Davis v. State, 90-KA-0477

• Decision Date: 18 September 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-KA-0477,90-KA-0477
• Citation: 586 So.2d 817
• Parties: Charles DAVIS v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 817

586 So.2d 817

Charles DAVIS v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 90-KA-0477.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

Sept. 18, 1991.

Raymond L. Wong, Cleveland, for appellant.

Mike C. Moore, Atty. Gen., Mary Margaret Bowers, Sp. Ass't Atty. Gen., Jackson, for appellee.

En Banc.

ROBERTSON, Justice, for the Court:

I.

Today's appellant brokered, then observed, the sale of two stolen rifles and has been convicted of receiving stolen property. He charges the prosecution never proved he had dominion and control of the rifles and, hence, in law he never "received" them. He overlooks the law that one who aids or abets the commission of a felony is guilty as a principal, and that abundant evidence before us shows appellant knew the guns were "hot" and forthrightly assisted companions in their sale.

We affirm.

II.

A.

On January 5, 1990, someone burglarized, looted and burned the home of the Marlin Russell, Jr., family in Quitman County, Mississippi, some five miles out from Marks. The thieves took from the Russell home four long guns, specifically:

a. a Savage 20 gauge 30-30 caliber over and under;

b. a Remington 700 .270 caliber with a Tasco scope;

c. a Remington 30-30 with Bushnell scope; and

d. a Revelation .22 caliber with scope.

Later that same day, Robert Earl Lynch and Aaron Lynch arrived in Clarksdale to visit Charles Davis, a friend of theirs. Davis, who was born April 28, 1958, was the Defendant below and is the Appellant here. The Lynch brothers arrived in Robert's 1977 red or maroon Oldsmobile. After a brief visit, Davis joined the Lynch brothers to go riding.

The trio proceeded south from Clarksdale and as they neared Alligator, Mississippi, one of the Lynch brothers asked Davis if he knew where they (the Lynch brothers) could get rid of some guns. Davis suggested that they go to see Marshall West, who lived near Deeson, Mississippi. The three left Alligator, Aaron Lynch driving since he had a driver's license and Robert did not. They drove along a country road and soon found West in his front yard.

Davis introduced the Lynch brothers to West. Aaron Lynch then went around to the trunk of the car, opened it, and unfolded a blanket or cover containing the four long guns, whereupon Davis first saw the guns. Davis admits at this point, "I didn't know they was stolen, but, after I seen them, I figured they was." In any event, Aaron Lynch engaged in a brief negotiation with West, which came to naught. It seems West did not have the cash to pay the price Aaron asked.

While at West's home, Davis saw an acquaintance, Clifton Selby, Jr., drive by. Selby lived about two and a half miles past West's place. Davis says he had already thought of Selby as a possible purchaser of the guns. In any event, the threesome got back into Robert Lynch's car and headed to Shelby with Davis driving. They caught up with Selby in Shelby. Davis first approached Selby and asked if he were interested in some guns, and Selby replied, "Yeah." Davis then said, "They hot, man." Davis then introduced Selby to the Lynch brothers. Selby promptly asked Aaron Lynch, "Was they hot, was they hot?" Aaron told him, "They was clean, that he got them on the other side, on the other side of Memphis." Selby told Aaron Lynch he was interested in two of the guns--the 30-30 and the .270--but he said he wanted to test fire them before buying them. The four left and went out to a deserted spot on Ferretti Road whereupon Selby, with the assistance of Aaron Lynch, loaded and fired the two rifles. Satisfied, Selby bought the guns from the Lynch brothers for $400.00. Shortly thereafter, Aaron Lynch paid Davis $5.00 for his trouble.

In due course, Bolivar County Sheriff's Investigator Billy Joe Estes got wind of the sale of the guns to Selby. He obtained issuance of a warrant for Davis' arrest, forwarded it to Clarksdale, where the Coahoma County Sheriff's Deputies took Davis into custody. The Lynch brothers were also arrested roughly simultaneously. On February 8, 1990, Davis gave Investigator Estes a statement wholly consistent with the facts recited above.

B.

On March 13, 1990, the grand jurors of the First Judicial District of Bolivar County returned an indictment jointly charging Robert Earl Lynch, Aaron Lynch and Charles Davis "while acting in concert with each other" with receiving stolen property, to-wit: four specifically identified rifles. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-17-69 (1972). The day before trial, the Lynch brothers entered pleas of guilty, and, on April 5, 1990, Davis stood trial alone. The Lynch brothers did not testify. At all appropriate stages, Davis challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, particularly on the "knowledge" and "receiving or control" issues. In the end, the jury found Davis "guilty of receiving stolen property." The Circuit Court sentenced Davis to four years imprisonment.

