Davis v. Butler
| Decision Date | 23 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-410-NJR-DGW |
| Parties | QUINTEN DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. WARDEN KIMBERLY BUTLER, KENT BROOKMAN, MICHAEL KEYS, MICHAEL HOF, MAJOR ZIEGLER, B. WESTFALL, and T. RUBACH, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Donald G. Wilkerson by United States District Judge Nancy J. Rosenstengel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by all Defendants except Defendant Brookman on February 23, 2018 (Doc. 51) and the Motion for Leave to Join filed by Defendant Brookman on August 14, 2018 (Doc. 64). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the motion for summary judgment be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART, that the motion to join be DENIED and that the Court adopt the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
It is undisputed that from 2009 to 2016, Plaintiff, Quinten Davis, was an inmate incarcerated by the Illinois Department of Corrections. In 2015, he was housed at the Menard Correctional Center when a fight broke out in the recreation yard. Plaintiff, who was in the yard at the time, was interviewed as part of the investigation on the day of the fight, March 2, 2015, and two weeks later. He was subsequently issued a disciplinary ticket, found guilty on the ticket, and sentenced to 1 year in segregation, among other things. After serving 361 days in segregation, the Administrative Review Board expunged the disciplinary ticket, released Plaintiff from segregation, and reversed the other discipline imposed (most notably loss of good conduct credit). In this matter, Plaintiff claims that he was improperly ticketed and disciplined for the March 2, 2015 fight in violation of his due process rights (Count 1).
All material facts are taken in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party. Armato v. Grounds, 766 F.3d 713, 719 (7th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff was not involved in the fight in the recreation yard on March 2, 2015 (Doc. 52-1, p. 2). When it broke out near the telephones, Plaintiff was on the weight pile, some 20 feet away (Id. 2-3). A warning shot was fired and Plaintiff got onto the ground (Id. 3). He was then taken to the church and interviewed by an officer and then taken to segregation (Id.). He then was interviewed by another officer, Officer Rugrouge, two weeks later (Id.). Rugrouge challenged Plaintiff's assertion, during the first interview, that he was on weight pile and his subsequent statement that he was on the telephone (which are next to each other) at the time of the fight (Id. 3-4).1
On March 28th, Defendant Hof penned a disciplinary report that described the incident on March 2nd (Doc. 52-2, p. 1): The report states that one offender (A) assaulted another offender (B) near the handball/basketball courts. Offender A then attempted to blend into a group of otheroffenders who were near the phones. Other offenders, who observed the altercation, including Offender C, went to aid Offender B. Offender C then confronted Offender A and a second altercation ensued involving 15 to 20 other offenders.
The disciplinary report charged Plaintiff with various violations: "105-Dangerous Disturbance, 110-Impeding an Investigation, 301-Fighting." It is unclear from the body of the report whether Plaintiff is one of the enumerated inmates (A, B, or C), whether he was one of the 15 to 20 inmates involved in the melee, or in what manner he impeded the investigation. Indeed, the "observation" section of the disciplinary report does not mention Plaintiff at all nor does it indicate in what manner he could have been either fighting, causing a dangerous disturbance, or impeding an investigation. The report was signed by Defendants Ziegler and Westfall (who agreed that Plaintiff should be temporarily confined) and was served upon Plaintiff by Defendant Rubach on April 3, 2015. Plaintiff asked Rubach to list his witnesses on the ticket but Rubach ignored him (Doc. 52-1, p. 10). There is no other evidence, other than Plaintiff's deposition testimony, about his involvement in the events of March 2, 2015.
A disciplinary hearing was held on April 7, 2015 and was presided over by Defendants Brookman and Keys, members of the Adjustment Committee (Doc. 52-4, pp. 1-2). The written decision at once states that "No Witness Requested" but then notes that Plaintiff requested two witnesses, inmates "Lumar Parish" and "Demetrius Jones."2 The decision3 repeats theinformation contained in the ticket and then states Plaintiff's involvement:
Following the altercations the investigations unit began to conduct interviews with all offenders who were on the yard. Offender DAVIS was identified by responding security staff as being in the direct vicinity of the altercation and subsequently placed on Investigative Status. During the first interview with offender DAVIS he stated he was on the weight pile doing a chest workout when the altercation occurred, during a second interview he claimed he was on the telephone when the altercation occurred. Offender DAVIS was not on the weight pile and his phone records were searched. The phone records reflected offender DAVIS made zero phone calls that day. Due to offender DAVIS's unwillingness to cooperate and provide truthful information he is being charged with 110: Impeding an Investigation, 105: Dangerous Disturbance, and 301: Fighting.
Plaintiff was ultimately found guilty of Dangerous Disturbances and Fighting, but was curiously found not guilty of Impeding or Interfering with an Investigation. Neither of Plaintiff's witnesses were called to provide testimony. During the hearing, Brookman and Keys told Plaintiff, and others, that they should not have been issued disciplinary tickets because they were not involved in the altercation (Doc. 52-1, p. 8). As stated above, they nonetheless found him guilty and he was sentenced to one year of segregation.
Plaintiff filed a grievance on April 24, 2015 regarding the discipline (Doc. 52-5, pp. 1-2). Plaintiff believes that each of defendants conspired together with respect to the ticket and opines that it is because they believed he was being untruthful during the investigation (Doc. 52-1, p. 9). He also wrote a letter to Defendant Butler explaining the error of the disciplinary action but received no response directly from her (Doc. 52-1, p. 8). Instead, the Assistant Warden, Jackie Lashbrook, told Plaintiff that the letter had been forwarded to her by Butler for resolution and that Plaintiff should talk to the grievance officer (Id.). On February 18, 2016, the Administrative Review Board recommended that the grievance be affirmed and that Plaintiff be released from segregation (Doc. 52-8). The Director of the IDOC (or his designee) concurred with the decision on February 23, 2016 (Id.).
Plaintiff was released from segregation after serving approximately 361 days (Doc. 52-1, p. 7). Six months of that time was in the segregation unit at Menard Correctional Center and the remainder was at the Pontiac Correctional Center (Id.). While at Menard CC, he was in the North 2 cellhouse (Id.). In comparison to the West cellhouse where Plaintiff was previously housed, North 2 cellhouse had "no ventilation," had smaller cells, solid metal doors, and unbearable heat ( ) (Id.). Additional differences include increased vermin ("extreme bugs"), dirty cells, mold, uncleanliness (only one shower per week as oppose to three), and less socialization (Id. 7-8).
When he was later transferred to the segregation unit at Pontiac CC, he was placed in the West House (Id. 8). In that cell house, Plaintiff had difficulty sleeping because of the constant noise and the inmates throwing feces (Id.). In his response to the motion for summary judgment, which is not in the form of an affidavit, Plaintiff indicated that while in segregation he was subjected to so much noise and disturbance from other inmates that it took a toll on his mental state and resulted in increases in medication to deal with the stress (Doc. 63).
Summary judgment is proper only if the moving party can demonstrate "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). See also Ruffin-Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005); Black Agents & Brokers Agency, Inc. v. Near North Ins. Brokerage, Inc., 409 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that no material facts are in genuine dispute; any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved against themoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970). See also Lawrence v. Kenosha County, 391 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2004). A moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law where the non-moving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. The Seventh Circuit has stated that summary judgment is "the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit, when a party must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events." Steen v. Myers, 486 F.3d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 2007) ().
Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment due process...
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