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed with the District Court that a dual system now prevails in calculating LSD weights in cases like this, and it affirmed petitioner's sentence.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the Courts of Appeals over whether the revised Guideline governs the calculation of the weight of LSD for purposes of § 841(b)(1). 515 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2576, 132 L.Ed.2d 826 (1995). Compare United States v. Muschik, 49 F.3d 512, 518 (C.A.9 1995) (Guideline method should be used under § 841(b)(1)), cert. pending, No. 95-156, with United States v. Boot, 25 F.3d 52, 55 (C.A.1 1994); United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 759 (C.A.2 1995), cert. pending, No. 95-6746; United States v. Hanlin, 48 F.3d 121, 124 (C.A.3 1995); United States v. Pardue, 36 F.3d 429, 431 (C.A.5 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1969, 131 L.Ed.2d 858 (1995); United States v. Andress, 47 F.3d 839, 840 (C.A.6 1995) (per curiam); United States v. Stoneking, 60 F.3d 399, 402 (C.A.8 1995) (en banc), cert. pending, No. 95-5410; United States v. Mueller, 27 F.3d 494, 496-497 (C.A.10 1994); United States v. Pope, 58 F.3d 1567, 1570 (C.A.11 1995).

II

Congress has tried different punishment schemes to combat the menace of drug trafficking. Under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of...

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