Davis v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 23 March 2017
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 15–1194 (JEB)
• Citation: 244 F.Supp.3d 27
• Parties: Louise DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

244 F.Supp.3d 27

Louise DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 15–1194 (JEB)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed March 23, 2017

Robert Wilson Jones, James E. Brown & Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Veronica A. Porter, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES E. BOASBERG, United States District Judge

Almost every American child goes through the ordeal of starting at a new school at least once in her lifetime. Yet the fact that the experience is common does not make it less nerve-racking or daunting—for parent and student alike. In this case, Plaintiff Louise Davis sent her daughter N.D., a student who had since preschool benefited from special-education interventions, to a public charter school located here in Washington at the beginning of the fourth grade. After a few months, that new school reduced N.D.'s services. By the end of the academic year, it found that she was no longer disabled. And following that decision, the school refused to test her for additional categories of disabilities. Having lost her administrative challenge to those determinations, Davis has now, pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, brought this action against Defendant District of Columbia.

As is customary in IDEA cases, the Court reviews the administrative ruling following summary-judgment cross-motions. Because that decision was fatally imprecise as to whether N.D. had a particular disability and erred in concluding that she did not require additional assessments, the Court will grant a segment of Plaintiff's Motion. In doing so, it remands to the hearing officer on that disability issue and orders that Defendant provide further testing.

I. Background

This case concerns the education of N.D., a child born in 2004, and her transition to KIPP DC: WILL Academy Public Charter School during the 2013–2014 academic year. Before the Court delves any farther into the administrative record (for short, A.R.), see ECF Nos. 9–10, it assembles the statutory armature on which this narrative rests.

A. IDEA Statutory Framework

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act has, since 1975, been a pillar of the special-education landscape. The Act attempts "to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education" and "that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected." 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1).

To advance these goals, IDEA requires state and local educational agencies that seek federal funding to first adopt procedures for securing appropriate services for students with disabilities. Id. §§ 1412, 1413. Here, the school district—D.C. Public Schools—is the District's sole local educational agency, though DCPS and KIPP have collaborated on various special-education choices. See 5–E D.C. Mun. Regs. §§ 923.3(a), 924.3 ; B.R. ex rel. Rempson v. District of Columbia , 802 F.Supp.2d 153, 160–61 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing how public charter schools may elect to be D.C. public schools for IDEA purposes).

The Act's process begins with identifying a child who may have a disability and then evaluating that impairment. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A) (defining "child with a disability"); id. § 1414 (outlining procedures for evaluations and eligibility determinations); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.301 – .311 (similar). If she indeed exhibits a disability in need of remediation, then she is eligible for special-education services. As not all disabilities are permanent or even manifest, the school district generally must reevaluate a child's status at least once every three years and at most annually. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2)(B).

Once found eligible, children with disabilities are entitled to an individualized educational program. The IEP—a document that teachers reference in classroom instruction—"sets out the child's present educational performance, establishes annual and short-term objectives for improvements in that performance, and describes the specially designed instruction and services that will enable the child to meet those objectives." Honig v. Doe , 484 U.S. 305, 311, 108 S.Ct. 592, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) ; see 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). To draft it, the school district convenes a group—typically prior to the academic year—consisting of the parents, a special-education teacher, a school-district representative, and possibly other specialists. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B). Although the district may subsequently modify that IEP at any time if it notifies the parents and explains the changes in writing, id. § 1415(b)(3), (c)(1), it must revise the Program at least yearly in light of academic progress, changes in needs, and other recent educational or medical information. Id. § 1414(d)(4)(A).

Aside from its process-based guarantees, IDEA sets a "basic floor of opportunity" for what substantively counts as an appropriate education. Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 200, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). To pass muster, the school district must, at a minimum, "provid[e] personalized instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction." Id. at 203, 102 S.Ct. 3034 ; accord Reid ex rel. Reid v. District of Columbia , 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Parents who object to the district's "identification, evaluation or educational placement" of their child or to its "provision of a free appropriate public education" may request a due-process hearing. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6). At that hearing, headed by an impartial hearing officer, the parties may present evidence and elicit expert testimony about the child's educational needs. Id. § 1415(f), (h). A party aggrieved by the hearing officer's decision (HOD) may then sue in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2). In reviewing the HOD, a court has broad remedial authority to grant "such relief as the court determines is appropriate." Id. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) ; see Florence Cty. Sch. Dist. Four v. Carter ex rel. Carter , 510 U.S. 7, 16, 114 S.Ct. 361, 126 L.Ed.2d 284 (1993).

Having set out the statutory framework, the Court next details the expansive factual background of this case and concludes with the procedural path of Plaintiff's challenge.

B. N.D.'s Educational History

The present season of N.D.'s education involves, in one way or another, each step of this process. The Court recaps her early academic history and then describes her experience transitioning to KIPP in the fourth grade—that is, her 2013 IEP, Revised 2013 IEP, and subsequent removal from special education altogether, and the events that followed.

1. Early Education

N.D. has been raised by her mother in Southeast Washington since her birth in 2004. See A.R. (December 2010 Psychiatric Report) at 30, 34. In far from a normal delivery, Davis gave birth to N.D. two months early after falling down a set of stairs. Id. at 32. In addition to several medical issues that ensued, the child missed developmental milestones, only beginning to walk at around the age of two and talk at three or four. Id.

N.D. attended Eagle Academy Public Charter School from prekindergarten (at three years old) until the third grade. See A.R. (May 2014 Psychological Report) at 158. There, her school implemented IEPs and special-education services to compensate for her diagnosed learning difficulties, developmental delays, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

. See 2010 Psych. Report at 34. In her early years at Eagle Academy, specialists would pull N.D. out of the general-education classroom setting for 10 hours per week of specialized instruction and for other therapy. See 2014 Psych. Report at 158. Even with these interventions, she was held back and repeated the first grade. See A.R. (May 2011 Educational Report) at 47.

In December 2010, during her second stint in first grade, the school referred her for psychiatric testing. Following clinical interviews, she was again diagnosed with ADHD, as well as with acute Post–Traumatic Stress Disorder

and an unspecified anxiety disorder arising out of a public-bus accident after which she and other passengers were hospitalized. See 2010 Psych. Report at 30–31, 36. Her psychiatrist also expressed concern over developmental delays and advised Eagle Academy to investigate whether N.D. "does in fact have a Learning Disability" so that Davis could "ensur[e] that the current level of services she receives via her IEP is adequate and appropriate" and "advocat[e] for more intensive services" if needed. Id. at 37.

Later testing confirmed these suspicions. At the end of first grade, in May 2011, school assessments verified that N.D. displayed serious academic deficits—e.g. , "significant weakness in broad written language" and "vocabulary and language deficits"—that required "special education remediation ... as a learning disabled student" and "speech and language services." 2011 Educ. Report at 49; A.R. (May 2011 Speech–Language–Impairment Report) at 56–57. The record does not reflect whether N.D.'s subsequent second-grade 2011 IEP formally identified her as learning disabled. A later IEP indicates that it likely did, however, as throughout the second grade she received an increased 15 hours per week of specialized instruction outside the general-education classroom. See A.R. (2012 IEP) at 59, 70.

As to N.D.'s third-grade history, the 2012 IEP lists her primary disability as a "Specific Learning Disability." Id. at 59. IDEA defines that impairment as follows:

The term "specific learning disability" means a disorder in 1 or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations.

20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(A). Federal rules...