Davis v. Gaschler, C011785
Decision Date | 23 December 1992 |
Docket Number | No. C011785,C011785 |
Citation | 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 679,11 Cal.App.4th 1392 |
Parties | Judith C. DAVIS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Randy GASCHLER et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Greve, Clifford, Diepenbrock & Paras, Gary S. Decker and William L. Baker, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.
In this action for damages arising from a dog bite, plaintiff Judith C. Davis appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of the dog's owners, defendants Randy Gaschler and Linda Gaschler, on the ground that plaintiff's reasonable implied assumption of the risk provided a complete defense. We will conclude recent California Supreme Court authority on the subject compels reversal of the judgment.
The following facts are taken from the trial court's ruling:
Plaintiff's first cause of action was labeled "Strict Liability" but alleged both strict liability under the "dog bite statute" (CIV.CODE § 3342 )2 and negligence in allowing the dog to roam loose.
Defendants moved for summary judgment on alternative grounds that (1) Civil Code section 3342 did not apply to the facts of this case; (2) plaintiff's assumption of the risk provided a complete defense to both strict liability and negligence; and (3) there was no proximate causation.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that plaintiff's reasonable implied assumption of the risk barred recovery. Plaintiff appeals.
In order to warrant summary judgment, a defendant must establish as a matter of law that none of the plaintiff's asserted causes of action can prevail. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c; Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1107, 252 Cal.Rptr. 122, 762 P.2d 46.) Our review is de novo. (Saldana v. Globe-Weis Systems Co. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1505, 1511-1513, 285 Cal.Rptr. 385.)
The California Supreme Court has recently filed two opinions discussing the question whether the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of the risk survives comparative negligence principles announced in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226. The new cases are Knight v. Jewett (1992) 3 Cal.4th 296, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2 834 P.2d 696, and Ford v. Gouin (1992) 3 Cal.4th 339, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 834 P.2d 724. 3
In Ford, Justice Arabian authored a lead opinion in which no other justice joined. In Knight, Justice George penned the lead opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justice Arabian concurred. Justice Mosk provided a majority vote with a concurring opinion that agreed for the most part with the lead opinion. (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296 at p. 321, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696, (conc. & dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Because Knight commands a strong plurality, and because it speaks generally to the doctrine of implied assumption of the risk, we will follow Knight here.
According to Knight, scenarios involving assumption of the risk can be grouped in two categories: (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 308, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696.)
Knight continued: (Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 309, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696, original emphasis.)
The Knight plurality summarized its conclusions: '(Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 314-315, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696.)
Applying Knight to this case, we conclude the judgment must be reversed. Defendants, as the parties moving for summary judgment, had the burden to establish the absence of any basis for recovery under plaintiff's causes of action for negligence and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Under Knight, this means they had the burden to show that this is a case of primary assumption of risk--where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relationship to the activity, the defendants owe no legal duty to plaintiff. Otherwise, the case is subject to comparative fault principles and is thus inappropriate for summary judgment.
Here, defendants have not shown the absence of a legal duty to plaintiff.
We first note that traditionally the affirmative defense of assumption of risk has presupposed the existence of a duty. Under Knight, however, assumption of risk is now recast as an absence of duty. (See Ford v. Gouin, supra, 3 Cal.4th 339 at p. 352, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 30, 834 P.2d 724 (conc. opn. of Kennard, J.).) We therefore look to the complaint, which delimits the scope of the issues on summary judgment and measures the materiality of the facts tendered in the defendant's challenge. (FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 381, 282 Cal.Rptr. 508.)
The complaint here alleges facts sufficient to impose a duty on the part of defendants, based on allegations that they owned and negligently controlled the dog that bit plaintiff.
Here, a duty is found in Civil Code section 3342, subdivision (a) (fn. 2, ante ), which imposes on a dog owner liability for damages suffered by a person bitten by the dog while in a public place. 4
We note it has been authoritatively held that "[i]n adopting section 3342 of the Civil Code, the Legislature did not intend to render inapplicable such defenses as assumption of risk or wilfully invited injury." (Gomes v. Byrne (1959) 51 Cal.2d 418, 420, 333 P.2d 754.) Adopting this holding to the...
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