Davis v. Jarnigan
Decision Date | 29 March 1933 |
Docket Number | No. 1072.,1072. |
Citation | 59 S.W.2d 281 |
Parties | DAVIS v. JARNIGAN et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Taylor County; M. S. Long, Judge.
Action by G. S. Jarnigan and another against G. F. Davis, who filed a cross-action. From a judgment for plaintiffs in part, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
J. D. Barker, of Cisco, for appellant.
Stinson, Hair, Brooks & Duke, of Abilene, for appellees.
G. S. Jarnigan and H. Feagan sued G. F. Davis, a road contractor, for moneys alleged to be owing to them by him for road work under subcontracts. They sued for $2,291.87 road work in Jones county, $912.19 road work in Wise and Parker counties, $500 attorney's fees, and $2,500 damages alleged to have been sustained by them in that Davis caused them to move their teams and road-working equipment from Jones to Parker and Wise counties before the right of way was procured, thus delaying their work and damaging them in said amount.
The defendant answered by general denial, plea of settlement, and in cross-action sought to recover against the plaintiffs on their promissory note in the sum of $2,191.87, alleged to have been executed and delivered to him in settlement of their accounts.
By a verified supplemental petition the plaintiffs denied the allegations of the defendant's answer and specially alleged that the note for $2,191.87 was left with the defendant for a special purpose, and that it did not represent any unconditional obligation. In this respect they alleged that a dispute arose between them and the defendant concerning the alleged indebtedness by one to the other; that they were unable to agree on such matters; that the defendant had possession of their teams and road-construction equipment and refused to surrender them to plaintiffs; that they had entered into a contract to grade and excavate roads in Brown county, and had agreed to begin the work at a specified time, and were unable to gain possession of their teams and equipment; that, in order to release them, they executed the note in question and left it with the defendant under a separate and contemporaneous agreement and understanding that if the state engineer's estimates (not then at hand) later disclosed that the defendant owed him (as they contended) that the defendant should pay same and return the note, and that, on the other hand, if such estimates disclosed that the plaintiffs owed the defendant, they would pay the same, and be entitled to the return of the note. That is, the note passed into the hands of Davis for the special purpose to obtain the release of teams, etc., and to be held pending definite ascertainment of status of accounts between the parties.
Such, we think, is the reasonable construction of the plaintiffs' pleading, which, in that respect, is as follows:
Trial was before the court and jury, and in response to the issues the jury found: (1) That at the date of the execution and delivery of the note for $2,191.87, a bona fide dispute existed between plaintiffs and defendant as to any balance due by plaintiffs to defendant; (2) that at time of execution of the note plaintiffs and defendant did not agree that the former owed the latter $2,191.87; (3) that plaintiffs and defendant, at said date, did not have accounts stated between them of respective claims listed in pleadings; (4) that plaintiffs excavated and moved 55,240 cubic yards of dirt for defendant on the Jones county job; (5) that plaintiffs did for defendant 182½ hours of blading on said road; (6) plaintiffs were not overpaid by defendant for the Jones county work; (7) plaintiffs did not agree that bills paid by defendant to one Carlton were proper charges against them; (8) that defendant Davis owed plaintiffs a balance of $1,311.14 on the Jones county job; (9) he owed them no balance on the Parker and Wise county work; (10) that plaintiffs were damaged $440 by defendant's failure to obtain right of way in Parker county before moving them to that place; (11) that plaintiffs sustained no loss in moving teams, etc., from one point to another in Parker county.
Based on this verdict the court entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs against the defendant for the sum of $1,311.14, and otherwise, in accordance with the verdict, except as to the item of $440, as to which judgment was rendered in favor of the defendant.
Proposition 1 complains that the court erred in admitting testimony to the effect that the plaintiffs were damaged by the defendant's moving them to Parker and Wise counties before the right of way was procured, thereby causing them unnecessary expense and delay....
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...Bank of Copeville, Tex.Civ.App., 11 S.W.2d 652; Stubblefield v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 37 S.W.2d 818 (er. dis.); Davis v. Jarnigan, Tex.Civ.App., 59 S.W.2d 281 (er. dis.); Moore v. B. & M. Chevrolet Co., Tex.Civ.App., 72 S.W.2d 945; Bledsoe v. Pritchard, Tex.Civ.App., 107 S.W.2d 742; Guarant......