Davis v. Dawson

• Decision Date: 10 May 2022
• Docket Number: 21-2419
• Citation: 33 F.4th 993
• Parties: Crysteal DAVIS; Damon Davis; Iisha Hillmon, Plaintiffs - Appellees v. Jeffrey DAWSON; Brad Youngblut; Josh Rhamy, Defendants Trevor Spear; Ryan Neumann; Lucas Kramer, Defendants - Appellants Ross Klein; Patrick Hickey, Defendants Robert Clock, Defendant - Appellant Dana Wingert ; City of Des Moines, Iowa; Steven McCarville, Defendants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

33 F.4th 993

Crysteal DAVIS; Damon Davis; Iisha Hillmon, Plaintiffs - Appellees

v. Jeffrey DAWSON; Brad Youngblut; Josh Rhamy, DefendantsTrevor Spear; Ryan Neumann; Lucas Kramer, Defendants - AppellantsRoss Klein; Patrick Hickey, DefendantsRobert Clock, Defendant - AppellantDana Wingert ; City of Des Moines, Iowa; Steven McCarville, Defendants

No. 21-2419

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: January 13, 2022

Filed: May 10, 2022

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellant was John O. Haraldson, of Des Moines, IA.

Counsel who presented argument on behalf of the appellee was Gina Messamer, of Des Moines, IA.

Before BENTON, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Des Moines Police officers, lacking probable cause, took relatives of a stabbing victim to the station, holding them for over three hours despite their repeated requests to leave. Meanwhile, the victim died. The family sued. The district court¹ denied qualified immunity, ruling for the family on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest. The officers appeal. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

On August 5, 2017, Shawn E. Davis stabbed Preston Davis outside a gathering at his home. Several people—including Crysteal Davis (the victim's wife), Damon Davis (his brother), and Iisha Hillmon (his cousin)—witnessed the stabbing. Police secured the scene, taking Shawn into custody. Paramedics took the victim to the hospital.

Des Moines Police Department officers Trevor Spear, Ryan Neumann, and Lucas Kramer responded to the scene. Captain Robert Clock was the Watch Commander in charge of the officers. All the witnesses, including the family, told the officers that Shawn stabbed the victim, and they wanted to go to the hospital.

Crysteal and Damon tried to leave in their cars but the officers stopped them. At least three officers told the family they would take them to the hospital. They got in two patrol cars. Instead, the officers took them to the police station, where they waited more than three hours to be interviewed. Throughout the car ride and during their wait at the station, the family members demanded to go to the hospital.

In the patrol car, after being told they were going to the station to be interviewed instead of to the hospital, Crysteal repeatedly insisted that they needed to go to the hospital: "We have to go to the hospital, first .... If we're not going to the hospital right now, I'm having my dad call a lawyer, because my husband is in critical condition. We can do that at the hospital .... I would have never gotten in this car had I known they were taking me for questioning."

At the station Crysteal asked: "Are we like literally for real held captive? If we tried to walk out, would we be arrested?" An officer responded: "You guys are not free to leave. The detectives want to talk to you." Damon repeatedly asked if Crysteal could go see her husband. But the family members were detained for over three hours while Preston died.

Crysteal Davis, Damon Davis, and Iisha Hillmon sued Officers Trevor Spear, Ryan Neumann, Lucas Kramer, and Captain Robert Clock (and others not party to this appeal) for unreasonable seizure in violation of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the related state constitutional claim under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution, and common law false arrest.

The district court denied summary judgment based on qualified immunity.² The district court also entered judgment for the family members on their claims of illegal seizure and false arrest by Spear, Neumann, and Kramer.

This court has interlocutory jurisdiction over the denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). This court reviews de novo the denial of qualified immunity. Gladden v. Richbourg , 759 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 2014).

II.

Officers are "entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs], establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the violation, such that a reasonable official would have known that his actions were unlawful." Blazek v. City of Iowa City , 761 F.3d 920, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2014), citing Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). A clearly established right is one that is "sufficiently clear ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’ " Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) (cleaned up), quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). For a right to be clearly established, "existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate." al-Kidd , 563 U.S. at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074.

