Davis v. Springfield Hospital

• Decision Date: 16 June 1917
• Docket Number: No. 1915.,1915.
• Citation: 196 S.W. 104
• Parties: DAVIS v. SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

196 S.W. 104

DAVIS v. SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL.

No. 1915.

Springfield Court of Appeals. Missouri.

June 16, 1917.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Guy D. Kirby, Judge.

Action by Sarah L. Davis against the Springfield Hospital. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Delaney & Delaney, of Springfield, for appellant. T. H. Douglas, of Bolivar, for respondent.

FARRINGTON, J.

The respondent, the widow of Nathan D. Davis, deceased, recovered a judgment for $1,475 against the appellant in an action of tort.

The petition set out the relationship of the parties, and alleged that the defendant is a private corporation conducting a hospital in the city of Springfield in which sick and afflicted persons may be placed and kept for treatment for hire, and that it undertakes to furnish to persons admitted such nursing, care, and attention as their condition may require; that Nathan D. Davis on February 1, 1916, being sick and afflicted, was received by the defendant as a patient, and then and there agreed for hire to furnish said Davis a room in its hospital and such nursing and care and attention as his condition required; that he was assigned to a room on the third floor of the hospital and placed therein on February 1, 1916; and the petition then alleged the following charge of negligence:

"That said Nathan D. Davis remained in said hospital as an occupant of said room, and under the charge and care of defendant as aforesaid, from said 1st day of February, 1916, until the 4th day of February, 1916, on which last date said Nathan D. Davis, while so seriously sick and afflicted as to be unable to properly care for himself, or to know what he was doing, or to be conscious of the dangers surrounding him, or to protect himself therefrom, was, through the negligence and carelessness and unskillfulness of defendant, and its agents, servants, and employés, permitted to, and did fall from the window of the room in which he was kept by defendant in the third story of its hospital building aforesaid, a long distance to the ground below outside said building, and by such fall said Nathan D. Davis received such serious bodily injury that as a result thereof he died in a short time thereafter."

This is followed by an allegation that the carelessness, negligence, and unskillfulness of the defendant and its agent, servants, and employés in not giving said Nathan D. Davis proper nursing, care, and attention was the proximate cause of him falling from the window in said room, and the cause of his death, concluding with a prayer for $7,500 damages. An amendment was made to that portion of the petition which we have quoted, in which amendment it was charged that the defendant was negligent in not properly watching, attending, and caring for such patient. A general denial was filed by the defendant, and the case proceeded to trial. After much of the plaintiff's evidence had been introduced, that portion of the petition which we have quoted, as amended, was again amended so as to read as follows:

"That said Nathan D. Davis remained in said hospital as an occupant of said room, and under the charge and care of defendant, as aforesaid, from the 1st day of February, 1916, until the 4th day of February, 1916, on which last date said Nathan D. Davis, while under the care and in charge of said defendant, as aforesaid, and while so seriously sick and afflicted as to be unable to properly care for himself, or to know what he was doing, or to be conscious of the dangers surrounding him, or to protect himself therefrom, was, through the negligence and carelessness and unskillfulness of defendant, and its agents, servants, and employés, in failing to give to said Nathan D. Davis the care and attention which his condition required, and in failing to properly watch and care for him while he was in a delirious condition, and by reason of such delirious condition was unable to properly care for himself, said Nathan D. Davis was permitted to and did escape from his room and from the building, and fell to the ground below outside said building, and by such fall said Nathan D. Davis received such bodily injury that as a result thereof he died in a short time thereafter."

This amendment was made to cover certain testimony that was given by a Mrs. Brown who was also a patient in the hospital, which testimony will be hereinafter mentioned.

