Davis v. City of Shinnston
| Decision Date | 09 September 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:12CV53 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
| Parties | VINCENT P. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SHINNSTON, RICK BARNHART, and DEBRA HERNDON, Defendants. |
(Judge Keeley)
JUDGMENT [DKT. NO. 19] AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
Pending before the Court is the defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 19). The defendants, the City of Shinnston ("Shinnston"), Lieutenant Rick Barnhart ("Lt. Barnhart"), and Debra Herndon ("Debra Herndon") (collectively, the "defendants"), seek a declaration that they are not liable to the plaintiff, Vincent P. Davis ("Davis"), for any deprivation of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or for conspiracy, malicious prosecution, or intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress. (Dkt. No. 20). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS the defendants' motion (Dkt. No. 19).
The material facts are largely undisputed and all inferences to be drawn from the facts have been considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 574, 574 (1986).
Chris and Tina Herndon ("the Herndons") own a home located in Shinnston, West Virginia. On August 12, 2009, they entered into a contract with Davis for construction services on their home. Those services included removing old shingles and two chimneys, and installing a new drip edge, new black paper, shingles, a new solar roof vent and gutters. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, the Herndons were to pay Davis a total of $8, 300 for labor and materials according to the following schedule: $4,400 up front; another $1,950 when the shingles were completed; and the remaining balance of the contract upon completion of the job. The Herndons contend that Davis failed to completely install the gutters by early 2010, as the contract required.
On September 9, 2009, the Herndons entered into a second contract with Davis to rebuild their front and side porches in which they agreed to pay Davis a one-time sum of $5,000 for labor and materials. They contend that Davis failed to adequately rebuild their porches as required under the terms of theircontract. For his part, Davis does not dispute that he did not complete the contracts as the parties had contemplated.
On April 19, 2010, the Herndons called 911 to report that Davis's employees were removing lumber from their property without permission. Lt. Barnhart responded to the call and advised the employees to return the lumber. While at the residence, he also talked to the Herndons and learned that they had paid Davis for materials and work he had not performed.
Sometime following this, Debra Herndon, who is Chris Herndon's mother, and also the City Manager for Shinnston, advised Lt. Barnhart that he should further investigate the Herndons' complaints about Davis. Following that conversation, the Herndons met with Lt. Barnhart on May 2, 2010 and provided him with written complaints, copies of calendar dates, copies of payments and statements, inspection reports, as well as the initial proposal from Davis. Lt. Barnhart drafted an incident report later that same day, and sent it to Harrison County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Kurt Hall ("APA Hall") together with "the statements of Chris and Tina Herndon, copies of calendar dates, copies of payments and statements, the results of building inspection conducted by Code Enforcement Officer Rick McElroy, the initial proposal from Davis, the new estimate to finish the job, and two CD-Rs consisting ofpictures of the victims' home before, during, and after the work performed by the Plaintiff." (Dkt. No. 28 at 2-3).
On May 28, 2010, APA Hall advised Lt. Barnhart that, in his opinion, Davis had violated W. Va. Code § 61-3-24. Barnhart then signed a criminal complaint alleging that Davis had accepted money from the Herndons under false pretenses. Specifically, the criminal complaint stated that "[a]s of this date the defendant has not returned to finish construction on the house." (Dkt. No. 24-7 at 2). The complaint concluded with the statement that, although the Herndons had paid Davis Id.
Magistrate Warren Davis later issued an arrest warrant for Davis who, on June 19, 2010, was arrested and arraigned in the Magistrate Court of Harrison County, where bond was set at $10,000. Due to his arrest, Davis's parole for an unrelated charge also was revoked. Because he was unable to post bond and his parole had been revoked, Davis remained incarcerated throughout the pendency of his criminal proceedings.
On June 28, 2013, Davis waived his right to a preliminary hearing. On September 1, 2010, Magistrate Judge Warren Davis found probable cause for the case to be bound over to the Circuit Courtof Harrison County, where a grand jury returned an indictment charging Davis with Fraudulent Schemes in violation of W. Va. Code § 61-3-24(d). He proceeded to trial and, on March 29, 2011, a jury returned a verdict of "not guilty" on all charges contained in the indictment. Following that, on May 11, 2011, Davis was released from custody.
He then filed a complaint in this case on March 28, 2012, in which he alleged that he had spent almost ten months in jail as a result of a "wrongful arrest and prosecution." Davis claims that his "wrongful arrest and prosecution" makes the defendants liable to him for deprivation of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and intentional and/or reckless infliction of emotional distress. On October 17, 2012, the defendants moved for summary judgment as to all of Davis's claims. That motion is now fully briefed and ripe for review.
A moving party is entitled to summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).In applying the standard for summary judgment, the Court must review all the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The Court must avoid weighing the evidence or determining the truth and limit its inquiry solely to a determination of whether genuine issues of triable fact exist. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In Celotex, the Supreme Court held that the moving party bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and of establishing the nonexistence of genuine issues of fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once "the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56, the opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. The nonmoving party must present specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Id. This means that the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of [the] pleading, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The "mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" favoring the nonmoving party will not prevent the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248. Summary judgment is proper only "[w]here the record takenas a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
As Davis's claims all depend on the fate of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the Court first turns its attention there. In order to establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant: (1) was acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived him of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639 (4th Cir. 2011).
In laying out his § 1983 claim in the complaint, Davis alleges that "[t]he conduct of Defendant Rick Barnhart and Defendant Debra Herndon, as alleged herein, deprived Plaintiff of his civil rights, including the rights secured to him and guaranteed to him under Amendments IV, V, VI and XIV of the United States Constitution[.]" (Complaint ¶ 31).2 In his response to the defendants' motion,however, Davis repeatedly states that his § 1983 claim "is based on the absence of probable cause to support his arrest and prosecution." (Dkt. No. 24 at 13). Hence, contrary to the allegations in the complaint, his § 1983 claims are most appropriately evaluated under the Fourth Amendment's right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.
The Fourth Circuit has recognized two distinct causes of action under § 1983 for violations of a person's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure. See Brooks v. Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-82 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484 (1994)). One of these is a cause of action for false or unlawful arrest or arrest without legal process. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007). Such a cause of action cannot be pursued, however, when a person has been arrested based on a facially valid warrant. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Wells, 548 F.Supp.2d 234, 237 (W.D. Va. 2008); Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (); see also Dorn v. Town of Prosperity, 375 F. App'x 284, 286 (4th Cir. 2010) (...
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