Davis v. Mayor

• Decision Date: 01 September 1891
• Citation: 18 S.W. 254
• Parties: DAVIS v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

18 S.W. 254

DAVIS v. MAYOR, ETC., OF CITY OF KNOXVILLE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

September Term, 1891.

Error to circuit court, Knox county; S. T. LOGAN, Judge.

Action by one Davis against the mayor and aldermen of Knoxville. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

E. F. Mynatt and D. A. Gaut, for plaintiff in error. J. W. Caldwell, for defendant in error.

LURTON, J.

Appellant, Davis, sued the city of Knoxville to recover damages for an assault made on him while confined in the city calaboose, on a charge of drunkenness, by prisoners confined with him in the same room. The case was submitted to a jury, who, under a very perspicuous charge by Special Judge HOWE, returned a verdict for the defendant. The negligence charged may be summarized as follows: (1) That the city calaboose was not sufficiently commodious to permit a separation of prisoners, with some regard to character of inmates and grade of offense. (2) That there were three rooms in the calaboose, two of which were unoccupied, and that under these circumstances it was negligence to confine him with other prisoners, some of whom were known to the officers locking him up to be turbulent characters. (3) That it was negligence not to prescribe and enforce the separation of prisoners known to be violent and quarrelsome from others of a different character. (4) That the city watchman in charge of this place of detention was negligent in not being where he could hear the outcry of plaintiff when assaulted, and that he did not come to his relief. (5) That it was negligence not to so locate its watchman that he might readily hear a disturbance among the prisoners confined, and promptly command the peace. The learned circuit judge charged the jury, in substance, that the city would not be liable for the negligence of its public officers, nor that of its watchman at the calaboose. He refused to charge several propositions holding the defendant liable for the acts of negligence we have endeavored to summarize. Municipal corporations, such as counties, cities, and towns, are arms of the state, to whom has been delegated, for purposes of local government, a portion of the sovereign power of the state. Such corporations can only act through agents, and, as they are but arms of sovereignty, the principle of respondeat superior does not apply. But when such corporation exists by virtue of a charter, general or special, limiting its powers and prescribing duties, it implicitly contracts to carry out the prescribed purposes of its creation; and if its agents or servants are guilty of negligence while in the discharge of corporate duties...