Davis v. State
Citation | 343 A.2d 550,28 Md.App. 50 |
Decision Date | 08 September 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 916,916 |
Parties | lloyd Franklin DAVIS v. STATE of Maryland. |
Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Dennis M. Henderson, Asst. Public Defender, with whom was Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief, for appellant.
Donald R. Stutman, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Clarence W. Sharp, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lawrence V. Kelly, State's Atty., and Michael R. Burkey, Asst. State's Atty., for Allegany County, on the brief, for appellee.
Argued before GILBERT, MOORE and MASON, JJ.
The issues before us on this appeal are whether appellant who pled guilty to three counts of burglary was properly apprised, when he entered his pleas, of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; and whether, with respect to two of the counts, there was a factual basis for the pleas.
Appellant, Lloyd Franklin Davis, was charged by a criminal information on March 6, 1974 with nine counts of burglary. At his arraignment on March 14, 1974, he entered a plea of not guilty and prayed a jury trial. On April 22, 1974, when the case was called for trial in the Circuit Court for Allegany County before The Honorable Harold E. Naughton, appellant's counsel informed the court that Mr. Davis desired to enter pleas of guilty to the first, sixth and ninth counts of the information. The State thereupon announced that if the pleas were accepted, it would stet the remaining counts. The trial judge then addressed the following questions to the appellant:
'BY THE COURT: Stand please, Mr. Davis. Mr. Davis, in order to make certain that you are entering your pleas of guilty to these three counts willingly, freely, knowingly and with some degree of intelligence, it is necessary that I ask you a few questions and determine that fact.
Now would you please state your full name?
The next question asked by the court pertained to appellant's privilege against self-incrimination:
The State was then requested by the court to give its 'version of these three cases' and responded as follows:
'MR. KELLY: May it please the Court, the facts in these cases would be that on the 11th day of February, 1974, Lieutenant Kenneth Morrissey of the Cumberland Police Department received a tip that the home of Carl Pete Robb, located at 716 Winifred Road, Cumberland, Maryland, would be broken and entered that evening.
Lieutenant Morrissey in company with Corporal McGrown and other State and City of Cumberland policemen went to the residence. They staked the place out, being inside of the premises in the evening hours at approximately 8:30 or around 8:00 o'clock, during the dark hours of the day. The police officers did observe an individual, who they would recognize as the Defendant in this case, Mr. Lloyd Franklin Davis, pop the sliding glass door as an entrance to the place, came into the premises, was arrested on the premises in company with two other individuals.
After being taken into custody, Mr. Davis was questioned by William F. Baker of the State's Attorney's Office, after having been fully advised of his constitutional warning. Mr. Davis did give a statement indicating his guilt both in the Pete Robb home which I have described and in two other premises, one being the home of Charles Steiner located at 625 Niagara Street, which was burglarized on the 29th day of January, 1974, and also the home of Jack Carter located 1045 Bishop Walsh Drive in the City of Cumberland, which burglary occurred on the 6th of February. As I've indicated, Mr. Davis indicated both in an original statement given on Monday, February 11th, 1974, to Mr. Baker, and in a supplemental statement dated February 12th, Tuesday, February 12th, 1974. He indicated he was involved with the codefendants; that he had broken these homes that he has plead guilty to in addition to other homes in the area during this period of time.
I might indicate to the Court that with regard to the Carter home it was property of the total value of . . ..
After hearing the above statement of the facts and ascertaining that appellant agreed with the statement, the court accepted appellant's pleas of guilty. On April 24, 1974, the court imposed three consecutive five-year sentences.
The principal constitutional question raised by appellant, based upon our decision in English v. State, 16 Md.App. 439, 298 A.2d 464 (1973), cert. granted, 268 Md. 748, dismissed July 3, 1973, is that prior to the acceptance of his guilty pleas he was not informed by Judge Naughton that if he elected to stand trial and did not take the witness stand no inference of guilt could be drawn from his failure to testify.
In English v. State, supra, we quoted from Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964) that the meaning of the privilege is 'the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty * * * for such silence.' We then stated as follows:
First we observe that our decisions in English and in Williams v. State, 10 Md.App. 570, 271 A.2d 777 (1970), and Silverberg v. Warden, 7 Md.App. 657, 256 A.2d 821 (1969) placed Maryland in the minority of jurisdictions which adhere to the view that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969) requires some articulation to the defendant that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and to confront one's accusers. Indeed, the United States Courts of Appeals which have addressed this issue are unanimous that under Boykin specific questions about the waiver of these rights are not required. 1
Supporting the Maryland position, however, is the leading California case of In Re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-33, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 584, 460 P.2d 449, 456 (1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 911, 90 S.Ct. 1708, 26 L.Ed.2d 72 (1970) where the Supreme Court of California in an opinion by Justice Mosk interpreted Boykin to...
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Davis v. State
...five-year terms. On appeal these convictions were affirmed by a divided panel of the Court of Special Appeals. Davis v. State, 28 Md.App. 50, 343 A.2d 550 (1975). We granted certiorari. Davis asserts-relying on Boykin v. Alabama, supra, and four decisions of the Court of Special Appeals whi......
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...for comment against him but also that it may not be used as an inference to be weighed on the issue of guilt." See Davis v. State, 28 Md.App. 50, 58, 343 A.2d 550 (1975). It is important to note, however, that (1) even in that extended view of Boykin, we never suggested that the defendant h......
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...191, 263 A.2d 19, cert. denied, 258 Md. 729 (1970); Silverberg v. Warden, 7 Md.App. 657, 256 A.2d 821 (1969). In Davis v. State, 28 Md.App. 50, 58, 343 A.2d 550 (1975), we modified our prior holdings that strict compliance with Boykin was required, by holding that 'substantial compliance' w......