Davis v. Sawyer

• Citation: 133 Mass. 289
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 07 September 1882
• Parties: Charles G. Davis & others v. Francis A. Sawyer & others

133 Mass. 289

Charles G. Davis & others v. Francis A. Sawyer & others

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

September 7, 1882

Plymouth.

Decree affirmed.

N Morse & E. W. Hutchins, for the defendants, cited Scott v. Firth, 10 Law Times (N.S.) 240; Gaunt v Fynney, L. R. 8 Ch. 8; St. Helen's Smelting Co. v Tipping, 11 H. L. Cas. 642; Walter v. Selfe, 4 DeG. & Sm. 315; White v. Cohen, 1 Drew. 312; Ripon v. Hobart, 3 M. & K. 169; Attorney General v. Nichol, 16 Ves. 338; Salvin v. North Brancepeth Coal Co. L. R. 9 Ch. 705; Fay v. Whitman, 100 Mass. 76; Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448; Richards's appeal, 57 Penn. St. 105; Huckenstine's appeal, 70 Penn. St. 102; Dumesnil v. Dupont, 18 B. Mon. 800; Hahn v. Thornberry, 7 Bush 403; Jordan v. Woodward, 38 Me. 423.

C. G. Davis, for the plaintiffs, among other cases, cited Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. N. C. 134; Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. (N.S.) 133; Harrison v. St. Mark's Church, 3 Weekly Notes (Penn.) 384.

W. Allen, J. Endicott & Field, JJ., absent.

OPINION

W. Allen, J.

This is a bill in equity praying for an injunction to restrain the defendants from ringing a bell. The case comes here on appeal by the defendants from a decree entered by a single judge, enjoining them from ringing the bell earlier than half after six o'clock in the morning. The plaintiffs for many years have owned and occupied dwelling-houses situated, one about one thousand feet, and the other about three hundred feet, from a woollen mill of the defendants. The defendants began to run their mill, which had been before that occupied by other persons, in December 1879, and about January 1, 1880, placed the bell upon the mill, and caused it to be rung every working day at five o'clock, and twice between six and six and one half o'clock, in the morning, and at other times during the day, except that the five-o'clock bell was discontinued during the summer months.

The plaintiffs allege that the bell as rung is a private nuisance to them, and injures their property, and disturbs the quiet and comfort of their homes; that it is not necessary for any purpose of trade or manufacture; that it is unnecessarily large, and rung at unseasonable hours, and unreasonably long. The defendants in their answer deny that the bell is a nuisance to the plaintiffs, and say that it is used by the defendants to summon the operatives in their mill to work; that it is necessary and customary to adopt some method to summon operatives in such a manufactory to their work; that the bell is of suitable size, and rung at suitable hours, and in a proper manner, for that purpose.

Two questions are presented: whether the plaintiffs have proved that the ringing of the bell is a nuisance to them; and whether it is such a nuisance that this court will interfere to restrain it by injunction.

Noise which constitutes an annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibility to sound, such as materially to interfere with the ordinary comfort of life, and impair the reasonable enjoyment of his habitation, is a nuisance to him. Crump v. Lambert, L. R. 3 Eq. 409. Wesson v. Washburn Iron Co. 13 Allen 95. Fay v. Whitman, 100 Mass. 76. Upon a careful examination of the evidence reported, it seems fully to sustain the finding of the judge who heard the case, that the ringing of the bell was a nuisance to the plaintiffs. The bell weighs about two thousand pounds, and is set in an open tower about forty feet from the ground, and was rung for a long time at five o'clock, as many as ninety strokes having been repeatedly counted. The residences of the plaintiffs are so situated with respect to the bell particularly that of the plaintiff Davis, being higher than the bell and upon a hill-side, with no obstruction between, that they receive the full force of the sound, and they are in a village in which, at that hour, there is no other ringing of bells, or other disturbing noise. Without referring to the evidence in detail, or reviewing the particular circumstances affecting the question, it is enough to say that the evidence sustains what must have been found by the judge, namely, that the plaintiffs were deprived of sleep during hours usually devoted to repose, and were personally annoyed, and disturbed in their homes, and the quiet and comfort of their dwellings were impaired, as the natural consequence of the acts of the defendants which are complained of. Nor is the fact that a large majority of the persons living nearer to the bell than the plaintiffs were not annoyed by it, at all conclusive that it would not, and did not, awaken and annoy persons of ordinary sensibility to noise situated as the plaintiffs were. Besides the consideration that nearness to the bell would not alone determine the effect produced by its sound, it is obvious that the bell was sufficient and effective to awaken persons ordinarily sensitive to sound, who were no...