Davis v. Neal

• Decision Date: 23 October 1911
• Citation: 140 S.W. 278
• Parties: DAVIS v. NEAL et al.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

140 S.W. 278

DAVIS v. NEAL et al.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

October 23, 1911.

Appeal from Bradley Chancery Court; Zachariah T. Wood, Chancellor.

Action by Mary Neal and others against J. H. Davis. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Appellees instituted this suit in the chancery court against appellant to cancel a tax deed from the state to the appellant as a cloud on their title, to confirm their title, and for a writ of possession.

In 1864 William A. Leslie died intestate, owning and occupying the lands in controversy as a homestead. He left surviving him his widow, Ann Leslie, and three minor children, namely, Mary E., aged six years, Maggie J., aged four years and a half, and Annie M., aged three years. The lands were situated in Bradley county, Ark., and the mother and children continued to reside thereon. In 1870 the widow married the appellant, J. H. Davis, and continued to occupy the lands as her homestead until September, 1908, when she died. Her daughter Mary E. lived with her until her marriage in January, 1884, to David Neal, at which time she was 24 years old. Maggie J. lived with her mother until her marriage in October, 1885, to Sam Boyce. She has since died, leaving surviving her minor children, who are the remaining appellees in the case. No dower was ever assigned the widow, Ann Leslie. Annie M. Leslie was never married, and died without issue. The lands were forfeited to the state for the nonpayment of taxes for the year 1868. The appellant after his marriage to Ann Leslie purchased the state's title thereto. He testified that he had been in possession of the lands ever since June 3, 1872, and has made valuable improvements thereon. He built a residence costing about $400 in 1876 or 1880, and a barn which cost him about $100. Within the last two years, he testifies that he has put up considerable wire fencing, but does not state the amount and value of same. He further states that the appellees have known all the while that he has claimed the land in question as his own individual estate, and that he has paid taxes on same. The chancellor rendered a decree in favor of the appellees, and the case is here on appeal.

John E. Bradley, for appellant. Herring & Williams, for appellees.

HART, J. (after stating the facts as above).

It is conceded by the counsel for both sides that the decision of this case depends upon the construction to be given to sections 29 and 30, c. 68, Gould's Digest. Section 29 provides that "every free white person of this state, being the head of a family, is entitled to a homestead." Section 30 reads as follows: "The preceding section shall be deemed and construed to exempt such homestead in the manner aforesaid, during the time it be occupied by the widow or child or children of any deceased person, who was when living, entitled to the benefits of this act."

It is contended by counsel for the appellant that the word "widow," as used in the act, means a woman who has lost her husband by death, and also remains unmarried. They insist that when Ann Leslie, the widow of William Leslie, married the appellant, J. H. Davis, her right of homestead in the lands in controversy ceased. On the other hand, it is contended by counsel for the appellees that the word "widow" is used in the sense of a wife who has outlived her husband. We think that the construction contended for by counsel for appellant is too narrow and literal, and is contrary to the spirit and intent of the act. It is the settled policy of this court that homestead acts are remedial, and should be liberally construed to effectuate the beneficent purposes for which they are intended. We think that the word "widow," as used in the act, refers to the person, and not to her state or condition, whether she remains a widow or marries again. The rule is that, whenever a right of law is attached to a person by reason of her being a widow, such right...