Davis v. Davis

• Decision Date: 17 May 1926
• Docket Number: 373
• Parties: DAVIS v. DAVIS
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

283 S.W. 360

171 Ark. 168

DAVIS v. DAVIS

No. 373

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 17, 1926

Appeal from White Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

John E Miller and Culbert L. Pearce, for appellant.

Brundidge & Neelly, for appellee.

OPINION

SMITH, J.

L. D Davis died October 19, 1924, leaving two sons and a daughter the appellant and appellees, and four grandchildren, who are the children of J. M. Davis, a deceased son.

On February 6, 1922, L. D. Davis executed a will, devising to Ada C. Langford, a daughter, and A. S. and H. G. Davis, his sons, all of his personal property and real estate after the payment of his debts. The effect of the will was to exclude the heirs of the deceased son, J. M. Davis, it being recited in the will that the testator had given this son a deed to sixty acres of land and had substantially aided him in purchasing another one hundred and twenty-acre tract, thereby relieving the testator of further duty to the heirs of this son.

On September 5, 1922, the testator added a codicil to the will, by which he bequeathed to his daughter Mrs. Langford the northwest quarter section 19; to his son H. G. Davis the west half southwest quarter section 17 and the west half northwest quarter section 20; and to his son A. S. Davis a part of the northeast quarter section 19, containing fifteen acres, all the land being in township 6 north, range 9 west.

After the death of L. D. Davis there was some negotiation between the daughter and the two sons in an effort to divide their father's land contrary to the will. There was some threat of a contest of the will, on the ground that the testator was lacking in testamentary capacity. Certain neighbors participated in the discussion, and offered suggestions. Finally the parties entered into the following agreement: "We hereby agree satisfactory between ourselves and is satisfactorily between all parties concerned, H. G. Davis is to get the home place, 80 acres. A. S. Davis is to get lower bottom, 80 acres. Ada Langford is to get upper bottom, 40 acres, and 15 acres known as the Mart Emmons place."

Later H. G. Davis, after considering the matter further, declined to perform the agreement by making the necessary exchange of deeds, and his brother and sister brought suit against him to compel the specific performance of the contract of settlement, and tendered into court deeds conveying to H. G. Davis the land which it was agreed he should have in the settlement contract.

The court found the fact to be that the parties had entered into the written contract to divide their father's land, and decreed a specific performance of the agreement.

For the reversal of this decree it is insisted that the agreement was not sufficiently definite and certain to be the subject of a suit for specific performance, and further, that the contract did not express the entire agreement of the parties.

We have had before us a number of cases wherein it was sought to specifically enforce contracts for the conveyance of land, wherein it was alleged, in opposition to granting that relief, that the written instrument evidencing the agreement to convey was not sufficiently definite to warrant a decree granting the relief prayed. Two of the latest of these cases are reported in 168 Ark., one being the case of Harper v. Thurlow, 168 Ark. 491, the second that of Richardson v. Stuberfield, 168 Ark. 713. In the last-mentioned case it was said: "It is well settled by these and other decisions of this court that every contract for the purchase of land must define its identity and fix its locality, or there must be such a description as, by the aid of parol evidence, will readily point to its locality and boundaries. An agreement for the sale of land which is required to be in writing by the Statute of Frauds must be certain in itself, or capable of being made certain by reference to something else."

The still later case of Moore v Exelby, 170 Ark. 908, 281 S.W. 671, reviews the earlier cases on the subject, and it would serve no useful purpose to again review them. The contract involved in that case was made and evidenced by...