Davis v. Knight
| Decision Date | 14 December 1948 |
| Docket Number | 47336. |
| Citation | 35 N.W.2d 23,239 Iowa 1338 |
| Parties | DAVIS v. KNIGHT. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
White & Bruner, of Carroll, for appellant.
James L. Pauley, Jr. and Chas. E. Hird, both of Jefferson, for appellee.
The statute above noted provides that the operator of a motor vehicle shall not be liable for damages to any passenger or person riding in said vehicle as a guest or by invitation and not for hire unless the damage is caused by reckless operation of the vehicle.
It is admitted that decedent was the guest of the defendant-owner who was driving the car. For the plaintiff to obtain a judgment for damages it was necessary that she establish by adequate evidence that the reckless operation of the car by defendant was the proximate cause of the death of the intestate.
At the close of plaintiff's evidence the defendant moved for a directed verdict. This motion was renewed at the close of all the evidence. At that time the court stated that it would reserve ruling on the motion and decide the case on its merits. It filed written findings of fact and conclusions of law, all to the effect that the relief prayed for by plaintiff was denied because she had failed to establish that there was any reckless operation of the car by defendant as alleged. Judgment was rendered accordingly. Having decided the case on its merits, the court stated that it was not necessary to rule on defendant's motion to direct a verdict in his favor, made at the close of all evidence.
I. This case is not triable de novo. In accord with the uniform prior decisions of this court, Rule of Civil Procedure 334 provides that findings of fact by the court in jury-waived cases have the effect of a special verdict. If the findings are supported by substantial evidence and are justified as a matter of law, the judgment entered thereon will not be disturbed on appeal. Artificial Ice Co. v Reciprocal Exchange, 192 Iowa 1133, 1138, 1139, 184 N.W. 756; Iowa Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. De La Hunt, 197 Iowa 227 228 196 N.W. 17; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1656, pages 675 et seq.; Finkle v. Finkle, Iowa, 32 N.W.2d 807, 808.
The question is not what would have been the finding of this court or its members on the evidence received by the trial court, but whether the findings and judgment of the latter have the required support as stated above. Eilers v. Frieling, 211 Iowa 841, 844, 234 N.W. 275; Calkins v. Alley, 190 Iowa 1180 1183, 181 N.W. 427; Sprecher v. Ensminger, 167 Iowa 118, 122, 149 N.W. 97; Second Nat. Bank of New Hampton v. Mielitz, 211 Iowa 218, 219, 222, 233 N.W. 108, 110, stating: 'Whether the finding is in accordance with the weight of the evidence is not here subject to review.' Kellogg v. Rhodes, 231 Iowa 1340, 1346, 4 N.W.2d 412, 416, where we said: 'We are not permitted to review the evidence de novo and decide the case as we think proper.' Crouse v. Cadwell Transfer & Storage Co., 226 Iowa 1083, 1087, 285 N.W. 623; In re Estate of Matthews, 234 Iowa 188, 192, 12 N.W.2d 162; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1656(h), page 698, § 1656(i), pages 699, 720, 721; Ross v. McQuiston, 45 Iowa 145, 146, 147, where the court said: 'But we are not required to hold that the judgment of the court is in accord with the preponderance of the evidence, in order to support it.'
II. Ordinarily, the issue of negligence or recklessness is for the determination of the jury. This is uniformly true where there is conflict in the evidence. Courts have sometimes stated that if the facts are not in dispute the issue is one of law for the court. There is such a statement in Siesseger v. Puth, 213 Iowa 164, 182, 239 N.W. 46, 54, where the court said: 'If the facts are not in conflict, it is for the court to determine whether the defendant has been proven 'reckless' in his operation of the automobile.' This statement was rightly challenged in the dissenting opinion of Justice Wagner, in which Justices Stevens and Morling joined. 213 Iowa 164, 188, 239 N.W. 46. The recognized rule is that, even where the facts are not in dispute, the negligent or reckless conduct of a party cannot be conclusively established by a state of facts from which different inferences may be fairly drawn, or upon which fairminded persons may reasonably arrive at different conclusions. In Pierson v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 127 Iowa 13, 22, 102 N.W. 149, 152, the court said: '* * *, we have held that, even where the facts are not in dispute, it should be left to the jury to say whether a course of conduct is negligent, if reasonable men may honestly differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from such undisputed facts.' Both before and since that decision the principle there stated has appeared in the decisions of this court. See Milne v. Walker, 59 Iowa 186, 188, 13 N.W. 101; Whitsett v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 67 Iowa 150, 159, 25 N.W. 104; Bach v. Iowa Cent. R. Co., 112 Iowa 241, 244, 83 N.W. 959; Tobey v. Burlington, C. R. & N. Ry. Co., 94 Iowa 256, 264, 62 N.W. 761, 33 L.R.A. 496; Barnhart v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 97 Iowa 654, 655, 656, 66 N.W. 902; Payne v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n of America, 119 Iowa 342, 345, 93 N.W. 361; Balcom v. City of Independence, 178 Iowa 685, 687, 688, 160 N.W. 305, L.R.A.1917C, 120; Dreier v. McDermott, 157 Iowa 726, 729, 141 N.W. 315, 50 L.R.A.,N.S., 566; Murphy v. Iowa Electric Co., 206 Iowa 567, 572, 220 N.W. 360; Rosenberg v. Des Moines R. Co., 213 Iowa 152, 155, 156, 238 N.W. 703; Robertson v. Carlgren, 211 Iowa 963, 974, 234 N.W. 824; Home Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-Phenix Fire Ins. Co., 225 Iowa 36, 47, 48, 279 N.W. 425; Schwickerceath v. Maas, 230 Iowa 329, 333, 297 N.W. 248; Lawson v. Fordyce, 234 Iowa 632, 636, 12 N.W.2d 301.
