Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 12 November 1982 |
| Parties | Lamotte L. DAVIS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. . Submitted: |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed.
Thomas Little, Wilmington, for defendant below, appellant.
Ferris W. Wharton, Deputy Atty. Gen., Wilmington, for plaintiff below, appellee.
Before McNEILLY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ.
In this appeal defendant seeks reversal of his convictions of Burglary Second Degree Felony Theft and Conspiracy Second Degree.
The first issue raised by the defendant is whether the evidence of the value of the items stolen by the defendant was properly admitted. Defendant maintains that the State failed to prove the market value of the item, at the time and place of the theft in that the owner's testimony as to value of the property constituted the purchase price of the property when new.
The value of the items stolen means the market value of the property at the time and place of the crime. 11 Del.C. § 224. Evidentiary testimony from the owner is permitted as the value of the property, as the owner is presumed cognizant of the market value. State v. 0.15 Acres of Land, etc., Del.Super., 169 A.2d 256, 258 (1961).
In the instant case, Loretta Jones, the owner of the stolen property, testified as to the estimated value of the property stolen as of the date of the theft. She described each item taken, how well it worked, when it had been purchased and her estimate as to its current value which she placed at $885.00. Given this record, we find that the evidence of the value of the property stolen was properly admitted. Defendant's contention that Jones' estimates were inflated goes to the weight of her testimony, not whether the figures were properly admitted.
The second issue is whether the State offered sufficient evidence to establish that the defendant was guilty of the crime of conspiracy. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support this conviction.
Where a defendant urges that the evidence is insufficient to support a guilty verdict, "the relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 317, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Lively v. State, Del.Supr., 427 A.2d 882 (1981).
In the instant case, a review of the evidence indicates that the defendant, Arthur Snow and others were engaged in conversation with each other immediately prior to the burglary and in a location where the victim could be...
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