Davis v. State
Citation | 102 Wash. App. 177,6 P.3d 1191,102 Wn. App. 177 |
Decision Date | 25 August 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 24301-6-II.,24301-6-II. |
Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Parties | Joseph Patrick DAVIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Washington, Respondent. |
Glen Andrew Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for Respondent.
John Louis Messina, Jeffrey Howard Sadler, Messina Law Firm, Tacoma, for Appellant.
Joseph Davis seeks compensation from the State of Washington for the injuries he sustained when the motorcycle he was riding overturned. Davis had been riding at a state-owned recreation area. The trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, finding that the State was immune from tort liability under the recreational use statute, RCW 4.24.200 and .210. Davis argues that he followed motorcycle tracks in the sand leading to a drop-off and that the tracks constituted a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which the State is liable. We disagree and, thus, affirm.
On May 27, 1995, Davis and two companions were riding motorcycles over the sand dunes at Beverly Dunes Recreational Area, a popular spot for off-road vehicle enthusiasts. The State owns and operates Beverly Dunes as a recreation zone, accessible free of charge to the public.
Davis claims he was following motorcycle tracks left in the sand by other riders when his vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly went over a drop-off into a bowl-like depression. He sustained serious permanent injuries in the fall and he subsequently filed this lawsuit against the State.
The State moved for summary judgment, asserting immunity from liability under RCW 4.24.200 and .210. In response, Davis argued for application of the statute's immunity exception. The exception holds owners of recreational lands liable for injuries "sustained to users by reason of a known dangerous artificial latent condition for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted." RCW 4.24.210(3). There were no warning signs at Beverly Dunes.
The State supported its summary judgment motion with the declaration of James Munroe, the manager of Beverly Dunes. Munroe stated that the sand dunes had been left in their natural state; there had been no alterations made to them. He explained that the dunes are constantly shifting due to winds off the Columbia River and, as a natural result, the dunes typically have a gradual slope on the windward side and a steeper slope on the leeward side, where Davis's accident occurred.
The State contended that the condition that caused Davis's injury was the naturally occurring drop-off of the sand dune. It further claimed that the condition was neither artificial, latent, nor known by the State and, thus, the exception to the recreational use immunity statute did not apply.
Davis countered that the injury-causing condition was an "established trail" of tracks that led up to the deceptive drop-off in the sand dune. He argued that the condition was artificial, as the recreational vehicle tracks left by other riders had altered the land's natural contours. In support, he submitted several declarations and affidavits.
In an attempt to show the State's knowledge of the condition, Davis provided evidence of two earlier injury accidents at the same location, one in April 1995 and one in early May 1995. Although both were reported to local law enforcement, there was no evidence that State officials knew of the accidents.
Davis also produced evidence designed to show that the condition was "latent." According to several individuals, the drop-off was not visible to an approaching motorcyclist or a four-wheel recreational vehicle driver until it was too late to avoid going over the edge.
To establish artificiality, Davis provided affidavit testimony about tracks in the sand. Mathew Atterson, who accompanied Davis on the day of the accident, described the conditions as follows:
We were following a distinct trail of tracks leading us straight. We were following this trail as I felt we were supposed to. I was riding slightly behind Joe who was to my left. Richard was to my right. When I looked ahead, it appeared that the trail was to continue straight and then I could see a rise in the distance. All of a sudden, I saw Richard become airborne. I immediately hit my brakes. At that moment, I saw Joe, who was more ahead of me than Richard, also become airborne. My bike went over the lip of the drop-off and skidded down to the bottom of the drop-off. From there, I could see that it was a bowl which then climbs up to the rise which I had been seeing just seconds before the drop off [sic]. We had all been looking at it and, because all we could see was flat sand, we were unable to detect that there was a drop-off in the middle.
Davis recalled the incident in his own affidavit:
Davis also submitted an affidavit from Robert J. Cunitz, a certified human factors professional, who attested:
The trial court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the injury-causing condition was not artificial. It framed the issue as "whether the use by other recreational users changes the condition of the property from natural to artificial." After reviewing the clause in the statute that describes the statute's purpose, the court held that the condition was not artificial as a matter of law.
When reviewing an order of summary judgment, we engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). The court must consider all the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson, 98 Wash.2d at 437, 656 P.2d 1030.
If the plaintiff "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential" to his case, there can be no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Therefore, because "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case...
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