Davis v. General Finance & Thrift Corp., 32749

• Decision Date: 06 January 1950
• Docket Number: No. 32749,No. 1,32749,1
• Citation: 57 S.E.2d 225,80 Ga.App. 708
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Parties: DAVIS v. GENERAL FINANCE & THRIFT CORPORATION

Page 225

57 S.E.2d 225

80 Ga.App. 708

DAVIS v. GENERAL FINANCE & THRIFT CORPORATION.

No. 32749.

Court of Appeals of Georgia, Division No. 1.

Jan. 6, 1950.

Syllabus by the Court

1, 2, 3. Neither the first nor second count sets forth a cause of action for libel.

4. The third count does not set forth a cause of action for a violation of the right of privacy.

H. J. Davis sued General Finance & Thrift Corporation for damages allegedly sustained by him by reason of alleged acts of libel and invasion of privacy by the defendant. The petition as amended was in three counts, Counts One and Two being on the theory of libel and Count Three being on the theory of invasion of privacy. Count One of the amended petition alleged substantially: that on April 18, 1949, defendant published a libel concerning the plaintiff which was false and which subjected plaintiff to public hatred, contempt and scorn; that the libel consisted in publishing to the Western Union Telegraph Company a telegram addressed to plaintiff in the name of the defendant which was as follows: 'Must have March payment immediately or legal action'; that said publication was published by delivery of the printed message or telegram to the various employees of the Western Union Telegraph Company who handled such message in its course of transmittal whose names were unknown to plaintiff; that the matter conveyed to such persons the fact that plaintiff did not pay his just debts and that he was a 'dead beat'; that the message held plaintiff up to public ridicule; that the publication of such matter was damaging to plaintiff in his trade and profession; that petitioner was a pipe cutter and followed the construction work, and that in order to obtain employment plaintiff must pay his debts and have a good credit standing; that the telegram was sent collect and plaintiff had to pay something over a dollar for such telegram; that the telegram was delivered to plaintiff's wife; that plaintiff was humiliated and embarrassed about the libel; that plaintiff was not indebted to defendant at that time; that plaintiff went to 'some expense' to assure his wife that he did not owe defendant company any payment as indicated in the telegram; that plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $10,000. Count Two alleged substantially the same facts as Count One except it concerned a telegram sent to plaintiff by defendant on April 22, 1949 which read: 'Payments must be received by Monday or legal action'. Count Three was substantially the same as Counts One and Two combined except it was based on the theory of invasion of privacy. The defendant filed its special and general demurrers to the petition. The trial court sustained the demurrers and the plaintiff excepts.

Nathan Jolles, Augusta, for plaintiff in error.

W. D. Lanier, Augusta, for defendant in error.

FELTON, Judge.

1. It was not alleged in counts one or two that the words used were in reference to plaintiff's trade, profession or business. It follows that no cause of action was alleged in either of these counts on the theory of a libel per se, as tending to injure plaintiff in his trade, profession or business. Witham v. Atlanta Journal, 124 Ga. 688, 53 S.E. 105, 4 L.R.A.,N.S., 977; Van Epps v. Jones, 50 Ga. 238; Aiken v. Constitution Pub. Co., 72 Ga.App. 250, 33 S.E.2d 555; Mell v. Edge, 68 Ga.App. 314, 22 S.E.2d 738.

2. It was not alleged that the plaintiff was engaged in a vocation which requires credit and the words charging plaintiff with refusal to pay a debt were not libelous per se, there being no imputation of insolvency. Mell v. Edge, supra; Estes v. Sterchi Bros. Stores, Inc., 50 Ga.App. 619, 179 S.E. 222. The allegation that the plaintiff was a pipe cutter and followed construction work and in order to obtain employment he must pay his debts and have a good credit standing is not an allegation that plaintiff required credit in his pipe cutting and construction business in order to carry them on.

3. The words alleged to have been used are plain and unambiguous, no proper item of special damage is alleged, and there is no allegation that the words conveyed a covert meaning different from the ordinary and natural interpretation usually put upon them and that they were so understood, and for these reasons the first two counts must fall. Mell v. Edge, supra. The ordinary and natural meaning of the words does not authorize the statement that they charged the plaintiff with being a 'dead beat'. The price paid for the collect telegram was not a damage resulting from the alleged libel. Furthermore, the plaintiff was not required to pay the charges. There is...