Leekley-Winslow v. Minnesota

• Decision Date: 30 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 19-cv-2071 (NEB/HB)
• Parties: Colton Francis Leekley-Winslow, Plaintiff, v. State of Minnesota, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

Colton Francis Leekley-Winslow, Plaintiff, v. State of Minnesota, Defendant.

Case No. 19-cv-2071 (NEB/HB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

March 30, 2020

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Colton Francis Leekley-Winslow, 16465 25th Street South, Lakeland, MN 55043, pro se

Kathryn Iverson Landrum, Minnesota Attorney General's Office, 445 Minnesota Street, Suite 1100, Saint Paul, MN 55101, for State of Minnesota

HILDY BOWBEER, United States Magistrate Judge

This matter is before the Court on the State of Minnesota's Motion to Dismiss. [Doc. No. 11.] The motions were referred to this Court for a report and recommendation by the Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Court Judge, in an order of referral dated November 7, 2019. [Doc. No. 10.]

I. Background

Plaintiff Colton Francis Leekley-Winslow, proceeding pro se, initiated this action against the State of Minnesota on August 1, 2019.¹ (Compl. at 1 [Doc. No. 1].) Thecomplaint concerns interactions Plaintiff alleges he had with the Hennepin County District Court related to an action he attempted to pursue in that court, Leekley-Winslow v. Fairview Health Services, No. 27-CR-18-19543 (Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct.).

On June 11, 2019, Plaintiff filed an affidavit to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in the state court proceedings. (James Aff. Ex. 3 [Doc. No. 15-3 at 3].) Under state law, if a person submits an affidavit for IFP status that is "substantially in the language required by [law], and is not found by the court to be untrue," and the court finds "that the action is not of a frivolous nature," then the court shall permit all court expenses to be paid by the state. Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3(b). Plaintiff's application was reviewed and denied by the state court, who found that Plaintiff was not indigent and was not entitled to proceed IFP. (James Aff. Ex. 4 [Doc. No. 15-4].)

Subsequently, on July 31, 2019, Plaintiff visited the Hennepin County District Court to file in-person a motion for default judgment and an affidavit related to his state case. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff informed the court clerk that his IFP request had been denied, which he "found . . . unacceptable," and asked the clerk to put the $75 filing fee "on his tab." (Id.) The clerks declined to file the paperwork because Plaintiff did not pay the filing fee. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff filed this lawsuit the next day, alleging constitutional violations.

On October 25, 2019, Assistant Attorney General Marta James filed a Notice of Appearance in this matter and served it at the address provided by Plaintiff and on the Court's docket (hereafter referred to as the "home address.") That mailing was returned with a notation that Plaintiff had been detained at the Washington County Jail. (LandrumLetter at 1 [Doc No. 24].) From that point forward, Defendant mailed all documents to both Plaintiff's home address and the Washington County Jail. (Id.) When Defendant filed its motion to dismiss the remainder of Plaintiff's claims on November 8, 2019, copies of the motion and supporting documents were mailed to both locations. (Certificate of Service [Doc. No. 17].) The paperwork mailed to Plaintiff's home address was returned as undeliverable but the mailing to the Washington County Jail was not returned. (Landrum Letter at 1.) Later, in December, Defendant mailed a Notice of Withdrawal and Substitution of Counsel to both addresses. [Doc. No. 18-1.] This time, the copy sent to the Washington County Jail was returned as undeliverable, but the document sent to Plaintiff's home address was not returned. (Landrum Letter at 1.) Finally, on January 23, 2020, Defendant mailed a copy of its Notice Regarding Reply Memorandum to both addresses. [Doc. No. 22.] Neither copy was returned. (Landrum Letter at 1.)

A hearing on Defendant's motion was scheduled for January 28, 2020, at 9:00 a.m. (later changed to 9:30 a.m.). [Doc. Nos. 12, 20.] The date, time, and location of the hearing were set forth in the Notice of Motion filed by Defendant and sent to both addresses. [Doc No. 17.] Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's motion and did not appear for the hearing. (See Jan. 28, 2020 Minutes [Doc. No. 23].)