The cause was submitted to the jury on the following instructions asked by the plaintiff:

"(1) The court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that Nathan D. Davis, the former husband of plaintiff, on or about the 1st day of February, 1916, was sick and afflicted and while in that condition defendant received him as a patient in its hospital and undertook for pay to furnish him room and care while sick, then it became and was the duty of defendant to use ordinary care to give to said Nathan D. Davis such care and attention as his condition should require, and if while in the care of defendant the condition of said Nathan D. Davis became such that he was likely to become delirious, and by reason of said delirium to become unable to properly care for himself, and was likely while in that condition to place himself in a position of danger, and the servants of defendant charged with his care knew these facts, then in that event it became and was the duty of said servants of defendant to use ordinary care to keep themselves informed as to his condition, and to use ordinary care to prevent injury befalling him while delirious and unable to properly care for himself should he become in that condition, and if you shall further believe that said Nathan D. Davis did become delirious, and unable, by reason thereof, to properly care for himself, and while in that condition escaped from his room and fell on the ground below and was injured thereby, and the said servants of defendant knew at the time that said Nathan D. Davis was likely to become delirious and unable, by reason thereof, to properly care for himself, and while in that condition likely to place himself in a position of danger, and failed to use ordinary care to watch him and prevent his doing so, and by reason of said failure on their part said Nathan D. Davis escaped from his room and from the building, and fell on the ground below and was injured thereby, and that such injury caused his death, then defendant is liable therefor and you should find the issues for the plaintiff."

(2) This instruction merely defines "ordinary care."

"(3) The court instructs the jury that if you find the issues for the plaintiff you will assess her damages at such sum as you may find from the evidence to be just with reference to the necessary financial injury, if any, resulting to plaintiff from the death of her husband, not to exceed the sum of $7,500; and in ascertaining the amount of her damage, if any, you must not consider loss of companionship or mental anguish suffered by plaintiff, but may take into consideration the age of plaintiff and the age of her deceased husband at the time of his death, the earning capacity of the deceased and the value of the support, if any, furnished plaintiff by deceased, and the financial burdens, if any, cast upon the plaintiff by reason of the loss of her husband."

And upon the following instructions asked by the defendant:

"(4) The court instructs the jury that the defendant was not an insurer of the safety and safe-keeping of the deceased. The only duty which defendant owed deceased was to exercise reasonable care in looking after his safety, that is, such care as a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, would exercise; and, if you find and believe from the evidence that the defendant exercised such reasonable care, then your verdict must be for the defendant, notwithstanding the fact that the deceased got away from his room and out of the building and met with an injury resulting in his death. The fact that a fall occurred and resulted in the death of the deceased is no proof or evidence of negligence or want of ordinary care as herein defined, nor can you infer such want of reasonable care from such facts."

"(6) Although you may find and believe from the evidence that the deceased was mentally unbalanced, and that defendant was guilty of `negligence' as the term is in these instructions defined, yet, if you find he had sufficient mentality to appreciate his surroundings and danger, and that he either threw himself from the window or from the fire escape, or fell therefrom accidentally, then the plaintiff cannot recover, and the burden of proving that he was so far lacking in mentality as to be unable to appreciate his surroundings is upon the plaintiff."

And upon the following instructions, being modifications of instructions asked by defendant:

"(5) The court instructs the jury that the plaintiff charges that while the deceased was a patient at the hospital of, and in charge of defendant, he became so afflicted as to be unable to properly care for himself, and became unconscious of his surroundings, and that the defendant through its servants negligently permitted the deceased to fall to the ground from the building, thereby causing his death. It is therefore incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove, and the burden is upon her to prove: First, that the deceased did become so afflicted as not to know what he was doing, and not able to properly protect himself; second, that while the deceased was in such condition of mind, the defendant through the carelessness, negligence, or unskillfulness of its servants permitted deceased to get out of his room and out of the building and to fall to the ground; third, that such fall caused his death. The burden of proving each and all of such facts is upon the plaintiff; that is to say, she must establish such facts to your reasonable satisfaction by a greater weight or preponderance of the evidence."

"(7)...