Davis v. Luster

• Decision Date: 31 October 1876
• Citation: 64 Mo. 43
• Parties: LUTHER M. DAVIS, Respondent v. RHODA M. LUSTER, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

64 Mo. 43

LUTHER M. DAVIS, Respondent

v.RHODA M. LUSTER, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1876.

Appeal from Jasper Court of Common Pleas.

W. H. Phelps, for Appellant, cited: Pars. Cont., 392.

Lay & Belch, for Respondent, cited: 1 Bouv. Law Dic. 454; 7 Wall. 214; Chit. Cont. 217; Greenl. Ev. 283; 16 Ves. 156; 1 Ves. Jr. 22; 9 Penn. 14: 27 Penn. 22; 11 Mass. 318; 13 Mass. 371; Forshay vs. Furguson, 5 Hill. 158; Central Bank vs. Copeland, 18 Md. 317; Edie vs. Shannon, 26 N. Y. 12; 1. Sto. Eq. Juris. [9th ed.] 239; Harmony vs. Bingham, 12 N. Y. 99, 229; Fleetwood vs. City of N. Y., 2 Sandf. 475; Tutt vs. Id., 3 Blatch. 250; Aster vs. Reynolds, 2 Strange, 9, 915; Brown vs. Peck, 2 Wis. 277; Oates vs. Hudson, 5 Eng. Law & Eq. 469; 2 Inst. 482; 2 Roll. Abr. 124; Richardson vs. Duncan, 3 N. H. 508; Watkins vs. Bird, 6 Mass. 511; Huguenin vs. Baseley, 3 Lead. Cas. Eq. 94; Tapley vs. Tapley, 10 Minn. 448; 1 Pars. Cont 319, 392; 33 Mo. 412; 59 Mo. 124; 10 Allen, 76; Wagn. Stat. 1036.

HOUGH, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This was a suit to set aside a conveyance made by the plaintiff to the defendant, of a lot in the town of Joplin.

The circumstances attending and superinducing the execution of the conveyance, and which are relied on to obtain the relief sought, are thus stated in the petition: “that on said 29th day of August, 1873, defendant, intending to cheat and defraud plaintiff, procured plaintiff to make and plaintiff did make a deed of conveyance of said real estate to defendant; that defendant and other persons acting with her and aiding and assisting her, threatened to charge plaintiff's brother, G. H. Davis, with having committed adultery with defendant, and said other persons would prosecute plaintiff's brother for said alleged offense and that they would stir up a mob and hang plaintiff's brother if plaintiff did not deed said real estate to defendant; that plaintiff, fearing that defendant and said other persons aiding her, would carry their threats into execution, and bring plaintiff and his said brother into disgrace, or that they would carry their threats of violence into execution, and do this plaintiff and his said brother the injury threatened, was compelled against his will, by said threats, to execute and deliver to defendant said deed of conveyance; that said deed of conveyance was executed by plaintiff without any consideration whatever but through the fear aforesaid.”

The defendant failed to plead in time, and the court entered judgment for the plaintiff, for want of an answer, which judgment it refused to set aside. The only question to be determined, as the case is now presented, is, whether the foregoing extract from the petition stated sufficient grounds for avoiding the deed.

That a contract or conveyance made under compulsion, amounting to duress, may be set aside in equity, is not controverted by the defendant. But it is insisted on her behalf, that the threats recited in the petition were not sufficient to constitute legal duress, and therefore the relief sought for should be denied.

Duress is divided at common law into two classes, duress per minas and duress of imprisonment. Duress per minas is confined to fear of loss of life or of limb, fear of mayhem and fear of unlawful imprisonment. Duress of imprisonment is well defined in Richardson vs. Duncan (3 N. H. 508), as an arrest for improper purposes without a just cause, or an arrest for a just cause but without lawful authority, or an arrest for a just cause and under lawful authority for unlawful purposes. This latter class need not be referred to again, as it has no relation whatever to the case at bar.

While the rigidity of the common law rule as to duress per minas has been somewhat relaxed in this country, and the common law definition has been extended by some decisions so as to include fear of a mere battery, or of the destruction of goods, we know of no case in which it has been held to include a threat of lawful prosecution.

Another rule on this subject, announced by some authors and in some adjudged cases, is, that the duress which will avoid a contract must be offered to the party who seeks to take advantage of it. But as early as the year 1609, it was said in the case of Baylie vs. Sir Henry Clair “that the husband may avoid his deed that he hath sealed by the duress of imprisonment of his wife or son.”

In M'Clintock vs. Cummins (3 McLean) it was said: “The father and son may each avoid his obligation by duress of the other, and so a husband may avoid his deed by duress of his wife.”

In the present case the threats were not made against the plaintiff, but only to the plaintiff and against his brother, and in this respect it differs from all the cases we have examined involving the question of legal duress. But it has long been the habit of courts of equity to relieve parties from contracts made under the influence of threats, or of apprehensions not amounting to legal duress. Where a fraudulent advantage has been taken of the fears, the affections or the sensibilities of a party, equity will grant relief. Judge Story says that circumstances of extreme necessity and distress of a party, though not accompanied by any...