Davis v. Montgomery, No. C-3-99-609.

Citation124 F.Supp.2d 1107
Decision Date03 August 2000
Docket NumberNo. C-3-99-609.
PartiesJeanette DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. Betty MONTGOMERY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Tony Merry, Palmer Volkema & Thomas, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Chester Tynes Lyman, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, Business & Government Regulation Section, Columbus, OH, John Edward Patterson, Darrell M. Pierre, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, Chief Counsel's Staff Section, Columbus, OH, Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant Attorney General, Chief Counsel's Staff, Columbus, OH, for Betty Montgomery, Robert Taft.

Chester Tynes Lyman, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, Business & Government Regulation Section, Columbus, OH, John Edward Patterson, Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant Attorney General, Chief Counsel's Staff, Columbus, OH, for State of Ohio, Police and Firemen's Disability and Pension Fund.

Eugene Baldwin Lewis, Richard A. Frye, Sarah Morrison Daggett, Chester Willcox & Saxbe, Columbus, OH, Chester Tynes Lyman, Jr., Ohio Attorney General, Business & Government Regulation Section, Columbus, OH, Kimberly L. Charles, Assistant Attorney General, Chief Counsel's Staff, Columbus, OH, for Allen J. Proctor, David Harker, Kenneth M. Gehring, O'Neal Saunders, Robert M Beck, Thomas Bennett, Martin Erbaugh, Patrick J Patton, Richard T Balazs, James R Winfree, Jim Petro.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS OF DEFENDANTS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND THE INDIVIDUALLY-NAMED TRUSTEES OF THE OHIO POLICE AND FIRE PENSION FUND (DOC. # 17) AND OF DEFENDANTS MONTGOMERY AND TAFT (DOC. # 21); THE MOTION OF DEFENDANTS STATE OF OHIO AND BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OHIO POLICE AND FIRE PENSION FUND (DOC. # 6) OVERRULED AS MOOT; PLAINTIFF ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS FROM DATE, WHY FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF (PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS) SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

RICE, Chief Judge.

This litigation stems from the divorce of Jeanette Davis and her former husband, James E. Davis, a municipal firefighter. During the course of their marriage, Mr. Davis was a participant in the Ohio Police and Fire Pension Fund, formerly known as the Ohio Police and Firemen's Disability and Pension Fund ("Pension Fund"). As part of its decree of divorce, the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas awarded Jeanette Davis one-half of the benefits from the Pension Fund that had accrued to Mr. Davis during their marriage. To effectuate the pension portion of the divorce decree, the court issued an agreed Qualified Domestic Relations Order ("QDRO"), directing the Pension Fund to allocate 50% of the future benefits due to Mr. Davis from the fund to Plaintiff. The Pension Fund, through Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery, filed a motion with the Common Pleas Court, seeking the vacation of the QDRO on the ground that the Fund was barred by Ohio Rev.Code § 742.47 from paying benefits to Jeanette Davis. The Pension Fund's motion was overruled, and it timely appealed. On December 4, 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Ohio reversed the lower court, and remanded the case to the Court of Common Pleas for the entry of an order vacating the QDRO.

Plaintiff Jeanette Davis initiated this litigation on November 16, 1999, seeking to invalidate and enjoin enforcement of Ohio Rev.Code § 742.47 and other Pension Fund policies, on the ground that application of that statute and the policies resulted in deprivations of her constitutional rights. She set forth three claims for relief under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, to wit: 1) a claim for taking of her property interest in 50% of James Davis' pension benefit from the Pension Fund without just compensation; 2) a claim for violation of her right to substantive due process; and 3) a claim for violation of her right to equal protection. The original defendants to this action were Betty Montgomery, Attorney General of Ohio; Robert Taft, Governor of Ohio; the State of Ohio; and the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund.

On February 10, 2000, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (Doc. # 11), in which she removed the State of Ohio and the Board of Trustees of the Pension Fund as party-defendants to this litigation, and added the Executive Director and individual trustees of the Pension Fund.1 In addition, she added a fourth claim, namely a claim for violation of her right to procedural due process.

