Davis v. Sec'y
| Decision Date | 04 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:12-cv-659-FtM-38CM |
| Parties | RYAN DAVIS, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Ryan Davis ("Petitioner") who is presently confined at the Liberty Correctional Institution in Bristol, Florida (Doc. 2, filed December 10, 2012). Petitioner attacks the convictions entered by the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court in LeeCounty, Florida for three counts of aggravated battery with a weapon. Id. Respondent filed a response to the petition (Doc. 16). Petitioner filed a reply (Doc. 28).
Petitioner raises eight claims in his petition. Upon due consideration of the pleadings and the state court record, the Court concludes that each claim must be denied. Because the Court may resolve the Petition on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) ().
On July 14, 2005, Petitioner was charged by information with three counts of aggravated battery (Ex. 1).3 After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty on all three counts with a specific finding that he had used a weapon (Ex. 5). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 years in prison on each count (Ex. 6; Ex. 7 at 49). Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences on February 12, 2010 (Ex. 14).
On January 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a motion pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Rule 3.850 motion") in which he raised ten claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (Ex. 15). The motion was denied by the post-conviction court (Ex. 20), and Florida's Second District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed (Ex. 24). Mandate issued on November 29, 2012 (Ex. 25).
Petitioner filed a state habeas corpus petition on July 5, 2011 in which he raised two claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel (Ex. 27). The petition was denied on September 21, 2011 (Ex. 28).
Petitioner signed the instant federal habeas petition on December 7, 2012 (Doc. 2).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Notably, a state court's violation of state law is not sufficient to show that a petitioner is in custody in violation of the "Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 16 (2010).
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S.70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since 'a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S. Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). State courts "must reasonably apply the rules 'squarely established' by Court's holdings to the facts of each case. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).
Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the statecourt's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). Moreover, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by Court." Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122.
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) () (dictum); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013) (same).
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
The focus of inquiry under Strickland's performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner bears the heavy burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner's burden to demonstrate prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That is, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Kaitlyne Byrne ("Byrne") as a defense witness at trial (Doc. 2 at 5). Petitioner asserts that Byrne would have testified that: prior to the fight, "multiple people were showing aggression" towards Petitioner; more than twenty or thirty "Cape" kids attacked Petitioner and his three friends;no additional cars showed up with Petitioner's friends during the fight; Petitioner told her that he was "jumped"; Petitioner told her that he picked up something from the ground; Petitioner never bragged about the fight in her presence; after the fight he was next to her as he ran back to the truck; and that she was friends with both Petitioner and the victims. Id. at 6.
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion, and the trial court denied the...
To continue reading
Request your trial