Davis v. Honorable Thomas D. Wingate Judge
| Decision Date | 14 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2014–SC–000323–MR.,2014–SC–000323–MR. |
| Citation | 437 S.W.3d 720 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
| Parties | Honorable George W. DAVIS, III, Appellant v. Honorable Thomas D. WINGATE Judge, Franklin Circuit Court, Division II, Appellee and Marc I. Rosen and Commonwealth of Kentucky, Real Parties in Interest. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
George W. Davis, III, appeals from the order of the Court of Appeals that denied his petition for a writ commanding the Judge of the Franklin Circuit Court to dismiss the underlying case for want of jurisdiction. The underlying case in Franklin Circuit Court is a declaratory judgment action filed by Marc I. Rosen in which he contests the constitutionality of House Bill (HB) 427 (2013 Regular Session), a statute that prohibits judges who have chosen to retire as a Senior Status Special Judge from becoming a candidate for an elected office for five years after retirement.
Davis argues Franklin Circuit Court lacks jurisdiction to decide Rosen's constitutional challenge because the General Assembly, through Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 118.176, has created a statutory mechanism to determine the bona fides of a candidate and that statute vests exclusive jurisdiction in the candidate's county of residence. Rosen, a former Senior Status Judge and a resident of Boyd County, Kentucky, seeks to become a candidate for circuit judge in the 2014 election.
Effective June 25, 2013, HB 427 amended various statutes governing elections. 1 It sought to prohibit “a judge acting as a Senior Status Special Judge” from “becom[ing] a candidate for any elected office during the five (5) year term prescribed in KRS 21.580[.]” 2 To this end, the following language—or a slight variation thereof 3—was inserted to amend the associated statutes:
A judge who elected to retire as a Senior Status Special Judge in accordance with KRS 21.580 shall not become a candidate or a nominee for any elected office during the five (5) year term prescribed in KRS 21.580( l )(a)l., regardless of the number of days served by the judge acting as a Senior Status Special Judge.4
Before the filing deadline in late January of this year, Rosen submitted nominating papers with the Kentucky Secretary of State to become a candidate for the 32nd Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, First Division, in the 2014 election cycle. Rosen held the same Boyd Circuit judgeship for which he now seeks to become a candidate until January 31; 2009, when he elected to retire as a Senior Status Special Judge.
After submitting his nominating papers, Rosen filed the underlying declaratory judgment action in Franklin Circuit Court, seeking a determination of the constitutionality of HB 427.5 As the incumbent seeking re-election, Davis sought and was granted leave to intervene in Rosen's suit. Immediately, Davis moved to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, raising essentially the same question he now presents in this appeal. The Franklin Circuit Court denied Davis's motion to dismiss.
A week after Rosen filed the underlying declaratory action in Franklin Circuit Court, a concerned voter in Boyd County filed an action challenging the bona fides of Rosen's candidacy under KRS 118.176(2). It is unnecessary for the resolution of this appeal to go into much detail discussing the proceedings in Boyd Circuit. In short, the Boyd Circuit found Rosen was disqualified from being a candidate because he had been a Senior Status Special Judge and the five-year term in KRS 21.580(1)(a)1 had not passed. The Boyd Circuit made no explicit determination concerning the constitutionality of HB 427 but perhaps implicitly upheld its constitutionality because it applied the terms of HB 427 to disqualify Rosen.
Under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 65.07, Rosen petitioned the Court of Appeals to set aside the Boyd Circuit order. The Court of Appeals granted Rosen's motion, specifically finding “it was incumbent upon [Boyd Circuit] to either address the constitutional question underpinning the controversy or to defer any ruling until the Franklin Circuit Court had resolved the constitutional question.” 6
Meanwhile, in Franklin Circuit, Davis renewed his motion to dismiss following Boyd Circuit's judgment. Again, the Franklin Circuit denied Davis's motion, noting that despite Rosen asserting the constitutionality of HB 427 as a defense in Boyd Circuit, the merits of the issue had not been previously litigated; and, accordingly, the Franklin Circuit found the constitutional question properly before it, irrespective of the bona fides challenge in Boyd Circuit. Davis promptly initiated the writ action in the Court of Appeals and moved the Franklin Circuit to stay the proceedings there in the interim.
