Porterfield v. Lott
| Decision Date | 22 September 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-2254,97-2254 |
| Citation | 156 F.3d 563 |
| Parties | Sherman O. PORTERFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Leon LOTT; Faye Anthony; Berry Brown, Defendants-Appellants, and Richland County, a political subdivision; Richland County Sheriff's Department; John Doe; Richard Roe; State of South Carolina, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
ARGUED: Andrew Frederick Lindemann, Ellis, Lawhorne, Davidson & Sims, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants. Thomas Keith Fowler, Jr., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: William H. Davidson, II, James M. Davis, Jr., Ellis, Lawhorne, Davidson & Sims, P.A., Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellants.
Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge MURNAGHAN and Judge DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ joined.
After money laundering and drug trafficking charges were unsuccessfully prosecuted by Richland County, South Carolina officials against Sherman Porterfield, Porterfield sued three sheriff's deputies under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for arresting him and pressing the charges against him without probable cause. The district court denied the deputies' claims of qualified immunity, giving no reasons for its ruling. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
In 1990, the Internal Revenue Service became concerned that drug dealers in Richland County, South Carolina, were buying automobiles with drugs and cash, thereby laundering drug money and avoiding federal income reporting requirements. In a joint investigation with the Richland County Sheriff's Department, the officials began investigating automobile dealerships through the use of informants known to the Sheriff's Department. A number of tips indicated that drug dealers were buying automobiles from a dealership known as "Wright's on Main," which was owned by Larry Wright and was located at 2521 Main Street in Columbia, South Carolina.
Shane Thompson, an informant used previously by the Sheriff's Department, was arrested in early 1991 for unrelated cocaine trafficking and, after his arrest, informed a Richland County deputy sheriff that he had negotiated the purchase of an automobile at Wright's on Main for cash and drugs. He indicated that he had agreed with Sherman Porterfield, a salesman at the dealership, to purchase a 1986 Mercedes Benz 190E automobile in exchange for $10,000 in cash and four ounces of powder cocaine which had a value of approximately $4,000--$5,600. At the Sheriff's Department's request, Thompson agreed to pursue the transaction while being "wired."
The Mercedes Benz under negotiation had been consigned to Wright's on Main under an agreement by which the dealership promised to pay the consignor $12,300 if the car was sold. And if the dealership was unable to sell the car, the consignor would pay the dealership $300 for its "marketing services." The dealership listed the car at retail for $16,995.
To consummate the purchase of the Mercedes Benz, Thompson called Porterfield at Wright's on Main on February 14, 1991, recording the conversation. During this conversation, Thompson told Porterfield that he had been "paid by the insurance company," which was apparently code for his possession of drug money, and that he wanted to consummate the deal the following day. The following exchange about the cocaine, referred to as "blow," then took place:
On the next day, February 15, Thompson and an undercover narcotics agent went to the dealership to consummate the transaction with Porterfield. They drove one of the dealership's rental cars that Porterfield had arranged for Thompson to drive. Thompson was again "wired" with a recording device and carried $10,000 in cash. The four ounces of powder cocaine were placed in the trunk of the car. During his meeting with Porterfield, Thompson told Porterfield he wanted to have the title to the car put in a family member's name so that it would not be subject to criminal forfeiture, as had happened to another drug dealer known as "JuJu." As Thompson explained to Porterfield, Porterfield agreed, "I can do it like that." Porterfield then had Thompson count the cash in front of him, and after Thompson counted out $10,000, Porterfield stated, "You and I right." Thompson confirmed, "You're on," and Porterfield added, "This is business." Before proceeding further with the transaction, however, Porterfield instructed Thompson to remove his jacket to "let me see if you are straight." Porterfield explained, When Thompson removed his jacket, Porterfield noticed the recording device which was taped to Thompson's shoulder and angrily terminated the meeting, telling Thompson to leave. Although Thompson later attempted to rehabilitate the transaction, Porterfield refused to deal with him any further.
The sheriff's deputies, including the three defendants, held a meeting and concluded that even though the transaction had not been consummated, they had probable cause to arrest Porterfield for money laundering and cocaine trafficking. Nevertheless, they elected to present their information to a magistrate who issued a warrant for Porterfield's arrest. Porterfield was arrested at the dealership on February 22, 1991, and released on bond.
Several months later, a grand jury indicted Porterfield on one count of drug trafficking and two counts of money laundering. Following a trial, a state jury convicted Porterfield of one count of money laundering in connection with the $10,000 transaction for the Mercedes Benz and acquitted him on the other two counts. The trial judge sentenced Porterfield to 20 years imprisonment, suspended to 5 years service with 5 years probation. Porterfield appealed his conviction, and, in a case of first impression, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding that the state money laundering statute required the transaction to include the actual proceeds of illegal drugs. Since the $10,000 in this case came from the Sheriff's Department's bank account, the statute had not been satisfied. See State v. Porterfield, 317 S.C. 360, 454 S.E.2d 351, 352-53 (App.1995).
Thereafter, Porterfield filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 contending that he was arrested and imprisoned without probable cause. He asserted claims for (1) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (4) infringement of his right of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (5) conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (6) several pendent state law claims. Pursuant to a consent order and a motion for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all of Porterfield's claims except three claims asserted against the three Richland County sheriff's deputies in their individual capacities for false arrest, malicious prosecution, and illegal search. The court also rejected the defendants' claims for qualified immunity.
The sheriff's deputies noticed this interlocutory appeal from the district court's order denying them qualified immunity. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).
To avoid "excessive disruption of government," a qualified immunity is recognized to protect government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits "insofar as [the officials'] conduct does not violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Officials lose the protection of the immunity if they violate a constitutional or statutory right of the plaintiff and the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the defendants' position would have known of it. See id. We summarized these requirements in Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 312 (4th Cir.1992):
Ruling on a defense of qualified immunity therefore requires (1) identification of the specific right allegedly violated; (2) determining whether at the time of the alleged violation the right was clearly established; and (3) if so, then determining whether a reasonable person in the officer's position would have known that doing what he did would violate the right.
It is thus clear that the degree of knowledge of the law imputed to government officials is that imputable generally to a reasonable official. Accordingly, "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law" are protected. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct....
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