First, this court considers whether the officers violated the family members’ constitutional rights. To establish a violation of the Fourth Amendment, "the claimant must demonstrate a seizure occurred and the seizure was unreasonable." Quraishi v. St. Charles County , 986 F.3d 831, 839 (8th Cir. 2021).

"[A] person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). Officer Kramer told Crysteal and Damon they were going to the station, not the hospital, after they were in the "cage" in the back of the moving patrol car. Crysteal and Damon immediately and repeatedly objected to the changed plans. They asked to be taken to the hospital. As Officer Neumann escorted Iisha to the patrol car, he stated: "alright, we're going to the hospital, is that correct?" Once she and the other passengers were seated in the car, he announced the change of plans: "I'm telling you where we're going, we're going to the station." "I know you don't wanna ... that's where we're going." When Crysteal asked at the station if they were being "held captive," the officer responded: "you guys are not free to leave." The family members could reasonably assume they were not free to leave.

Unlike the witness in Lincoln , cited by the officers, the witnesses here clearly did not consent to being taken to the police station for questioning. See Lincoln v. Scott , 887 F.3d 190, 198 n.5 (5th Cir. 2018) (affirming the grant of qualified immunity on second appeal because officers reasonably believed witness had consented to being detained and interviewed). Here, the family members repeatedly asked to be taken to the hospital. They expressly told Spear they could be interviewed at the hospital or at a later time. They provided contact information to the officers at the scene so they could be reached for an interview later. Crysteal informed the officers unambiguously: "I would have never gotten in this car had I known they were taking me for questioning." The officers seized the family members without consent.

The question is then whether the seizure was reasonable. The Supreme Court in Dunaway v. New York said that with a few narrow exceptions "centuries of precedent" support "the principle that seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if supported by probable cause." Dunaway v. New York , 442 U.S. 200, 214, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979).

The officers argue that their seizure of the family should be examined as a Terry stop. See Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Terry provides one narrow exception to the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment. See Dunaway , 442 U.S. at 208-14, 99 S.Ct. 2248. But "[a]n action tantamount to arrest has taken place if the officers’ conduct is more intrusive than necessary for an investigative stop." United States v. Rose , 731 F.2d 1337, 1342 (8th Cir. 1984), citing Florida v. Royer , 460 U.S. 491, 504-05, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983). The Supreme Court has not extended Terry to custodial interrogations: "The officer may question the driver and passengers about their citizenship and immigration status, and he may ask them to explain suspicious circumstances, but any further detention or search must be based on consent or probable cause." United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , 422 U.S. 873, 881-82, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).

Analyzing a seizure, this court "must undertake a qualified immunity analysis not just with respect to the fact of detention, but with respect to its quality and duration as well." Seymour v. City of Des Moines , 519 F.3d 790, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2008). In Seymour , Des Moines police detained a father, preventing him from going to the hospital for about 45 minutes after his unresponsive child was hospitalized. Id. at 795. This court determined the detention violated the father's constitutional right to be free from unreasonable seizures, because there was not reasonable suspicion he had committed a crime (but granted the officers qualified immunity on mistake-of-law grounds). Id. at 798. Here, all witnesses told the officers that Shawn Davis was the perpetrator; they had him in custody. Indeed, the officers admit there was no probable cause to believe the witnesses had committed a crime (acknowledging that "Appellees were being interviewed as solely witnesses to a homicide" and "never suspects.").

Here, there was no minimally-intrusive Terry stop. Both the duration and the nature of this seizure exceed the bounds of the Constitution. Cf. Illinois v. Lidster , 540 U.S. 419, 427, 124 S.Ct. 885, 157 L.Ed.2d 843 (2004) (finding constitutional a traffic checkpoint seeking information about a week-old, hit-and-run accident because motorists had to wait "a very few minutes at most" and "[c]ontact with the police lasted only a few seconds"). As this court determined...