II. Discussion

The Court has the duty to construe liberally a pro se party's pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). The Court construes Plaintiff's remaining claims to be seeking (1) declaratory relief that Minnesota's IFP statute was unconstitutionally appliedto him and (2) declaratory relief that Minnesota's IFP statute is unconstitutional on its face, and (3) injunctive relief in the form of a change to Minnesota's IFP statute as follows:

A litigant who has filed an IFP [application] under penalty of perjury and not been found guilty of perjury may not have paperwork refused at the courthouse due to filing fees. The State of Minnesota must receive the paperwork, and may assess filing fees based on approval or denial of the IFP only after the case has concluded.

(Compl. at 5.)

A. Plaintiff's As-Applied Constitutional Challenge

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's complaint "in essence . . . asserts that the state court ruled incorrectly in determining that he was not indigent and in denying his application for IFP." (Def's Mot. Dismiss at 6 [Doc. No. 11].) To that end, Defendant asserts, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in that they seek to overrule the state court's decision. (Id. at 6-8.)

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). Generally, state appellate courts review state district court decisions, with any subsequent federal review limited to the United States Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. As such, federal "appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify a state-court judgment is lodged . . . exclusively in [the Supreme Court]." Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 283. In other words, with rare exceptions, the federal district courts lacksubject matter jurisdiction to review state-court rulings. See id. at 292 n.8; Lemonds v. St Louis Cty., 222 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2000).

Rooker-Feldman applies not only to "the rare case styled as a direct appeal," Simes v. Huckabee, 354 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 2004), but also to attempts to litigate different claims that are nevertheless "inextricably intertwined" with the state-court judgment, D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983); see Lemonds, 222 F.3d at 492 ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine forecloses not only straightforward appeals but also more indirect attempts by federal plaintiffs to undermine state court decisions."). There are four requirements for Rooker-Feldman to apply:

(1) the federal court plaintiff must have lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state court judgment, (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment, and (4) the state court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.

Christ's Household of Faith v. Ramsey Cty., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1044 (D. Minn. 2009) (citing Skit Int'l, Ltd. v. DAC Techs. of Ark., Inc., 487 F.3d 1154, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 2007)). All four elements are present here.

While Plaintiff's complaint is styled as a challenge to the Minnesota IFP statute, the impetus for his complaint was the state court's decision regarding his IFP status, which he essentially seeks to overturn. That is, the heart of Plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenge is that the IFP statute was wrongly applied to him by the state court. A decision by this Court that the law was unconstitutionally applied would effectively nullify the state judgment. That is precisely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. See Canal Capital Corp. v. Valley Pride Pack, Inc., 169 F.3d 508, 513 (8th Cir. 1999)("When the goal of a state action is nullify a state judgment, it is barred."); see also Davis v. Montgomery, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1113 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (citing Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the plaintiff's constitutional claims were "inextricably intertwined" with state court proceedings because the constitutional challenge "would effectively nullify the state court's determination"). Although his claims are styled as constitutional challenges, they are, in effect, an appeal by Plaintiff of the Minnesota state court's judgment denying him IFP status and, as a result, refusing to allow him to proceed with his case without paying the filing fee. See O'Grady v. Johnson, Case No. 05-cv-2203 (JNE/JJG), 2006 WL 2403579, at *10 (D. Minn. Aug. 18, 2006) (noting that a federal civil rights action was "in reality, an appeal . . . of the Wisconsin state court judgments relating to his divorce and child support and custody obligations under which he failed to prevail and from which he now complains of injury"). The Minnesota court's IFP determination is thus "inextricably intertwined" with Plaintiff's as-applied constitutional challenge. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16.

Moreover, Plaintiff did not pursue his constitutional challenge in state court despite having a reasonable opportunity to do so. See Powell, 80 F.3d at 467 (holding that a constitutional challenge of a statute did not preclude application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine when the plaintiff had a "reasonable opportunity" to bring his claim in the state court proceeding). As Defendant correctly notes, under Minnesota law, IFP decisions are subject to appellate review. See Minn. Stat. § 480A.06; State v. Scheffler, 932 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Minn. Ct. App. 2019). Plaintiff had sixty days from July 23, 2019 to appeal the IFP decision, which he did not do. See Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 104.01, subd. 1;(James Aff. Ex. 3). To the extent P...