Davis v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 1885
• Citation: 74 Ga. 869
• Parties: DAVIS v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

74 Ga. 869

DAVIS v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

December 15, 1885

October Term, 1885.

1. The evidence in this case was sufficient to show the defendant guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and the facts and circumstances proved excluded every other reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.

2. The following charge of the court contains a correct statement of the necessity for proving the links in a chain of circumstances: " When the guilt of the defendant depends on circumstantial evidence alone, the rule is that each separate fact or link which goes to make the chain of circumstances from which the deduction of guilt is sought to be drawn must be clearly proved, and a fact not clearly proved should not be considered as a part of the chain of circumstances, but should be rejected by the jury, and the circumstances proved must not only be consistent with the defendant's guilt, but they must exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that of the defendant's guilt. If any one or more of the circumstances relied on by the state are not clearly proved, and for this reason you reject one or more of the circumstances relied on, then you will inquire whether the other remaining circumstances proved— if they are clearly proved— are consistent with defendant's guilt, and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis than that of defendant's guilt. All essential facts and circumstances necessary to show the commission of the crime and so connect the defendant therewith as the party committing the act must be proved.

3. The requests to charge, numbered from 1 to 8, in so far as they were proper to be given, and so far as properly brought before this court for consideration, are substantially covered by the general charge.

4. The following charge, on the subject of motive for the commission of a murder, was correct: " You may inquire whether there was any motive on the part of the defendant to induce him to take the life of the deceased; and if there was any motive, what that motive was. If you find there was no motive on his part to commit the act, you may consider it especially if the evidence leaves the defendant's guilt at all doubtful, in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not. Yet, if the evidence shows the commission of the crime, and you are satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed it with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, and if the circumstances are consistent with his guilt, and inconsistent with any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his guilt, then, though the evidence may not disclose a motive, you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty."

5. The exceptions to various portions of the charge are unfounded or immaterial, or not hurtful, when read and considered with the balance of the charge.

6. There was no error in admitting evidence of various statements of the defendant, especially those made to the sheriff, denying having shot any gun where the firing was heard, it not appearing that there was anything done by the officer to excite the slightest fear or hope. Nor was there error in the charge on the subject of the admissions and statements of the accused and the cautions and remarks thereon.

7. The charge, as a whole, was full and fair.

8. A special plea to the effect that the indictment was improperly delivered to the court, being brought into the court by the bailiff of the grand jury, but not alleging that it had been tampered with or was out of the bailiff's hands from the time he left the grand jury room until he delivered it to the court, or that there was any improper conduct on his part was properly stricken on demurrer.

Criminal Law. Murder. Circumstantial Evidence. Admissions. Charge of Court. Indictment. Bailiff. Before Judge BRANHAM. Chattooga Superior Court. March Term, 1885.

To the report contained in the decision, it is necessary to add only that the grounds of the motion for a new trial were as follows:

(1.) Because the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to and overruling the special plea filed by the defendant. [See 8th division of decision.]

(2.) Because the verdict is contrary to law and evidence, and without sufficient evidence to support it, and is strongly and decidedly against the weight of the evidence.

(3.) Because the court refused to charge as follows: To authorize a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved ought to connect the defendant with the criminal act according to the following rules:

( a. ) The burden is upon the state to prove every single circumstance which is essential to constitute the crime, in the same manner and to the same extent as if the whole case had rested on the proof of each individual and essential circumstance, and a greater weight of evidence is required for the proof of a fact in a criminal than in a civil case.

( b. ) It is essential that all of the facts proved should be consistent with the supposition of the defendant's guilt, and the fact alleged, that he is the person who did the killing, and if any one established fact be inconsistent with this supposition or hypothesis, the strength of the evidence is broken, and the hypothesis cannot be correct.

( c. ) It is essential that the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency to authorize conviction on circumstantial testimony.

( d. ) It is essential that the facts proved should to a moral certainty, actually exclude every hypothesis but that of the defendant's guilt.

( e. ) It is necessary that every fact and circumstance that is relied upon in the chain of evidence invoked to establish the guilt of the defendant, should be clearly proved, and that the whole, when taken together should, to a moral certainty and beyond a reasonable doubt, establish the guilt of the accused to the exclusion of any other reasonable hypothesis. A jury would not be authorized to convict except upon plain and manifest proof of defendant's guilt.

( f. ) Circumstantial evidence ought to be acted on with great caution, especially where an anxiety is naturally felt for the detection of great crimes.

( g. ) The possibility of reasonably accounting for the facts by accident or suicide must be excluded by the circumstances proved, and it is only when no other hypothesis will explain all of the conditions of the case and account for all the facts, that it can safely and justly be concluded that it has been caused by intentional injury in other words, if the conditions of the case can be accounted for on the supposition of accident, or otherwise than by the intentional, unlawful and malicious killing of deceased by the defendant, then there will arise and exist such doubt in the case as to require the acquittal of defendant.

( h. ) The total absence of any apparent motive must always operate strongly as a circumstance in favor of the accused.

(4.) Because the court charged the jury, " You are the judges of the law and facts; you take the law from the court and the facts from the witnesses. Apply the one to the other; weigh them and judge of them, and make up your verdict accordingly." — The objection was that this charge confined the jury to the law only given them by the court, and to the facts only that were testified to by the witnesses from the stand, and excluded from their consideration facts from blood stains presented to them on the defendant's clothing that was exhibited by the state, and upon which defendant relied to debut the hypothesis that he killed and carried and threw the body of the deceased in the creek.

(5.) Because the court charged, in connection and qualifications of its charge to the jury on the subject of doubt, " It (doubt) must arise out of the evidence, or for the want of sufficient evidence."

(6.) Because the court charged, in connection and qualification of its charge, upon the subject of admissions, " If an admission or statement was voluntarily made, you may consider it, with the other evidence, in making up your verdict." — The error alleged was, that this was too general, and assumed that an admission was made, and left the jury to determine only whether it was voluntary, and not also whether it was made at all.

(7.) Because the verdict is contrary to the following charge of the court: " The burden is upon the state, not only to prove that the defendant killed the deceased, but also to prove to the satisfaction of the jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he killed with the intent, at the time, to do so; and if the killing was the result of accident, the defendant would not be guilty."

(8.) Because the court, after charging the jury, " It is not necessary to prove a killing by positive evidence, or by the testimony of an eye witness, who actually saw the crime committed," added, " a defendant may be convicted on circumstantial evidence alone," without any explanation of the nature and quantity of circumstantial evidence required to authorize a conviction.

(9.) Because the verdict is contrary to the following charge of the court: " A person shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor committed by misfortune or accident, and where it satisfactorily appears there was no evil design or intention to commit crime."

(10.) Because the court charged the jury as follows: " If you find that the defendant killed the deceased, then you cannot outside of the evidence in the case, assume or suppose such killing to have been done by accident. The mere fact that accidents may happen in the careless use of fire-arms would not alone, aside from the evidence in the case, authorize you to find the killing was the result of accident." — The error alleged is that this charge is argumentative, and expresses the opinion of the court...