Davis v. Briggs

• Decision Date: 19 December 1918
• Citation: 105 A. 128,117 Me. 536
• Parties: DAVIS et al. v. BRIGGS et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

105 A. 128

117 Me. 536

DAVIS et al.

v. BRIGGS et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Dec. 19, 1918.

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Piscataquis County, in Equity.

Suit by Calvin S. Davis and another against Mary A. Briggs and another. On report to the Supreme Judicial Court. Bill sustained.

Argued before CORNISH, C. J., and SPEAR, HANSON, PHILBROOK, DUNN, and MORRILL, JJ.

Hudson & Hudson, of Guilford, for plaintiffs.

Charles W. Hayes and W. E. Parsons, both of Foxcroft, for defendants.

PHILBROOK, J.Bill in equity. The docket entries in the court below, made part of the record, show that the sitting justice made a finding sustaining the bill, from which appeal was taken, but upon a later date, by agreement of parties, the same justice signed an order to report the. case to this court, which tribunal is to determine the cause "according to the equitable rights of the parties."

Comparatively few issues of fact exist From a careful consideration of all the evidence, we think the following statement of the case is correct:

The plaintiffs are respectively son and daughter of Joseph W. Davis, who died in 1904. The defendants are respectively widow and daughter of Judson Briggs, who died testate in 1906. By the terms of the latter's will all his estate was devised to these defendants. Since the beginning of these proceedings Mrs. Briggs has died, and Mrs. Henderson, her daughter and codefendant, and executrix of her will, defends individually and as such executrix.

On May 1, 1894, Joseph W. Davis, owned a double tenement house situated on the easterly side of Briggs street in the village of Brownville, while at the same time Judson Briggs owned a homestead on land adjoining the Davis property on the south, and also a stable and three tenement houses on land adjoining the Davis property on the north. Briggs street runs in a northerly and southerly direction. Parallel to and easterly from Briggs street, and between 150 and 200 feet distant therefrom, is Church street. Between the easterly line of the Davis land and the westerly line of Church street is land known as the Dunning land. From the latter land, passing some distance northerly along Church street, we come to the Highland Quarry road, leading toward the east, and at a point some distance east of Church street and north of the Quarry road is to be found a spring, which was owned by Judson Briggs in 1894, and since his death has been owned by the defendant.

In the year 1894 Judson Briggs and Joseph W. Davis entered into an agreement substantially upon these terms: Briggs was to complete a partly constructed water pipe from the spring to the Dunning land, while Davis was to lay a connecting pipe from Church street, across the Dunning land, across his own land to his own house, permit Briggs to tap the connecting pipe with a tee to his estead on the south of, and his stable and tenement houses on the north of, the Davis house. Davis was also to pay Briggs the sum of $50. When all this was done, Davis was to have water from the spring without any limit of time thereto being agreed upon. The water pipes were laid, the connecting tees attached and used by Briggs, the $50 paid, and from that time, during the remainder of the life of Judson Briggs, a period of about 12 years, and for the further period of about 5 years after his death, Davis and his heirs, these plaintiffs, received water from these pipes without charge or demand of payment for any water thus received. On the 22d of August, 1911, Mrs. Henderson notified the plaintiffs that the water would be cut off unless arrangements were made by August 28th, and thereafter the pipe was cut by Mrs. Henderson, and the supply ceased. The plaintiffs ask this court to order the defendant to reconnect the severed pipe and to thereafter refrain from any act which would prevent the enjoyment of this water supply.

What are the "equitable rights of the parties" which we are to determine? The plaintiffs claim an easement. This the defendants deny.

An easement is defined to be a right in the owner of one parcel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of another for a specific purpose, not inconsistent with a general property in the owner, a right which one proprietor has to some profit, benefit, or beneficial use, out of, in, or over the estate of another proprietor. 2 Washburn on Real Property, 25; Pomeroy v. Mills, 3 Vt. 279, 23 Am. Dec. 207. Our own court, in Bonney v. Greenwood, 96 Me. 335, 52 Atl. 786, said that an easement may be concisely defined as a privilege without profit which one has, for the benefit of his land, in the land of another. But as to the manner of creating an easement, it was declared in Brown v. Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 75 Atl. 382, that the same was by (1) express or implied grant, (2) reservation or exception in the deed of conveyance, (3) prescription, (4) statutory proceedings, and (5) estoppel.

In the case at bar there is no express grant, no reservation or exception, no prescription, and no statutory proceeding upon which the plaintiffs may rely. May they find support for their claims by an implied grant or by estoppel? In ...