Davis v. Braxnon
| Decision Date | 19 December 1896 |
| Parties | Davis v. Settle et al. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
1. CoxstRUotive TbUsts Adverse Possession Trustees.
Where a person having an inequitable paper title to a tract of land, and out ol' possession thereof, with fall know ledge of another's superior equitable title, by any means obtains the superior legal title, which rightfully belongs to the holder of the equitable title, and possession thereunder, so as to prevent the rightful acquirement thereof by the holder of Unequitable title, and thus bars his suit at law for the possession of the land, equity will hold such persona trustee of the legal title for the benefit of such holder of the equitable title; the acquirement of the legal title under such circumstances being regarded as constructively fraudulent, (p. 22.)
2. CoxstRUotIvETRUsts Quieting Title Trustees.
Where a holder of the equitable title to a tract of land has the right to have his deed reformed by his remote grantors, so as to cover such tract of land, and others claiming adverse inequitable title to the same land from the same grantors, with full knowledge of the outstanding equity, by judicious management contrive, in fraud of the rights of the equitable holder, to perfect their inequitable title in such way as to prevent the correction of such deed in such maimer by their common grantor, such others will he held as tiaistees of the legal title, and compelled to convey the same to the holder of the equitable title, (p. 23.)
3. (Jo-Tenancy Seisin.
Common seisin in fact or law, without regard to source of title, creates co-tenancy, (p. 24.)
4. (Jo-TenaNGYCo-Tenancy Possession Adverse Possession,
Where a person claiming an inferior paper title to land held by co-tenants under a superior possessory title obtains possession of the land by any device from the co-tenant in actual occupancy thereof, without the knowledge of the other cotenants, his entry will be held to have been under the cotenancy possession, and not under his adverse paper title, and to so continue until perfect dissesin of the other co-tenants, either presumed from lapse of time or some notorious act of adversary possession, or dissesin brought home to the knowledge of the other co-tenants. The burden of establishing such perfect disseisin is on the person alleging it. (p. 28.)
5. Equity J urisdiction Partition Quieting Title.
Section 1, chapter 79, Code 1891, authorizes a. court of equity in partition cases to pass on all questions of law touching the legal title of any one claiming to share in the partition to the interest he claims, if his interest he such as, if valid, will make him a co-owner in the common subject with the plaintiff as holding under the same right or title under which the partition is to he made; hut it does not authorize the court to pass on the title of a stranger claiming under a different title, adverse to the title under which the partition is to be made; nor can such stranger and his hostile title be brought into such suit, and the conflict between the two hostile rights settled as incident to partition, (p. 30.)
6. Equity Jurisdiction Trial by Jury Conetitutional Law.
In matters of such nature as give right to trial by jury under the Constitution, the legislature cannot give equity" jurisdiction over them, and deprive the party of right of trial by jury against his protest, (p. 32.)
7. Equity Jurisdiction Trial by Jury Constitutional Law.
Where already, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, equity exercised jurisdiction in a certain matter, the provision of the Constitution guaranteeing-trial by jury does not relate to or give right to trial by jury in suits in equity involving such matter, (p. 34.)
8. Equity J urisdiction Quieting Title Possession.
Equity has no jurisdiction, upon the soleground of removal of cloud from title, to try conflicting titles to lands, at the suit of one holding either legal or equitable title, the adverse claimant being in actual possession, (p. 3(5.)
9. Champerty.
Where a contract is affected with champerty, only the party to it, and not a stranger, can make chat defense against it. (pp. 25, 40.)
10. DE positions Notice Defective Notice.
A notice to take depositions is not bad because it specifies the county in which the depositions are to be taken, or in which the suit is pending, but does not specify the state, (p. 42.)
Appeal from Circuit Court, Fayette county.
Bill by James W. Davis against H. M. Settle, the Rush Run Coal & Coke Company, and others for partition, and to determine complainant's rights in land. From a decree for plaintiff', the defendant coke company appeals, and certain of the appellees cross-assign errors.
Reversed in part, and modified.
St. Clair & Gaines and Brown, Jackson & Knight, for appellant.
