Davis v. Guerra

Decision Date10 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. 10-13-00014-CV,10-13-00014-CV
PartiesDENNIS ALAN DAVIS, Appellant v. JOYCE GUERRA, ET AL, Appellee
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

From the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This is an inmate-litigation case under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.014 (West 2002 & Supp. 2012). In ten issues, which can be categorized as three, appellant, Dennis Alan Davis, challenges the trial court's dismissal of his lawsuit as frivolous under chapter 14. See id. §§ 14.001-.014. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Here, appellant, an inmate in the O.B. Ellis Unit in Huntsville, Texas, filed suit against three employees of the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—appellees, Joyce Guerra, Lakeshia Davis, and Brenda Hough. In his original petition, appellant asserted claims under chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 37.001-.011 (West 2008); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, appellant argued that appellees violated his civil rights by:

(1) subjecting him to deliberate indifference to his serious medical condition and/or needs, by (2) interfering with treatment once prescribed, which (3) constitutes gross negligence and malice by placing him in a life-threatening situation of physical harm with conscience [sic] indifference to his rights, safety[,] and welfare, with the intent to harm or injure the plaintiff by (4) intentionally misdiagnosing and/or identifying and reporting his true medical state by (5) tampering with a government record. Defendants also (6) denied the plaintiff adequate redress by grievance.

In response to appellant's original petition, the Office of the Attorney General of Texas ("OAG") filed an "Amicus Curiae Chapter 14 Advisory To The Court." In this filing, the OAG argued that appellant's claims were frivolous under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code because, among other things, (1) appellant's complaints have no basis in law and no chance of success; (2) several of appellant's complaints do not amount to a cognizable cause of action; and (3) appellant did not suffer any injury as a result of appellees' actions.

Thereafter, appellant requested a chapter 14 hearing, which the trial court granted. On November 13, 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing in which onlyargument was presented. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court concluded that appellant's suit did not comply with chapter 14. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed appellant's suit as frivolous under chapter 14.

Later, appellant filed a motion for new trial and requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law. Appellant's motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(c). This appeal followed.

II. INMATE LITIGATION

Inmate litigation is governed by the procedural rules set forth in chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.001-.014; see also Trevino v. Ravenburg, No. 10-11-00245-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 3323, at *5 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 25, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The Texas Legislature enacted chapter 14 to control the flood of lawsuits filed in state courts by prison inmates, which consume valuable judicial resources with seemingly little offsetting benefit. Hickson v. Moya, 926 S.W.2d 397, 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). This Court has noted:

Prisoners have everything to gain and little to lose by filing frivolous suits. It costs them almost nothing; time is of no consequence to a prisoner; threats of sanctions are virtually meaningless; and the prisoner can look forward to a day trip to the courthouse. Thus, the temptation to file a frivolous suit is strong. Such suits, however, waste valuable resources and subject the state and its prison officials to the burden of unwarranted litigation, preventing claims with merit from being heard expeditiously.

Id. (internal citations omitted).

Generally, the dismissal of inmate litigation under chapter 14 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Brewer v. Simental, 268 S.W.3d 763, 767 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, nopet.). "To establish an abuse of discretion, an appellant must show the trial court's actions were arbitrary or unreasonable in light of all the circumstances. The standard is clarified by asking whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Spurlock v. Schroedter, 88 S.W.3d 733, 735-36 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, pet. denied) (internal citations omitted). We may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court with respect to the resolution of factual issues or matters committed to the trial court's discretion. See In re Spooner, 333 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, orig. proceeding); see also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985). The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if that judgment can be upheld on any reasonable theory supported by the evidence. Ex parte E.E.H., 869 S.W.2d 496, 497-98 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied); Harris County Dist. Attorney's Office v. Burns, 825 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, and if there is some evidence to support the judgment, we will affirm. State v. Knight, 813 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).

In conducting our review, we take as true the allegations in the inmate's petition and review the types of relief and causes of action set out therein to determine whether, as a matter of law, the petition stated a cause of action that would authorize relief. See Leachman v. Dretke, 261 S.W.3d 297, 304 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (citing Scott v. Gallagher, 209 S.W.3d 262, 265 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Harrison v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, Inst. Div., 164 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.)). A claim has no arguable basis in the law if it is an indisputably meritless legal theory. Id. (citing Scott, 209 S.W.3d at 266-67).

III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

In what we characterize as his first issue, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law. Specifically, appellant argues that the chapter 14 hearing was a fact hearing and that the trial court was obligated to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its reasons for dismissing his lawsuit. We disagree.

A. Applicable Law

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296 provides that: "In any case tried in the district or county court without a jury, any party may request the court to state in writing its findings of fact and conclusions of law." TEX. R. CIV. P. 296. Further, rule 297 states that: "The court shall file its findings of fact and conclusions of law within twenty days after a timely request is filed." Id. at R. 297. However, Texas courts have held that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 296 and 297 do not apply when a court dismisses a case under chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code without holding a fact hearing. See Retzlaff v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 94 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (citing Zimmerman v. Robinson, 862 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1993, no writ); Timmons v. Luce, 840 S.W.2d 582, 586 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, no writ)); Kendrick v. Lynaugh, 804 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no writ); see also Smith v. Quada, No. 10-09-00414-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 5122, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Waco July 6, 2011, pet. denied) (mem. op.);White v. State, No. 12-09-00342-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 1444, at *10 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 28, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("[T]his court has held that rules 296 and 297 do not apply in an inmate suit that is dismissed for failure to comply with the pleading requirements of chapter fourteen. In that case, we held that a trial court could not make findings of fact since the trial court had merely dismissed the case because of deficiencies in the pleadings and had not heard any evidence." (internal citations omitted)); Walker v. Callahan, No. 04-05-00095-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7887, at **3-4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 28, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Decker, No. 06-04-00134-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 10843, at *3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Dec. 3, 2004, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Harris v. West, No. 09-98-231-CV, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 7626, at **5-6 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Dec. 10, 1998, no pet.) (per curiam) (not designated for publication) ("The procedure for filing findings of fact and conclusions of law applies only to cases tried on the merits. The trial court need not make findings of fact and conclusions of law when there has been no bench trial." (internal citations omitted)). The reasons for not applying rules 296 and 297 when a case is dismissed pursuant to chapter 14 are that: (1) the case was dismissed due to deficiencies in the pleadings; and (2) the trial court has not conducted a trial on the merits of the inmate's suit. See Timmons, 840 S.W.2d at 586.

In the instant case, the trial court conducted a chapter 14 hearing where no evidence was tendered or admitted. The purpose of the hearing was to determine whether appellant's lawsuit complied with chapter 14. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court concluded that appellant had not complied with chapter 14 and,therefore, dismissed appellant's lawsuit.1 This hearing was not a trial on the merits. Consequently, because appellant's suit was summarily dismissed as frivolous without a trial, we conclude that the trial court was under no duty to file findings of fact and conclusions of law in this case. See id.; Re...

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