Franklin Circuit declined to grant Davis's motion for a stay but elected to postpone reviewing arguments or ruling on the issue until the conclusion of Davis's writ action in the Court of Appeals. As it currently stands, Rosen's initial declaratory action is fully briefed to the Franklin Circuit Court and awaits final decision.
The Court of Appeals denied Davis's writ petition, clearly expressing that “[t]he declaratory judgment action filed by [ ] Rosen in Franklin Circuit Court was not a challenge to his bona fides; to the contrary, the Franklin Circuit Court action is a challenge to the statute that prevents him from being a bona fide candidate.” 7
The only issue before us in this appeal is whether the Franklin Circuit has jurisdiction to decide the constitutionality of HB 427 as raised in Rosen's declaratory judgment action. It is important to emphasize that the merits of the argument surrounding the constitutionality of HB 427 are not before us in the present appeal. Neither is the question of whether Rosen possesses the bona fides to be a candidate for the 32nd Judicial Circuit of Kentucky, First Division.
Because a writ is truly an extraordinary remedy, we allow writs to issue only in remarkable situations:
A writ of prohibition may be granted upon a showing that (1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside of its jurisdiction and there is no remedy through an application to an intermediate court; or (2) that the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.8
This case presents a writ of the first class because Davis argues the Franklin Circuit is proceeding outside of its jurisdiction by entertaining Rosen's declaratory action.
Identifying the class of writ presented is the starting point to establish the standard for our review. As we have previously noted, “the proper standard [of review] actually depends on the class, or category, of writ case.” 9 Rosen argues we should employ a bifurcated standard: clear error for the irreparable injury aspect and de novo for the jurisdiction question.10 We disagree. Contrary to Rosen's assertion, this class of writ action—the trial court acting allegedly outside its jurisdiction—does not require a showing of irreparable injury or the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. Those prerequisites apply only in the second class of writ actions—actions in which the trial court is allegedly erroneous but within its jurisdiction.11 As we noted in Hoskins v. Maricle, our decision in Shumaker v. Paxton12 apparently engendered this confusion. 13 In so noting, the Hoskins Court rejected Shumaker's thin reasoning and “depart[ed] from those cases holding that the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal precludes the issuance of a writ to prohibit a trial court from acting outside its jurisdiction.” 14 Rosen's bifurcated approach is not appropriate.
Instead, “[d]e novo review will occur most often under the first class of writ cases, i.e., where the lower court is alleged to be acting outside its jurisdiction, because jurisdiction is generally only a question of law.” 15 The error alleged by Davis does not involve the review of any findings of fact; accordingly, clear error is incorrect, and de novo is the appropriate standard.
We feel it prudent to begin our review with a proper understanding of jurisdiction and what it means for a court to act outside its jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the term jurisdiction is often “more easily used than understood.” 16 In Kentucky, circuit courts are courts of “general jurisdiction,” 17 which means that circuit courts “shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court.” 18 Jurisdiction, when used here, refers to subject-matter jurisdiction: the authority not simply to hear “this case[,] but this kind of case.” 19 Narrowing these broad concepts, “constitutional provisions and statutes [may] assign[ ] to the courts specific types of claims and causes of action[.]” 20 A court acts outside its jurisdiction, accordingly, only “where [it] has not been given, by constitutional provision or statute, the power to do anything at all.” 21 In essence, this is Davis's argument: the General Assembly, through KRS 118.176, has vested specific courts with specific types of claims and, here, that specific court is Boyd Circuit.
We do not dispute the General Assembly's ability to designate specific claims appropriate for specific courts. For example, a number of statutes assign claims exclusively to Franklin Circuit; and we acknowledged as much in Commonwealth ex rel Conway v. Thompson.22 Typically, this designation is one of venue rather than jurisdiction; and jurisdiction should not be confused with venue. Of course, “the required observance of proper venue is deeply imbedded in Kentucky law[ ]”; 23 but jurisdiction “relat[es] to the power of courts to adjudicate” while venue “relat[es] to the proper place for the claim to be heard[.]” 24
KRS 418.040 allows a claim for a declaration of rights to be brought in any co...
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