Davis v. Gibbs, 31819

Decision Date18 October 1951
Docket NumberNo. 31819,31819
Citation39 Wn.2d 481,236 P.2d 545
PartiesDAVIS, v. GIBBS et al.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

J. Edmund Quigley, Hile, Hoof & Shucklin, Seattle, for appellant.

Charles O. Carroll, K. G. Smiles, Seattle, for respondents.

Harroun & Shidler and Robert W. Moody, Seattle, for Ervin E. Oades.

WEAVER, Justice.

This is an action to restrain the proper officials from canvassing the vote of a special election held to determine whether a certain territory should be annexed to the city of Seattle. The trial court denied the injunction.

Two questions are presented: (1) Did the petition for annexation have sufficient signers? and, (2) Was adequate statutory notice published of the special election?

The assignments of error are all directed to the question of whether the findings of the trial court support the judgment. We, therefore, accept the findings as verities. LaLone v. Smith, Wash., 234 P.2d 893.

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 8897, so far as here material, reads, prior to amendment, Laws of 1951, chapter 248, as follows: 'A petition shall be presented to the board of county commissioners of such county, signed by at least twenty per centum of the qualified electors of such county, residents within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed to such city, who voted at the last previous election as shown by the official poll-books, * * *.'

The trial court found as a fact that: '* * * it was stipulated * * * that in the event Rem.Rev.Stat. 8897 requires that in addition to being qualified electors within the 'Annexation Area,' and resident therein persons entitled to sign the said petition for annexation must in addition thereto have themselves voted at the immediately preceding general election held in November, 1948, the valid signatures on said petition for annexation constituted less than the statutory requirement of 20%.'

All parties agree that a petition signer must at least be (1) a qualified elector of the county, and (2) a resident within the territory to be annexed. Respondents contend that the clause 'who voted at the last previous election' relates back to 'twenty per centum of the qualified electors', and thus, that it is inserted in the statute for the sole purpose of requiring that a number equal to twenty per centum of the qualified electors (predicated upon residents of the area who voted in the last election) be signers of the petition. Appellants, on the other hand, contend that the clause 'who voted at the last previous election' relates back to its immediate antecedent, 'residents within the limits of the territory', and thus requires, in addition to the foregoing, that a petition signer, to be qualified as such, must have voted in the 'last previous election'.

Where no contrary intention appears in a statute, relative and qualifying words and phrases, both grammatically and legally, refer to the last antecedent. State v. Bailey, 67 Wash. 336, 121 P. 821; State ex rel. Blakeslee v. Clausen, 85 Wash. 260, 148 P. 28; Tabb v. Funk, 170 Wash. 545, 17 P.2d 18; Smith v. Dept. of Labor and Industries, 8 Wash.2d 587, 113 P.2d 57; Crawford, Statutory Construction, 331; 2 Horack's Sutherland Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., 448. See, also, State v. Hemrich, 93 Wash. 439, 161 P. 79, L.R.A.1917B, 962.

The last antecedent is the last word which can be made an antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence. Traverse City v. Township of Blair, 190 Mich. 313, 157 N.W. 81.

Obviously, the adjective clause 'who voted at the last previous election' cannot refer to 'limits,' 'territory,' or 'city.' It refers to, and modifies, 'residents,' which is the last antecedent that can be used without impairing the meaning of the sentence. Where one goes, the other must follow. Therefore, since a petition signer must be (1) a qualified elector (2) who is a resident within the limits of the territory proposed to be annexed, it follows that such resident must (3) have voted in the last previous election. In view of the stipulation, the petition was deficient.

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 8898, so far as here material to the second question raised, reads as follows: 'Upon the granting of said petition said board [of county commissioners] shall thereupon give notice of an election to be held in such proposed territory to be annexed, not less than thirty nor more than sixty days thereafter, for the purpose of determining whether the qualified electors thereof desire the annexation of the same to such city. Such notice shall particularly describe the boundaries of said territory and shall state the objects thereof as prayed in said petition, and shall be published for at least two weeks prior to the date of such election in a newspaper printed and published within the limits of the said territory to be annexed, or, if there be no such newspaper, then in a newspaper printed and published in the city to which said territory is proposed to be annexed * * *.' (Italics ours.)

The trial court found as a fact:

'* * * That notice of said election was published * * * in the Ballard News, a weekly community newspaper printed and published in the City of Seattle, King County, Washington, but not printed or published or distributed in the 'Annexation Area.' * * * That at all times material to this action there was published in the 'Annexation Area' and printed in the 'Annexation Area's weekly community...

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25 cases
  • February 14, 2017, Special Election On Moses Lake Sch. Dist. Proposition 1 Fred Meise v. Jaderlund
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • March 8, 2018
    ...made to comply with the statute. School Dist. No. 81 v. Taxpayers, 37 Wn.2d at 671-72. The Supreme Court wrote in Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 485, 236 P.2d 545 (1951):In all cases where we have approved the doctrine of substantial compliance, that which was done, although irregular or def......
  • Meise v. Jaderlund (In re Feb. 14, 2017, Special Election on Moses Lake Sch. Dist. #161 Proposition 1)
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Washington
    • March 8, 2018
    ...the statute. School Dist. No. 81 v. Taxpayers , 37 Wash.2d at 671-72, 225 P.2d 1063. The Supreme Court wrote in Davis v. Gibbs , 39 Wash.2d 481, 485, 236 P.2d 545 (1951) :In all cases where we have approved the doctrine of substantial compliance, that which was done, although irregular or d......
  • State v. McGee
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • December 9, 1993
    ...to the last antecedent. Boeing Co. v. Department of Licensing, 103 Wash.2d 581, 587, 693 P.2d 104 (1985) (quoting Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wash.2d 481, 483, 236 P.2d 545 (1951)). The State, on the other hand, asserts the phrase "within one thousand feet" modifies the two initial words of the stat......
  • State v. Barton, No. 23036-8-III (WA 2/28/2006), 23036-8-III
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Washington
    • February 28, 2006
    ...refer to only the immediately preceding antecedent where no contrary intention appears in the statute. See, e.g., Davis v. Gibbs, 39 Wn.2d 481, 483, 236 P.2d 545 (1951). Applying the last antecedent rule to RCW 9.94A.505(8), we limit the application of the qualifying phrase, `as provided in......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Florida durable powers of attorney: exploring the limits of an agent's authority.
    • United States
    • Florida Bar Journal Vol. 76 No. 7, July 2002
    • July 1, 2002
    ...authority under Florida law. (1) FLA. STAT. [section] 709.08(7). (2) BLOCK, EFFECTIVE LEGAL WRITING 55 (4th ed.); Davis v. Gibbs, 236 P.2d 545, 456 (1951); State v. Bailey, 121 P.2d, 821, 822 (3) Block, supra note 2, at 56. (4) FLA. STAT. [section] 744.457; First National Bank of Tampa v. F......

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