Davis v. Sponhauer

• Decision Date: 24 June 1991
• Docket Number: No. 43A03-9010-CV-441,43A03-9010-CV-441
• Parties: Paul G. DAVIS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Marvey J. SPONHAUER and Beverly Sponhauer, Appellees (Plaintiffs Below).
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 292

574 N.E.2d 292

Paul G. DAVIS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. Marvey J. SPONHAUER and Beverly Sponhauer, Appellees

(Plaintiffs Below).

No. 43A03-9010-CV-441.

Court of Appeals of Indiana,

Third District.

June 24, 1991.

Michael J. Kramer, Heckner & Kirsch, Ligonier, Thomas L. Clem, Bagot Free & Shearer, Anderson, for appellant.

Richard K. Helm, Rockhill, Pinnick, Pequignot, Helm & Landis, Warsaw, for appellees.

STATON, Judge.

Paul Davis appeals from an adverse judgment following a bench trial on Marvey and Beverly Sponhauer's complaint to quiet title to a disputed strip of land. Davis presents nineteen allegations of trial court error, which we consolidate and rephrase as:

I. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the Sponhauers established title to the disputed tract by adverse possession.

II. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the property line had been established by the agreement of the parties and their predecessors-in-interest.

III. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Davis committed a slander of title against the Sponhauers.

IV. Whether the damages awarded to the Sponhauers were excessive.

V. Whether the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees to the Sponhauers.

VI. Whether the trial court erred in finding Davis in contempt for violating a preliminary injunction.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part.

This case concerns a boundary dispute over a strip of land located in the Cedar Point region of Lake Wawasee, Indiana. In 1973, the Sponhauers purchased two adjacent lots on which a cottage and boat house had been built. The Sponhauers' land is bordered on the south and east by lake channels. Davis' land borders the same southern lake channel, and is situated to the west of Mr. and Mrs. Sponhauer's lot.

In 1957, the parties' predecessors-in-interest vacated an unused roadway between their properties. This roadway makes up a large portion of the disputed tract. From 1973 to 1977, the Sponhauers and the Vances (Davis' predecessor-in-interest) used the gravel lot in between the properties as a parking area for their vehicles. The Sponhauers would park their cars on the easternmost part of the lot, two abreast, while the Vances would park their vehicles on the western portion. In 1977, the Sponhauers and the Vances blacktopped the gravel area, each paying for half of the improvement, and continued the same parking routine. The parties also used this area for playing basketball and other activities. From that point on, the Sponhauers maintained the blacktop area, applying sealer as needed.

When the Vances acquired their property in 1973, the Claytons (Sponhauers' predecessors-in-interest) showed them the dividing line between the properties. The boundary was described as a line parallel to the Vances' boat house, running north from an angle in the seawall on the southern channel, through or near a point where an historical marker was located. In Mr. Vance's presence, Mr. Clayton pointed out the same line to the Sponhauers when they acquired their property later that year.

Davis acquired the property from Vance in 1986. A survey of the property required by Davis' lending institution revealed the platted boundary as a line on the eastern edge of the vacated road. Although Davis and the Sponhauers got along well initially, relations deteriorated in 1989 when Davis began requesting that the Sponhauers (and those who rented the cottage on occasion) remove their vehicles from the blacktopped area. After conducting another survey, Davis erected a fence six inches west of the platted boundary line. The fence was initially constructed in a manner that required the Sponhauers to trespass on their neighbor's property in order to get to their own land.

The Sponhauers filed suit to quiet title to the disputed property, alleging that they had acquired title by agreement, adverse possession, easement by prescription, and an easement of necessity. They also sued for slander of title, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions, damages, and attorney fees. On October 19, 1989, the trial court entered a preliminary injunction, requiring Davis to leave removed that portion of his fence that had been taken down to allow the Sponhauers access to their property. The injunction also prohibited Davis from interfering with the Sponhauers' right to park their vehicles on the blacktopped area as they had done for the prior sixteen years.

On December 18, 1989, following a hearing on the Sponhauers' motion for contempt, the trial court found Davis in contempt for interfering with the Sponhauers' use of the blacktopped area. The court ordered Davis to comply with the injunction and pay the Sponhauers $400.00 in attorney fees. Following trial to the court, title to the disputed tract was quieted in the Sponhauers. The court established the property line as that agreed to by the parties' predecessors-in-interest, and ordered Davis to remove the fence. The court further ordered Davis to pay damages of $3,000.00 and attorney fees amounting to $8,071.00.