Davis timely filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, charging inter alia, that the prosecution's proof was legally insufficient to establish that Davis "knew the property was stolen and he had had dominion or control of the property." On April 20, 1990, the Circuit Court denied the motion in its entirety. This appeal follows.

III.

A.

The legislature has by statute declared the act of receiving stolen property an offense against the peace and dignity of the people of this state and has delineated this offense in these words:

If a person buy or receive in any manner or on any consideration personal property of any value, feloniously taken away from another, knowing the same to have been so taken, he shall be guilty of receiving stolen goods ...

Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-17-69 (1972). As with all criminal offenses, the prosecution may not procure a valid and enforceable conviction save it prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the offense. Doby v. State, 557 So.2d 533, 540 (Miss.1990); Steele v. State, 544 So.2d 802, 808-09 (Miss.1989). The Court below accepted this premise, as evidenced by Jury Instruction No. C-15A.

Once a jury has found a defendant guilty, however, our authority on appeal is by law considerably constricted. It matters not that we are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the accused's guilt. We may not reverse so long as there is credible evidence in the record from which the jury could have found or reasonably inferred each element of the offense charged. See, e.g., Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192-93 (Miss.1989); Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132, 136 (Miss.1989); Christian v. State, 456 So.2d 729, 734 (Miss.1984). It equally matters not that the evidence overwhelmingly establish that the defendant is guilty of other offenses. We may not affirm unless the evidence adequately undergirds conviction of the particular offense for which the accused has been indicted and tried.

B.

Against this backdrop, Davis first argues that the evidence is insufficient to establish the requisite mental state, that is, that he knew that the rifles were stolen. Here our law imports an objective standard:

If a person has knowledge from facts and circumstances which should convince a reasonable person that property has been stolen, in such situation the rule is that, in a legal sense, he knew the property was stolen.

Brown v. State, 281 So.2d 924, 926 (Miss.1973); see also, Van v. State, 477 So.2d 1350, 1351 (Miss.1985); Lumpkin v. State, 413 So.2d 386, 387 (Miss.1982); Ellett v. State, 364 So.2d 669, 670 (Miss.1978); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 526 (Miss.1968); Pettus v. State, 200 Miss. 397, 410, 27 So.2d 536, 540 (1946).

Today's facts and circumstances, known to Charles Davis on the afternoon of January 5, 1990, were such that a reasonable person should have known that the guns were stolen. Davis admits that when he saw the guns at Marshall West's place, he "figured they was ... stolen." He later told Clifton Selby "they hot, man." Given the law and this evidence, we cannot take seriously Davis' argument that he did not know the guns were stolen.

C.

Of more concern is Davis' complaint regarding proof of the act which is central to the offense. The statute prescribes that, before he may be guilty of receiving stolen property, a defendant must "buy or receive in any manner or on any consideration personal property...." No one suggests Davis bought the property. The question is whether he "received" the guns within the meaning and contemplation of the legislative prescription.

We read the words of a statute (or any other legal text) by their common and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 547 So.2d 803, 805 (Miss.1989). Context is important, for in legal language, as in ordinary parlance, words mean different things in different contexts. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 691 (Miss.1990); Segarra v. State, 430 So.2d 408, 411 (Miss.1983). And so we accept the lawmakers' power to define words in ways that differ from what the dictioner or the English teacher or even the informed layman might say. See, e.g., Mississippi State Tax Commission v. Moselle Fuel Co., 568 So.2d 720, 723 (Miss.1990); Pennock v. State, 550 So.2d 410, 412 (Miss.1989). Even so, we doubt the average person thinks "receipt" ends the moment the felon receives the stolen goods, any more than the pass play ends when the receiver catches the football. It may be that the pass is technically received at the moment and spot on the field where it is caught, but knowing those isolated facts without more is worth little. Both quarterback and receiver get credit for the yardage covered by the entire play, and the blocker certainly earns an assist. More substantively, where the receiver is tackled is what tells us how much yardage we credit the offense.

"Receive" within the statute is not limited to physical receipt. Still, an accused acting alone is guilty under Section 97-17-69 only if, within the terms of the statute, he has performed some act with respect to it. Receipt of...