Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 17 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 5652,5652 |
| Citation | 251 Ark. 771,475 S.W.2d 155 |
| Parties | Billy Ray DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Floyd J. Lofton and Richard L. Mays, Little Rock, for appellant.
Ray Thornton, Atty. Gen., Gene O'Daniel, Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant Billy Ray Davis appeals from a conviction of murder in the first degree for which he received a sentence of life imprisonment. He contends that the court erred (1) in instructing on first degree murder and (2) in refusing to grant a continuance.
On the night of March 10, 1971, Kenneth Pederson, in company with Doyle Randy Burleson, attended a basketball game at Barton Coliseum in Little Rock. As the two men left after the game they walked through a fair exhibit barn which was used as an exit and there they were attacked from their rear by a person wielding a hickory post. According to the State's evidence the assailant attacked Pederson by striking a violent blow to the head. Pederson died within thirty-six hours as a result of the attack. Appellant escaped by outrunning some bystanders who pursued him. Within a few days he was taken into custody. There was no evidence that appellant and deceased had ever met; particularly was there a total lack of evidence that they had ever had a confrontation of any kind with each other. Appellant is a black boy about seventeen years of age and the deceased was a young white technician and instructor at Arkansas Medical Center.
Appellant contends that there was a total lack of evidence of premeditation and deliberation, both being essential elements of first degree murder. The trial court properly defined deliberation as 'a weighing in the mind of the consequences of a course of conduct, as distinguished from acting upon a sudden impulse without the exercise of reasoning powers.' Premeditation, the court said, meant It has also many times been said the necessary elements of premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from the circumstances as shown by the evidence. Walker v. State, 241 Ark. 300, 408 S.W.2d 905 (1966). There is another well established rule we follow in resolving the issue before us, that is, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, it being the appellee. Stanley v. State, 248 Ark. 787, 454 S.W.2d 72 (1970).
There is not one scintilla of evidence to show that the deceased did anything to arouse the appellant's anger. The weapon selected by appellant is significant. It is a hardwood post about three feet long and tapered on one end. It weighs approximately nine pounds. Appellant pushed one of his friends aside, apparently to enable appellant to get a full swing. The situs on the body which appellant chose to strike is also significant, being the head. The viciousness of the swing of the club was revealed by the physician's testimony. Appellant struck with such force that the brain was lacerated on both sides. The brain was extensively lacerated, with hemorrhages both in the brain substance and on the cover thereof. The brain disintegrated. After striking the fatal blow appellant threw the post at the friend of the deceased and with such force as to knock him down. Whereupon the appellant fled the scene. The next day appellant went to school. There he was found reading a newspaper 'to see if he had killed that man.' We are unable to say that the jury was wrong in inferring premeditation and deliberation.
The second and final point for reversal is that the court erred in refusing to grant a continuance. The appellant took the position that since the trial took place some six weeks after his arrest, newspaper publicity given the incident was so intensive and inflammatory that an impartial jury could not have been selected. The record is silent as to any publicity being given the incidence of the homicide and of appellant's arrest. Of course we can presume that the two Little Rock dailies carried an account of the incidents but, in the absence of some evidence, we cannot presume that the publicity was intense and inflammatory. In examining the jurors' answers on voir dire we find that many of them had read a newspaper account of the homicide but that they could not recall the details. Very few of them had formed any opinion about the guilt or innocence of the...
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People v. Williams
...premeditated murder. In fact, the prosecutor's language would seem to pass muster even under what defendant, quoting Davis v. State (1972) 251 Ark. 771, 475 S.W.2d 155, 156, asserts is the "proper definition of deliberation," i.e., "weighing in the mind of the consequences of a course of co......
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Thornton v. State
...that premeditation does not require any prior knowledge or interaction with the victim by the perpetrator. Davis v. State, 251 Ark. 771, 774, 475 S.W.2d 155, 156 (1972) (finding that there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation despite the fact that there was a total lack......
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McKinney v. State
...any length of time and can be formed on the spur of the moment. See Ford v. State, 297 Ark. 77, 759 S.W.2d 556 (1988); Davis v. State, 251 Ark. 771, 475 S.W.2d 155 (1972). Evidence of motive, existing before the commission of the crime, may be relevant to the defendant's mental state, but i......
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Starr v. State, CR
...283 Ark. 162, 671 S.W.2d 741 (1984). We have recognized that it is not practical to expect jurors to live in a vacuum. Davis v. State, 251 Ark. 771, 475 S.W.2d 155 (1972). We find no error in the court's The third argument is that the trial judge erred in failing to answer the jury's questi......