Davis v. State, 30757

Decision Date30 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 30757,30757
PartiesGrady DAVIS, Jr. v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Robert D. Peckham, Jack H. Affleck, Athens, for appellant.

Harry N. Gordon, Dist. Atty., B. Thomas Cook, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., Athens, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Isaac Byrd, Atlanta, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant and the victim had had a fight two weeks earlier. On the night of the homicide, according to the defendant, the victim and the defendant were in a cafe, the victim pointed a pistol at the defendant, the defendant went outside, returned with a shotgun and killed the victim as he reached for his pistol. The State's witnesses had testified that the victim started to put his hands up when the defendant came in with the shotgun. Defendant contends that the trial court did not properly charge the jury so that he was denied a fair trial.

1. The defendant contends that the following portion of the charge to the jury was error: 'If it should appear to you by the preponderance of all of the evidence in the case that the homicide of the deceased was justified under the rules of law which I have given you in charge then in such an event it would be your duty to acquit the defendant of the charge of murder and of the lesser included charge of voluntary manslaughter contained in the indictment and to find the Defendant not guilty. By the phrase 'by the preponderance of the evidence' I mean that superior weight of evidence on the issue involved which, while not enough to wholly free the mind from reasonable doubt is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other; however, whether or not . . . justification has been proven by the preponderance of the evidence the burden of proof still rests on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense of justification does not exist before you would be authorized to convict the Defendant of either of the offenses which I have defined for you.' Although this charge will not hereafter be approved, State v. Moore, 237 Ga. 269, 227 S.E.2d 241 (1976), it is not error to give it at the time of the trial in this case. State v. Moore, supra.

2. Defendant complains of that part of the charge defining murder, Code § 26-1101, which states that malice '. . . shall be implied where no considerable provocation appears, and where all the circumstances of the killing show an abandoned and malignant heart.' The defendant contends that this portion of the charge unfairly shifted to him the burden of proving provocation; i.e., of proving his innocence.

Malice is a...

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26 cases
  • Holloway v. McElroy
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • December 11, 1980
    ...in Moore that the new rule prohibiting burden-shifting charges was to be applied prospectively only. The trial court in Davis v. State, 237 Ga. 279, 227 S.E.2d 249 (1976), began by charging the jury that it should acquit if it found that the defendant had proved justification by a preponder......
  • Gilreath v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1981
    ...is contending that in every murder case the state must disprove the elements of voluntary manslaughter, we disagree. Davis v. State, 237 Ga. 279(2), 227 S.E.2d 249 (1976). If he is contending that where the evidence raises an issue as to voluntary manslaughter, the burden is on the state to......
  • Parks v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 17, 1985
    ...absence of provocation may not substitute for proof of intent to kill, as the court's charge erroneously implied. See Davis v. State, 237 Ga. 279(2), 227 S.E.2d 249 (1976). The act of killing must also be proved in a murder case. That is, in addition to proving malice, the state must prove ......
  • Parker v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • November 23, 1998
    ...252 Ga. 409(3)(c), 314 S.E.2d 195 (1984), since malice is a state of mind which must often be proven indirectly. Davis v. State, 237 Ga. 279(2), 227 S.E.2d 249 (1976).2 However, the charge given by the trial court in this case did not inform the jury that they might infer intent to kill fro......
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