Standard of Review

Because the trial court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we are bound to review the same under the following standard: we first must determine whether the evidence supports the findings; then we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Kaminszky v. Kukuch (1990), Ind.App., 553 N.E.2d 868, 870, trans. denied. The judgment of the trial court will be affirmed if we conclude that the special findings support the judgment and are not clearly erroneous. Brancheau v. Weddle (1990), Ind.App., 555 N.E.2d 1315, 1317. Special findings are clearly erroneous if the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. Kaminszky, supra, at 870. A judgment is clearly erroneous where a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made, such as where the evidence is without conflict and points unerringly to a different conclusion. Indiana Dep't of Correction v. Stagg (1990), Ind.App., 556 N.E.2d 1338, 1341, trans. denied.

I. Adverse Possession

Davis first argues that the Sponhauers failed to meet their burden of proving the elements necessary to prevail on their claim of adverse possession. Title to real estate may be defeated by adverse possession where the possession has been actual, visible, notorious, exclusive, under a claim of ownership, hostile to the true owner, and continuous for the statutory period. Emberry Community Church v. Bloomington Dist. Missionary & Church Extension Society, Inc. (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 288, 294. The statutory period is ten years. IND.CODE 34-1-2-2(6) (1988); Ford v. Eckert (1980), Ind.App., 406 N.E.2d 1209. ¹ However, record title is the highest evidence of ownership, and is not easily defeated. McCarty v. Sheets (1981), Ind., 423 N.E.2d 297. The facts relied upon as constituting adverse possession must be strictly proved by evidence that is clear, positive and unequivocal. Piel v. DeWitt (1976), 170 Ind.App. 63, 351 N.E.2d 48.

Davis contends that the Sponhauers' possession was not sufficiently open or notorious to sustain a finding of adverse possession. A notorious possession is one that is:

so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public--at least by the people in the vicinity of the premises. It must be manifest to the community.... It ought to be so well known and commonly understood that the people residing in the neighborhood could testify with substantial unanimity concerning its existence.... the possession must have been so notorious as to warrant the inference that the owner ought to have known that a stranger was asserting dominion over his land.

McCarty, supra, at 301 (quoting Philbin v. Carr (1920), 75 Ind.App. 560, 584-85, 129 N.E. 19, 27-28).

A review of the record indicates the Sponhauers treated the disputed tract as their own property. They began parking their vehicles on the gravel lot from the very beginning of their residency at the lake. The evidence indicates that the lot was similarly used dating back to 1957. A few years after moving in, the Sponhauers and the Vances agreed to blacktop the parking area, splitting the cost. The Sponhauers continued to use the area to park their cars, and for other activities. Marvey Sponhauer maintained the blacktop area, applying sealant as needed. The Sponhauers placed a pier where the disputed tract borders the southern channel, and installed a birdhouse and some landscaping on that property. The Sponhauer children often played in the area in question. Neighbors were in agreement as to their understanding of the location of the property line, based on the Sponhauers' regular use of the property.

Contrary to Davis' assertions, these activities amount to more than just "casual maintenance" of the sort generally found insufficient to support an adverse possession claim. See, e.g., Beaver v. Vandall (1989), Ind., 547 N.E.2d 802. The trial judge determined that the evidence supported the conclusion that the Sponhauers' use was notorious. We cannot say that the evidence is without conflict and supports a contrary conclusion.

Davis claims that the Sponhauers' possession was not exclusive. A possession is exclusive if it is of such a character that it operates as an ouster of the owner of legal title. Philbin, supra, 75 Ind.App. at 585, 129 N.E. at 28. There was ample testimony to establish that, from 1973 until 1986, the Sponhauers and the Vances recognized the existence of a property line running approximately through the middle of the blacktopped parking area. From 1973 until at least 1986 the Sponhauers (and those renting the cottage from them) used their portion of the lot for parking their vehicles. It is clear that the Sponhauers claimed a right to the land in question as evidenced by the parties' understanding of the location of the boundary, and by the Sponhauers' use of the property. The finding that the Sponhauers'...