Davis v. State
| Decision Date | 30 January 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 77695,77695 |
| Citation | 594 So.2d 264 |
| Parties | 17 Fla. L. Weekly S77 Twana DAVIS, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Tanja Ostapoff, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Joan Fowler, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen. and Georgina Jimenez-Orosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for respondent.
We review Davis v. State, 576 So.2d 913, 914 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which the district court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
CAN A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER PAT-DOWN OR SEARCH THE CROTCH OR GROIN AREA OF AN INDIVIDUAL WHO HAS CONSENTED TO BE SEARCHED?
We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We hold that, in the case of a random and suspicionless stop in the public area of an airport, the voluntary consent to search one's "person" does not encompass a pat-down or search of the groin area. However, in the instant case, there is adequate evidence in the record indicating the officer never came in contact with Davis' groin area and supporting the trial court's conclusion that the search conducted did not exceed the consent given by Davis.
Two Ft. Lauderdale police detectives approached Twana Davis in the Ft. Lauderdale International Airport. The detectives identified themselves as police officers, asked Davis if she would speak with them, and then asked for her identification and her airline ticket. Davis produced them for inspection. After returning the ticket and identification, one of the detectives asked if they could search her luggage and her "person" and advised Davis of her right to refuse. * Davis agreed to the search.
While examining Davis's bag, the female detective noticed an object protruding from underneath Davis' skirt and asked Davis if she would prefer stepping around the corner for a pat-down. Davis stated that she would prefer to do so, and they went into the alcove of a ladies' rest room. The detective then placed her hand on the package between Davis' legs. She testified that the object was taped to Davis' thigh, about two or three inches below her crotch. Believing that the object was cocaine, the detective placed Davis under arrest.
The State charged Davis with possession of more than 400 grams of cocaine. The trial judge denied Davis' motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the search, finding that Davis had voluntarily consented to the search. On appeal the district court upheld the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress.
To determine whether a proper constitutional search was conducted in the instant case, two issues must be addressed. First, whether Davis voluntarily consented to the search. Second, if Davis voluntarily consented to the search, was the search conducted within the limits of the consent given. United States v. Blake, 718 F.Supp. 925 (S.D.Fla.1988), aff'd, 888 F.2d 795 (11th Cir.1989).
Whether a suspect voluntarily consents to a search is a question of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Shapiro v. State, 390 So.2d 344 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982, 101 S.Ct. 1519, 67 L.Ed.2d 818 (1981). In addition, the determination of whether the consent to a search was voluntary is a question for the trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal unless the determination is clearly erroneous. DeConingh v. State, 433 So.2d 501 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 995, 79 L.Ed.2d 228 (1984). Based on our review of the record, we hold that ample evidence supports the trial court's finding that Davis voluntarily consented to the search.
Once it is established that the search was conducted pursuant to a defendant's voluntary consent, we must determine whether the search was conducted within the limits of the consent given. United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d at 800; State v. Wells, 539 So.2d 464 (Fla.1989), aff'd on other grounds, 495 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990). Two principles guide us on this issue. First, the trial court's determinations as to the scope of the consent given and whether the search conducted was within the scope of that consent are questions of fact to be determined by the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Blake, 888 F.2d at 798. Second, the determination of the trial court will not be overruled unless it is clearly erroneous.
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