Davis v. Grover
| Decision Date | 02 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | PEN CV-01-34 |
| Parties | ROBIN DAVIS, Plaintiff v. SUSAN GROVER, et al. Defendants |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
This matter is before the court on the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend complaint. For the following reasons, the plaintiff's motion is denied and the defendants' motion is allowed in part and denied in part.
Peter Davis ("Peter"), the defendants' father and plaintiff's husband, owned a house (the "house"), which was moved to a lot in Veazie in 1988. Defendant Susan Grover ("Grover") owns the lot on which the house is now located; she also owns the neighboring lot, upon which her house sits. A line of trees divides the two lots. Peter and the plaintiff, Robin Davis ("Davis"), cohabitated in the house, both before and after the 1988 move, for a period totalling approximately twenty-five years. After the house was moved in 1988, and during the time Peter and Davis lived in it together, certain improvements were made to the premises, including building a foundation for the house, adding utilities, performing some remodeling and landscaping, and erecting a kennel. Davis asserts that she "expended her own funds to pay for these repairs and improvements."
For many years, Peter had a number of health problems. Beginning in 1997, Peter became ill and was unable to care for himself. He then had a stroke in 1998 and had to be hospitalized. Upon his return home from the hospital, Peter had difficulty walking, so Davis arranged home health care and physical therapy. Peter made a lot of progress, but was still very weak in his legs.
At some point, Peter was taken out of the house; the parties dispute how and why he was taken. According to the defendants, in June of 1999, the Maine Department of Human Services began an investigation of Peter's living situation. As a result of that investigation, in July of 1999 defendant Patricia Bastey ("Bastey") initiated proceedings to take guardianship over Peter. On August 12 1999, the Probate Court named Bastey as Peter's temporary guardian. Subsequently, on October 19, 1999, the Probate Court appointed Bastey as Peter's guardian.
According to Davis, however, around July of 1999,
During the time Bastey was guardian, she refused to tell Davis where Peter was, and when Davis found out and began visiting him Bastey took steps to prevent her from seeing Peter. The defendants contend that "Bastey took such action after consultation with and at the direction of [Peter's] caregivers, who, along with Defendants, were concerned that [Davis's] behavior towards [Peter] was detrimental to his well-being, and only after the staff's attempts to supervise Davis's visits failed." Meanwhile, Peter was told that Davis had run off with another man and that Davis had abandoned him.
While acting as Peter's guardian, Bastey expended moneys for his health and welfare, and accounted for all such sums. According to Davis, she was dependent upon Peter both for housing and income, and that while Bastey expended sums for Peter, she did nothing to support Davis, even though Bastey "had income and opportunity." The defendants assert that Davis was, and remains, capable of employment. Moreover the defendants deny that Bastey was under any obligation or duty to provide any support or assistance to Davis from Peter's estate and income, that Davis was entitled to the money paid by Bastey to the Maine Veteran's Home, or that Bastey was under any obligation or duty to provide such funds to Davis.
On August 5, 1999, Peter transferred the house to Grover by a "Deed of Building," which conveyed "all buildings, structures, improvements and fixtures now erected upon the land of Susan Grover . . . being the ranch house and attached garage together with all fences and appurtenances of Peter H. Davis." Davis admits that Peter executed a "Deed of Building" but denies that it was a valid transfer, stating that at the time Peter executed the deed Bastey had already filed a petition for guardianship of
Peter. Included in the petition was a doctor's statement from Henry Atkins, M.D., Peter's physician, stating that Peter lacked capacity to make decisions. Davis further states that "[d]uring the time leading up to the . . . Deed . . . [Davis] was hospitalized and not in contact with Peter." Peter was represented by counsel in that transaction.
After Grover received title to the house, she served a Notice of Termination of Tenancy on Davis which stated:
You are hereby notified, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002, that your tenancy-at-will in the premises you occupy at 1113 Chase Road, Veazie, Maine owned by Susan Grover will terminate after the expiration of 30 days following the date of this notice is served on you.
This notice is given to you by Susan Grover, owner of the premises. You must vacate the premises on or before the termination date, or you will be subject to an action for forcible entry and detainer.
After Davis failed to heed the Termination of Tenancy, Grover brought an action for forcible entry and detainer against Davis for possession of the house. The complaint for forcible entry and detainer stated, in part:
In her answer, Davis generally denied that she was a tenant at will at 1113 Chase Road and that Grover owned those premises. Davis did not assert title ownership in the house, and did not argue that the transfer of title to Grover was invalid by reason of Peter being incompetent.
After a hearing on October 12, 1999, the court issued a decision, in which it found that Grover was the title owner of the house, that Davis was a tenant at will, and that Davis made "no claim of title of the lot in either herself or Peter." On December 13, 1999, the court (Russell, J.) entered final judgment in the forcible entry and detainer action in favor of Grover. On December 20, 1999, Davis appealed the final judgment to the Superior Court, but in a decision dated July 11, 2000, the court (Hjelm, J.) denied the appeal.[1]
Grover's success in the forcible entry and detainer action forced Davis to vacate the premises. Davis lived in the house from the time it was moved onto Grover's property until Grover evicted her. Davis asserts that after Grover evicted her from her home and Bastey cut her off from Peter's support, she was without means of support and became homeless.
Peter died on March 31, 2001. Davis claims that she was devisee under Peter's last will and testament and that she would have taken any property owned by Peter at his death. She also claims that Peter gave her a durable power of attorney on January 7, 1999, which she could have used to manage Peter's care and affairs if given the chance.
By a complaint dated February 13, 2001, Davis brought this action asking for a judgment declaring that the deed is void due to Peter's incompetence and that Davis retains rights as a tenant and/or spouse to live therein, and that the transfer violated the Improvident Transfers of Title Statute (Count I); asking for a partition of the property, by statute and in equity (Count II); alleging negligent and/or intentional infliction of emotional distress through wrongful eviction and abuse of process (Count III); asking for a judgment declaring that Davis's power of attorney remains valid and may be exercised by her for her costs (Count IV); alleging intentional and/or negligent infliction of severe emotional distress and loss of comfort and society of her husband by physically keeping them apart (Count V); and alleging Bastey's misapplication of Peter's funds and income, and failure and refusal to expend Peter's funds to support Davis, despite the legal obligation of a spouse to support his spouse, and the fact that a portion of Peter's income is specifically paid for the support of Davis (Count VI).
On January 4, 2002, the defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts of Davis's complaint. After filing her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Davis filed a motion for leave to amend her complaint to add a seventh count alleging tortious interference with an expected inheritance.
Davis has moved to amend her complaint to add a seventh count alleging tortious interference with an expected inheritance. A plaintiff "may amend [his complaint] only by leave of court," and "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." M.R. Civ. P. 15 (a). Whether to allow a pleading amendment rests with the court's sound discretion. In re Sen, 1999 ME 83, ¶ 10, 730 A.2d 680, 683. The Rule 15 (a) standard "is a relatively low standard, but it becomes compounded with a higher standard once the deadline to amend passes because a scheduling order shall not be modified upon a showing of good cause." El-Hajj v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 156 F.Supp.2d 27, 34 (D.Me. 2001) (quotation and citation omitted).
The court issued...
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