Davis v. Roper, 43941
Citation | 167 S.E.2d 685,119 Ga.App. 442 |
Decision Date | 25 March 1969 |
Docket Number | No. 43941,No. 2,43941,2 |
Parties | U. E. DAVIS et al. v. Everett C. ROPER |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Scott & Bouwsma Otis J. Bouwsma, Cornelia, for appellant.
Ellard & Frankum, Stephen D. Frankum, Clarkesville, for appellee.
Syllabus Opinion by the Court
Since this appeal was taken from the dismissal of a third party complaint the following rule is applicable. Code Ann. § 81A-154(b). (Ga.L.1966, pp. 609, 658.)
In interpreting the equivalent of this section in conjunction with Federal Rule 14 (Code Ann. § 81A-114; Ga.L.1966, pp. 609 627) the federal courts have held that where a defendant's motion to implead a third party is denied the order would not be appealable inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of any rights of the defendant. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, § 14.19, p. 640 (Note 7); County Bank, Greenwood, S.C. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 4 Civ., 184 F.2d 152. If the main claim remains pending, an order dismissing a third party complaint lacks finality where the court does not execute a certificate pursuant to § 54 (Code Ann. § 81A-154). 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.36, p. 251 (Note 2); David v. District of Columbia, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 187 F.2d 204. Absent an express determination that there exists no just cause for delay and an express direction for entry of judgment, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims does not terminate the action as to any of the claims. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.28 (1 & 2) and § 54.36; 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1193 ( ). Republic of China v. American Express Co., 2 Cir., 190 F.2d 334, 338; Atkins, Kroll Ltd. v. Cabrera, 9 Cir., 277 F.2d 922; Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 3 Cir., 343 F.2d 200; Woodby v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 6 Cir., 345 F.2d 668.
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Walker v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 33225.
...denied the order would not be appealable inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of any rights of the defendant." Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685, 686 (1969). In other words, "when a trial court denies the motion of a party to the action to implead other persons, that order ......
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Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc.
...was no determination and direction within the purview of Code Ann. § 81A-154(b), supra. See also in this connection Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685; D. Davis & Company v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663; Residential Developments, Inc. v. Dodd, 122 Ga.App. 674, 178 ......
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Walker v. Robinson
...the appeal was premature and should have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Code Ann. § 81A-154(b) was applied in Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685 (appeal from the dismissal of a third-party complaint); D. Davis & Co. v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663 (appeal ......
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J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co.
...the entry of the judgment under the provision of Section 54(b) of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-154(b)). See Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685; D. Davis & Co. v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663; American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 120 Ga.App. 624, 171 ......