Davis v. Roper, 43941

Citation167 S.E.2d 685,119 Ga.App. 442
Decision Date25 March 1969
Docket NumberNo. 43941,No. 2,43941,2
PartiesU. E. DAVIS et al. v. Everett C. ROPER
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Scott & Bouwsma Otis J. Bouwsma, Cornelia, for appellant.

Ellard & Frankum, Stephen D. Frankum, Clarkesville, for appellee.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court

QUILLIAN, Judge.

Since this appeal was taken from the dismissal of a third party complaint the following rule is applicable. 'When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however, designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudiciating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.' Code Ann. § 81A-154(b). (Ga.L.1966, pp. 609, 658.)

In interpreting the equivalent of this section in conjunction with Federal Rule 14 (Code Ann. § 81A-114; Ga.L.1966, pp. 609 627) the federal courts have held that where a defendant's motion to implead a third party is denied the order would not be appealable inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of any rights of the defendant. 3 Moore's Federal Practice, § 14.19, p. 640 (Note 7); County Bank, Greenwood, S.C. v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 4 Civ., 184 F.2d 152. If the main claim remains pending, an order dismissing a third party complaint lacks finality where the court does not execute a certificate pursuant to § 54 (Code Ann. § 81A-154). 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.36, p. 251 (Note 2); David v. District of Columbia, 88 U.S.App.D.C. 92, 187 F.2d 204. Absent an express determination that there exists no just cause for delay and an express direction for entry of judgment, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than all the claims does not terminate the action as to any of the claims. 6 Moore's Federal Practice, § 54.28 (1 & 2) and § 54.36; 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1193 (1968 pocket part, pp. 22-26). Republic of China v. American Express Co., 2 Cir., 190 F.2d 334, 338; Atkins, Kroll Ltd. v. Cabrera, 9 Cir., 277 F.2d 922; Thompson v. Trent Maritime Co., 3 Cir., 343 F.2d 200; Woodby v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 6 Cir., 345 F.2d 668.

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23 cases
  • Walker v. Option One Mortg. Corp., 33225.
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • June 7, 2007
    ...denied the order would not be appealable inasmuch as it does not finally dispose of any rights of the defendant." Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685, 686 (1969). In other words, "when a trial court denies the motion of a party to the action to implead other persons, that order ......
  • Thompson v. Clarkson Power Flow, Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 1978
    ...was no determination and direction within the purview of Code Ann. § 81A-154(b), supra. See also in this connection Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685; D. Davis & Company v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663; Residential Developments, Inc. v. Dodd, 122 Ga.App. 674, 178 ......
  • Walker v. Robinson
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 12, 1974
    ...the appeal was premature and should have been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. Code Ann. § 81A-154(b) was applied in Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685 (appeal from the dismissal of a third-party complaint); D. Davis & Co. v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663 (appeal ......
  • J. C. Penney Co. v. Malouf Co.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • March 9, 1972
    ...the entry of the judgment under the provision of Section 54(b) of the Civil Practice Act (Code Ann. § 81A-154(b)). See Davis v. Roper, 119 Ga.App. 442, 167 S.E.2d 685; D. Davis & Co. v. Plunkett, 119 Ga.App. 453, 167 S.E.2d 663; American Mutual Liab. Ins. Co. v. Moore, 120 Ga.App. 624, 171 ......
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