Davis v. Howe

• Decision Date: 01 May 1915
• Docket Number: (No. 778.)<SMALL><SUP>†</SUP></SMALL&gt
• Citation: 176 S.W. 759
• Parties: DAVIS et al. v. HOWE.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 759

176 S.W. 759

DAVIS et al. v. HOWE.

(No. 778.)^†

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Amarillo.

May 1, 1915.

On Motion for Rehearing May 22, 1915.

Appeal from District Court, Hutchinson County; F. P. Greever, Judge.

Action by Belle Thompson Davis and another against J. F. Howe. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

H. E. Hoover, of Canadian, for appellants. Newton P. Willis, of Canadian, for appellee.

HENDRICKS, J.

George W. Thompson, deceased, was the patentee of section No. 129, certificate 325, in block Z, East Line & Red River Railroad Company survey, situated in Hutchinson county, Tex., and constitutes the land in controversy. The appellants, Belle Thompson Davis and her daughter, Maude Thompson Davis, succeed to all the title of W. M. Thompson, the patentee; Mrs. Davis having been the widow of W. M. Thompson (now married to Davis), and Maude Thompson Davis the daughter of the former union. The appellants, mother and daughter, recovered one-fourth of the section from certain parties defendant, who are not involved in this particular appeal; but the court trying the case, without the assistance of a jury, denied them a recovery against Howe, the appellee in this appeal, for three-fourths of the section, sustaining the latter's plea of limitation of five years under recorded deed.

In pursuance of a tax sale, July 5, 1904, the sheriff of Hutchinson county executed a tax deed of the same date to one F. J. Brown, purporting to convey said land for the sum of $75.63, as delinquent taxes. Brown in reality purchased this land for J. F. Howe, the appellee herein, who was at that time a deputy sheriff in that county, under the sheriff who made the sale; and Brown thereafter executed a quitclaim deed, dated the 21st day of December, 1904, to said Howe for a recited consideration of $90, which was never paid; Howe in reality having furnished the consideration paid by Brown to the sheriff for the tax deed of date July 5, 1904. The tax deed to Brown was recorded July 18, 1904, and the quitclaim deed from Brown to Howe was recorded December 22, 1904, and this suit was filed by appellants September 3, 1913. Howe did not prove that the prerequisites required by the statute, effectuating a proper sale, conveying the judgment debtor's title, had been complied with by the district attorney, referable to the tax proceedings; in fact, the court found, affirmatively, that no affidavit had been filed by the officer in support of the petition that the residences of the owners were unknown, or that they were nonresidents of the state.

Appellants assign that:

"The court erred in rendering judgment for the defendant Howe for three-fourths of the land in controversy, and in not rendering judgment for the plaintiff for all the lands, because the plaintiffs showed good title to the land, and the defendant claimed the same by limitation under a tax deed and failed to prove that all of the prerequisites provided by statute had been complied with before the sale was made."

This question may be abstract as Howe predicates his claim under the deed from Brown to himself, and by virtue of his adverse possession, and payment of taxes under said registered deed; however, with reference to a tax deed admitted in evidence solely as the basis to sustain the plea of limitation of five years, Chief Justice Stayton said, in the case of Seemuller v. Thornton, 77 Tex. page 158, 13 S. W. page 847:

"The instrument offered in evidence was, within the meaning of the statute, a `deed.' Whether the land had been properly assessed, the time for making sales for unpaid taxes had arrived, the land advertised for the proper time, or the officers legally empowered to make the sale and deed, would be important inquiries if the deed had been offered as evidence within itself of title; but it was not offered for that purpose, and though it may not have been effective to pass title, it was nevertheless a `deed.'"

See Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 44, 76 Am. Dec. 53; House v. Stone, 64 Tex. 683; Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270, 20 S. W. 122, on the question of tax deeds as a basis for limitation. There is nothing on the face of this deed indicative that it is void.

Appellants also contend, and assign the same as error, that because Howe was deputy sheriff, under the sheriff who made the sale to Brown, and because he provided Brown the money with which to purchase the land at the tax sale, that he could not claim title under the five-year statute of limitations. Article 3770, Vernon's Sayles' Civil Statutes, prescribes that:

"If any officer making sale of property on execution, or his deputy, shall, directly or indirectly, purchase the same, the sale shall be void."

As stated, Howe testified that he was holding under the deed executed by Brown to him, recorded in December, 1904. Assuming that both deeds are void (and the first one is unquestionably), neither contains the suggestion on its face. If they were void, the knowledge and participation of Howe, could not make them any more so, and the question at least is — assuming that both are absolutely void, for the purpose of argument — would that affect the plea of five years' statute of limitations, if the requirements of the statute were otherwise complied with?

The case of City of El Paso v. National Bank, 96 Tex. 499, 74 S. W. 21, was one involving the sale of land by the administrator of a certain estate. The trial judge, in the procedure of trespass to try title, held the sale void because of the disqualification of another special district judge, who had ordered and confirmed the sale of said property. The Court of Civil Appeals confirmed the action of the trial court, mainly on the ground that limitations did not run in favor of the United States for the land held by it; the defendant, the City of El Paso, deriving its title from the United States. The Supreme Court granted an application for writ of error, on the ground that they were inclined to the opinion that the evidence was insufficient to justify the finding of the disqualification of the trial judge, and that the administrator's sale was void on that account; but upon the submission of the cause, upon an inspection of the record, the Supreme Court discovered that no question of that kind was raised in the Court of Civil Appeals, and hence the Supreme Court was not authorized to consider the assignments attempting to raise the question in that court. There was also a question injected into the case of the lack of confirmation of the administrator's deed by the special district judge who ordered the particular sale. The Supreme Court said:

"The decisions, in this state, recognize the proposition that an instrument which, when tested by itself alone, appears to be void, is not a deed in the sense of the five-year statute of limitations. Schleicher v. Gatlin, 85 Tex. 270 ; Fry v. Baker, 59 Tex. 404; Wofford v. McKinna, 23 Tex. 36 ; Kilpatrick v. Sisneros, 23 Tex. 113. This principle has application only to deeds which are shown by their own recitals and provisions to be mere nullities, and not those which contain the essential constituents of conveyances, but are void because of want of power to convey or other defect appearing from evidence aliunde. This distinction has often been applied to instruments executed by sheriffs, tax collectors, etc., which are in themselves complete as deeds, but do not pass title for want of authority to make them."

The court further said, in the course of argument:

"But for the assumed disqualification of the judge, which does not appear from its recitals, it is clear that it would have passed the title of the estate, and this proves that it is, upon its face, a sufficient deed, inoperative only because of lack of authority behind it."

We rather infer from the opinion that after the execution of the deed a confirmation occurred and before the same was recorded, for the Supreme Court further said:

"When the deed in question was recorded, there had been a confirmation, complete in all things, unless there was a want of power in the special judge to act"

— and held that the instrument under which the United States had claimed the title was a sufficient basis for a claim under the five-year statute. We construe the logic of this opinion to be, that though the judge, who ordered the sale of the property, may have been...