Davis v. Clinton Water-Works Co.

• Decision Date: 15 June 1880
• Citation: Davis v. Clinton Water-Works Co., 54 Iowa 59, 6 N.W. 126 (Iowa 1880)
• Parties: DAVIS v. THE CLINTON WATER-WORKS COMPANY.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

54 Iowa 59

6 N.W. 126

DAVIS

v.THE CLINTON WATER-WORKS COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed June 15, 1880.

Appeal from Clinton circuit court.

Action at law to recover the value of certain buildings destroyed by fire, upon the ground that defendant was bound by contract with the city of Clinton to supply water to be used in extinguishing fires, and failed to perform its obligation in this respect, which resulted in the destruction of plaintiff's property. A demurrer to the petition was overruled, and defendant appeals from the decision upon the demurrer.E. S. Bailey and Wright, Gatch & Wright, for appellant.

J. S. Darling and A. R. Cotton, for appellee.

BECK, J.

1. The petition alleges that the defendant entered into a contract with the city of Clinton to supply water to be used by the city for the purpose of extinguishing fires. The contract is embodied in an ordinance passed by the city authorizing defendant to establish its works for supplying water to the city, and providing for compensation to be paid defendant by the city for water furnished for public purposes, including the extinguishing of fires. The terms and conditions of this contract need not be recited. It is sufficient to state that the parties thereto were the city and the defendant, and the plaintiff in this case in no sense was a party to the contract. The power of the city to pass the ordinance and enter into the contract is not questioned. The petition alleges that a fire occurred in certain store-rooms owned by plaintiff in the city, and they were entirely consumed, for the reason that the necessary supply of water was not furnished by defendant, and a sufficient pressure of water was not found at the hydrants contiguous to the buildings, which was caused by defective machinery and the negligence of defendant's servants, all of which was in violation of defendant's contract under said ordinance of the city. A demurrer to the petition was overruled.

2. The only question presented in the case is this one: Is the defendant liable to plaintiff upon the contract embodied in the ordinance? The petition does not allege or show any privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant. The plaintiff is a stranger, and the mere fact that she may find benefits therefrom, by the protection of her property, in common with all other persons whose property is similarly situated, does not make her a party to the contract, or create a privity between her and defendant. It is a rule of law, familiar to the profession, that a privity of contract must exist between the parties to an action upon a contract. One whom the law regards as a stranger to the contract cannot maintain an action thereon. The rule is founded upon the plainest reasons. The contracting parties control all interests, and are entitled to all rights secured by the contract. If mere strangers may enforce the contract by actions, on the ground of benefits flowing therefrom to them, there would be no certain limit to the number and character of actions which would be brought thereon. Exceptions to this rule exist, which must not be regarded as abrogating the rule itself. Thus, if one, under a contract, received goods or property to which another, not a party to the contract, is entitled, he may maintain an...