J. W. Davis, L. L. Lewis, J. W. Harris, and R. F. Dennis, for appellees.
This is a chancery suit, instituted by James AY. Davis against II. M. Settle et al, in the Circuit Court of Fayette county. The facts of the case are as follows: Both parties claim under Sarah Stuart. In September, 1887, Seth Huse purchased from Sarah Stuart, by written agreement, out of a large tract "fifty acres of land, on New river, including the upper improvement, that John Scott has in possession." Huse sold Settle this fifty acres in 1845 by writing, providing that, when the purchase money should be paid, Huse should convey or cause to be conveyed, to Settle. The agreement between Huse and Stuart was a mere executory agreement, not under seal, and provided that lluse might take in more land at fifty cents per aero. Sarah Stuart, by will devised her lands to her children, and empowered Samuel Price, her executor, uto convey any lands that may be sold at the time of my death." The lands were partitioned, and a five thousand eighty-three and a half acre tract was assigned to Agnes Peyton, in which was included the "Harrison Settle fifty acres," on New river, so marked on the plat of partition. Agnes Peyton and her trustees sold and conveyed this land, according to the plat, to A. A. Low, April 22, 1874, excluding on the face of the deed the Harrison Settle fifty acres. Huse and Harrison Settle had been in actual possession of the land since the year 1887, and Settle was in possession thereof at the time Low purchased and continued thereon until a short time before the institution of this suit. April 3, 1874, Samuel Price, as empowered by the will of Sarah Stuart, executed a deed to Settle for fifty acre's, by metes and bounds, but which did not include the thirty acre's now in controvesry, and which Settle was then in possession of, as the lluse land. The deed was not delivered to Settle until March 5, 1878, when lluse gave it to him, taking his receipt therefor on his bond, in words as follows: "Kec-'d of Harlow Huse, Samuel Price's executor's deed for the within-described land, this 5th March, 1878." It was recorded March 28, 1878. Afterwards, when Low claimed the land in controversy as not covered by Settle's deed, Settle refused to give it up, and claimed flu boundaries of the deed were wrong, and that he was entitled to the land, as shown on the partition map, as bounded by New river, and of which he had been in possession. Low brought an ejectment suit against him, and the plaintiff, Davis, agreed to defend suit and pay the costs, in consideration of one-half the recovery. This agreement was reduced to writing, and duly recorded, as required by law. The suit was twice tried and each time resulted in a verdict in favor of Low. Settle appealed, and this Court reversed the case both times; the last time holding that Low's deed did not cover the disputed land, and that Samuel Price's deed was void, in so far as it conveyed other land to Settle in lieu of that in suit, thus virtually determining the case against Low. 9 S. E. 922. In the meantime, Low had leased his land, or a part thereof, including; the disputed tract to the defendant, the Hush Hun Coal Company. Settle was still in adverse possession thereof. On the 8rd day of September, 1888, the Hush Hun Coal & Coke Company, Low's tenant, with full notice of Davis' claim to halt this land, both actual and constructive, obtained from Harrison Settle a deed purporting to convey to it the tifty acres deeded to him by Samuel Price, including within its boundaries the part thereof that had been disclaimed by Settle4 in the case of Low against him, and containing this recital: ktIt being the intention of the party of the first part to convey only such land as he now owns on the south side of the river within the lands of A. A. Low." Having thus parted with his whole interest, he surrendered possession of the land in controversy, and the Hush Hun Coal cv Coke Company took possession thereof, as they now claim, as the1 tenant of A. A. Low. Low, Inning thus obtained possession of the land through his tenant, dismissed Ids action. Plaintiff, learning of this, and on the 30th day of September, 1889, having obtained a deed according to his title bond, instituted this suit to know just how he stood, and have partition of the land between himself and the person appearing entitled thereto.
In the suit of A. A. Low against Settle, this Court held that Samuel Price had erroneously executed his power as executor of the will of Sarah Stuart. Such being the case, having once executed the power, though erroneously, he never could correct it, as the deed had been delivered, and admitted to record, and tie only way his mistake could be corrected was by the interference of a court of equity, and them only as against those Inning ...
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