Davis v. State, 21, 2002.
| Decision Date | 24 July 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 21, 2002.,21, 2002. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Delaware |
| Parties | Richard DAVIS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE of Delaware, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. |
Brian J. Bartley, Public Defender's Office, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellant.
Timothy J. Donovan, Jr., Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, for appellee.
BEFORE: VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and STEELE, Justices.
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court, the defendant-appellant, Richard Davis ("Davis"), was convicted of Robbery in the First Degree. The trial judge declared Davis to be an habitual offender under title 11, section 4214(a) of the Delaware Code. Davis was sentenced to be incarcerated for twenty years.
In his direct appeal, Davis argues that the trial judge committed two errors in granting his request, pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a), to waive his right to a jury trial. First, Davis argues that the record does not reflect that he made an intelligent waiver of his right to trial by jury. Although Davis acknowledges that his waiver was voluntary, he argues that it was not an intelligent waiver because he did not offer, and the trial judge did not solicit, an "intelligent reason" for departure from trial by jury, especially since Davis' decision was contrary to his counsel's advice. Second, Davis contends that the record does not reflect that the trial judge's approval of his jury trial waiver was an exercise of "sound and advised discretion."1
We have concluded that the record reflects that Davis' request to waive his right to trial by jury was intelligent and voluntary. We have also concluded that the trial judge's decision to accept Davis' jury trial waiver constituted a proper exercise of discretion. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court must be affirmed.
On October 25, 2001, Davis' case was called for trial. Defense counsel informed the trial judge that Davis wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, but that Davis' decision was contrary to counsel's advice. Davis' attorney also stated that Davis had indicated his desire for a bench trial on at least three separate occasions. The trial judge called Davis to testify on the matter. The following colloquy occurred:
Following this colloquy, Davis executed a written waiver of a jury trial that was submitted to and accepted by the trial judge. The "STIPULATION of WAIVER of JURY TRIAL," also signed by Davis' counsel and consented to by the Deputy Attorney General, recited:
IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED, subject to the Court's approval, that the above Criminal Case be tried by the Court without a jury.... I HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE ABOVE STIPULATION AND HEREBY WAIVE ALL RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL.
In view of the limited colloquy and Davis' written waiver, the trial judge accepted Davis' waiver of a jury trial. Davis' case proceeded to a bench trial. At trial, Davis did not testify or present any evidence in his own defense.
Both the United States and Delaware Constitutions guarantee a criminal defendant the right to trial by jury.2 "Trial by jury has been established by the Constitution as the `normal and ... preferable mode of disposing of issues of fact in criminal cases.'"3 Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has stated that "since trial by jury confers burdens as well as benefits, an accused should be permitted to forego its privileges when his competent judgment counsels him that his interests are safer in the keeping of the judge than of the jury."4 Thus, a criminal defendant may waive his or her right to a jury trial.5
A defendant, however, is not constitutionally guaranteed the right to waive a trial by jury.6 In Patton v. United States,7 the United States Supreme Court conditioned a criminal defendant's jury trial waiver as follows:
[T]he maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent consent of the defendant.8
In Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,9 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Patton:
[O]ne charged with a serious federal crime may dispense with his Constitutional right to jury trial, where this action is taken with his express, intelligent consent, where the Government also consents, and where such action is approved by the responsible judgment of the trial court.10
The common-law requirements set forth in Patton and reaffirmed in Adams were incorporated into Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a).11
Delaware embodied the same requirements in Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a), which is virtually identical to the federal rule.12 Specifically, Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a) states: "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and the consent of the state." Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a), a defendant in a criminal case is allowed to waive his or her constitutionally protected right to a jury trial when he or she "makes an intelligent and voluntary waiver in writing."13 That waiver becomes effective only when the defendant receives both "the approval of the court and the consent of the State."14
"Intelligent and Voluntary" Waiver
For a defendant to waive his or her right to a jury trial under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a), the defendant must make an "intelligent and voluntary waiver in writing."15 Generally, the waiver of a constitutional right will be intelligent and voluntary if the defendant is aware of the right in question and the likely consequences of deciding to forego that right.16 The determination of whether there has been an intelligent and voluntary waiver depends upon the "totality of the circumstances surrounding the particular case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused."17 Ultimately, the validity of the defendant's waiver turns on "the unique circumstances of each case."18
A defendant bears the burden of proving that he or she did not exercise a valid waiver of his or her right to trial by jury.19 The defendant sustains that burden "not as a matter of speculation but as a demonstrable reality."20 In this case, the record reflects that the trial judge conducted a limited colloquy with Davis in which Davis testified that: he understood his right to a jury trial, he understood his right to waiver, and he discussed waiver with his attorney on at least three separate occasions. Following that colloquy, Davis signed a form of waiver in open court.
Davis has not suggested or contended that such acts of waiver were unintentional or without actual knowledge of his right to a jury trial. Further, he has not asserted that his acts were made when he was "incompetent to execute a waiver, that his decision was induced by coercion or promises, or that he did not appreciate the gravity of the offense charged."21 Davis' primary contention is that, in assessing whether his waiver was intelligent, the trial judge was required under Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a) to engage in an expanded colloquy with Davis to ascertain an "intelligent reason" for his waiver request.
Superior Court Criminal Rule 23(a) requires that the right to trial by jury be waived explicitly in writing.22 No reference is made to an oral colloquy between the trial court and the defendant.23 Nonetheless, the trial judge will usually conduct, on the record, a colloquy with the defendant "to ascertain whether [he or she] fully understands the nature of the right being relinquished and the implications of that decision."24
This Court has not addressed whether a colloquy, in addition to a written waiver, is required for a valid jury trial waiver. The majority of the United States Courts of Appeals, however, have determined that a colloquy is preferable to the mere acceptance of a written waiver alone.25 Those federal courts have concluded that a colloquy serves three purposes: "(1) it more effectively insures voluntary, knowing and intelligent waivers; (2) it promotes judicial economy by avoiding challenges to the validity of waivers on appeal (as in this case) or in habeas proceedings; and (3) it emphasizes to the defendant the seriousness of the decision."26
We find that tripartite reasoning by the majority of the federal appellate courts to be persuasive. Accordingly, we have also concluded that a colloquy is preferable to the mere acceptance of a defendant's written jury trial waiver. In the future, Delaware trial judges should conduct a colloquy with the defendant, in addition to accepting his or her written waiver of the right to a jury trial. Such colloquies should ascertain that the defendant understands the nature of the jury trial right that he or she is waiving, but without jeopardizing other fundamental rights ensured to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.
Therefore, in any jury trial waiver colloquy, the trial judge must carefully limit the nature of such an exchange. The purpose...
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