III. In the determination of the question before us the evidence must be construed as a whole in the light most favorable to the judgment of the trial court. Smith v. City of Hamburg, 212 Iowa 1022, 1023, 237 N.W. 330; Tilden v. Zanias, 228 Iowa 708, 709, 292 N.W. 835; Kellogg v. Rhodes, supra, 231 Iowa 1340, 1341-1343, 4 N.W.2d 412; White v. Grovier, 237 Iowa 377, 380, 21 N.W.2d 769, 164 A.L.R. 943; Frideres v. Lowden, 235 Iowa 640, 642, 17 N.W.2d 396; Maland v. Tesdall, 232 Iowa 959, 965, 5 N.W.2d 327; 3 Am.Jur., Appeal & Error, sect. 897, pp. 461, 462; 3 Am.Jur., Appeal & Error, sect. 945; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, § 1656(i), page 700.
IV. As stated in Wilkins v. Howell, 194 Iowa 654, 655, 656, 190 N.W. 1, 'It is conceivable, of course, that evidence might be of such a conclusive character as to entitle the plaintiff to a favorable finding as a matter of law.' But we have also held that 'In the absence of an admission by the opposite party, it is seldom that a party having the burden [of proof] establishes his claim as a matter of law.' Kellogg v. Rhodes, supra, 231 Iowa 1340, 1342, 4 N.W.2d 412, 413; Low v. Ford Hopkins Co., 231 Iowa 251, 254, 1 N.W.2d 95; White v. Grovier, supra, 237 Iowa 377, 380, 21 N.W.2d 769, 164 A.L.R. 943; Frideres v. Lowden, supra, 235 Iowa 640, 642, 17 N.W.2d 396; State v. Dunne, 234 Iowa, 1185, 1190, 15 N.W.2d 296; Maland v. Tesdall, supra, 232 Iowa 959, 962, 5 N.W.2d 327.
V. For one to violate section 321.494, Code 1946, commonly referred to as the 'guest statute', by the reckless operation of a motor vehicle, his conduct must be more then negligent. It must manifest no care or a heedless disregard for or indifference to the consequences or the rights or safety of those riding with him or of others. To be reckless in the operation of the vehicle his conduct need not be willful or wanton or involve moral turpitude. Nor does it include inadvertence, momentary thoughtlessness, error in judgment, mere carelessness or negligence. But it does include the operation of the vehicle in heedless disregard for or indifference to dangerous conditions, hazards, or perils, known to him or which in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known to him, without care for the rights or safety of others. This in substance and in general is the interpretation of said statute as held by this court in Siesseger v. Puth, 213 Iowa 164 et seq., 239 N.W. 46, and thereafter followed in numerous decisions. A few of which are Hart v. Hinkley, 215 Iowa 915, 917-919, 247 N.W. 258; Siesseger v. Puth, 216 Iowa 916, 917, 925, 926, 248 N.W. 352; White v. Center, 218 Iowa 1027, 254 N.W. 90; Roberts v. Koons, 230 Iowa 92, 296 N.W. 811; Harvey v. Clark, 232 Iowa 729-733, 6 N.W.2d 144, 143 A.L.R., 1141; Popham v. Case, 223 Iowa 52, 271 N.W. 226; Olson v. Hodges, 236 Iowa 612, 621-623, 19 N.W.2d 676.
The decisive and only issue for determination on this appeal is whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the court's findings and judgment. The answer must be found largely in the facts. They are free from material conflict. Earl Davis, the deceased, was an unmarried man 25 years old. He owned a large transport truck and trailer with which he did contract hauling largely between Denver and Chicago. His parents lived on a farm near Carroll, through which city he passed on his trips. He had been at his parents' home for about a week before January 18 1947. For that evening the Davis family had planned a little farewell party for Dorothea Davis, sister of Earl, who had joined a group of girls who were going to travel about selling magazine subscriptions. Among those present at the party at the City Club in Carroll were Mr. and Mrs. Davis, the parents, Dorothea, her high school friend Evelyn Matthews, Earl, and the defendant, Warren Knight, a first cousin of the Davis children. Warren was about the same age as Earl. They had been in the service together, were good friends and were together when their work permitted. Warren was then living in Jefferson, but came to Carroll once or twice a week. On this Saturday...
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