Pending before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss (Doc. # 6, Doc. # 17, and Doc. # 21), constituting motions by each of the current and former Defendants to this lawsuit for dismissal of her three original claims. For the reasons assigned, the Motions of the Executive Director and the individually-named trustees (Doc. # 17), and of Montgomery and Taft (Doc. # 21) are SUSTAINED. The Motion of former Defendants State of Ohio and Board of Trustees (Doc. # 6) is OVERRULED as MOOT.

I. Motion to Dismiss of the Executive Director and Individually Named Trustees of the Pension Fund (Doc. # 17); Motion to Dismiss of Betty Montgomery and Robert Taft (Doc. # 21)

Allen J. Proctor, the Executive Director of the Pension Fund, and the eleven individually-named trustees assert four grounds on which Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed. First, they argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final determinations of the state courts in judicial proceedings under the Rooker Feldman doctrine. Second, they assert that, under the doctrine of claim preclusion, Davis is precluded from raising her constitutional claims in a federal proceeding when she has failed to raise those arguments in her previous state court proceeding. Third, Defendants Proctor, Erbaugh, Saunders and Winfree contend that Plaintiff has failed to state claims against them upon which relief may be granted. Fourth, the trustees argue that Davis has failed to name the real party in interest, when she named the designated agent for the Ohio Attorney General as a party-defendant.

Defendants Montgomery and Taft also set forth five arguments why the claims against them must be dismissed. First, they assert (as do the trustees of the Pension Fund) that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Second, they contend that they are entitled to immunity, pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. Third, they argue that Ohio Rev. Code § 742.47 (anti-alienation law) does not infringe upon Plaintiff's substantive due process rights. Fourth, they assert that the application of the anti-alienation law does not violate Davis' right to equal protection. Finally, they argue that there has been no unconstitutional taking in this case. As discussed below, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine requires that Plaintiff's claims be dismissed, for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the Court's analysis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine resolves Defendants' motions, the Court will not address their additional arguments in support of their motions to dismiss.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine states that a party which has lost in state court "is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights." Johnson v. DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-6, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994); see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923). A party raising a federal question must appeal a state court decision through the state system and then directly to the Supreme Court of the United States. Boure v. Clark County Municipal Ct. of Springfield, 2000 WL 145382 (6th Cir. Jan.31, 2000). As stated by the Supreme Court,

[O]ne of the policies underlying the requirement that constitutional claims be raised in state court as a predicate to our certiorari jurisdiction is the desirability of giving the state court the first opportunity to consider a state statute or rule in light of federal constitutional arguments. A state court may give the statute a saving construction in response to those arguments.

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482-84 n. 16, 103 S.Ct. 1303.

In order for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to apply, two elements must be satisfied: first, the issue before this Court must be "inextricably intertwined" with the prior state court claim, and second, the action brought in the district court must be a "specific grievance" that the law was invalidly — even unconstitutionally — applied in the plaintiff's particular case, rather than a "general challenge" to the constitutionality of the state's law applied in the state action. Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir.1998); Planet Earth Entertainment, Inc. v. Edwards, 84 F.Supp.2d 891, 900 (S.D.Ohio 1999)(Rice, J.).

The first requirement (i.e., that the issue before the Court be "inextricably intertwined" with the claim in the state court proceeding) has been found to be satisfied if the relief requested in the federal action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its holding. Planet Earth, 84 F.Supp.2d at 900, citing Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1994) and Whiteford v. Reed, 155 F.3d 671, 674 (3d Cir.1998). The failure of a party to raise a constitutional challenge in state court does not prevent application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. at 900. However, numerous courts have stated that an issue is not inextricably intertwined with the state court claim if the party had no "reasonable opportunity" to present the issue in state court. E.g., Wood v. Orange County, 715 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1983).

In the present case, the trustees contend that Plaintiff cannot satisfy the...

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  • Leekley-Winslow v. Minnesota
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota
    • March 30, 2020
    ...508, 513 (8th Cir. 1999)("When the goal of a state action is nullify a state judgment, it is barred."); see also Davis v. Montgomery, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff's constitutional claims w......

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