Davis v. Texas Co.
Decision Date | 25 March 1921 |
Docket Number | (No. 8008.) |
Citation | 232 S.W. 549 |
Parties | DAVIS et al. v. TEXAS CO. et al. |
Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Brazoria County; R. L. Cole, Special Judge.
Suit in trespass to try title by Nelson Davis and others against the Texas Company and others. Judgment on a directed verdict for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.
Presley K. Ewing, W. J. Howard, and Ewing Werlein, all of Houston, and A. R. Rucks, of Angleton, for appellants.
Baker, Botts, Parker & Garwood, of Houston, Louis J. Wilson, of Angleton, Ballinger Mills, of Galveston, C. K. Lee, of Fort Worth, and C. C. Wren, of Houston, for appellees.
On February 23, 1901, W. F. Arnold and Kate Arnold, his wife, were occupying as part of their homestead 81½ acres of land in the northeast part of the J. H. Bell league in Brazoria county, Tex. On that date they executed and delivered to John C. Underwood the following contract or conveyance affecting the 81½ acres:
Subsequently, on November 1, 1901, one of Underwood's assignees reconveyed or released to the Arnolds 5 acres out of the 81½-acre tract, leaving 76½ acres as the net effect of their conveyance to Underwood.
By later transfers, assignments, and other means not material here, whatever rights and interests in this net 76½ acres that passed to Underwood under the instrument between him and the Arnolds vested in the appellants in this case, and all their claims in this suit are referable to and based upon it.
Afterwards Arnold and wife, ignoring this pre-existing contract or conveyance they had made to Underwood, which had been shortly after its date duly recorded, by deeds dated, respectively, November 21, 1906, December 11, 1908, December 26, 1908, and August 25, 1917, each of which acknowledged the receipt of a good and valuable consideration, and had been shortly after its date duly recorded, conveyed in different parcels the whole of the fee in the entire 81½ acres to certain persons, all of whose interests thereafter passed to and became vested in the appellees in this cause, and upon their rights as therein and thereby acquired the appellees depended as against the title and interests asserted in the 76½ acres of land by appellants.
Arnold and wife were therefore the common source of title between the rival claimants, and that fact was shown and the cause was tried below upon that theory.
Appellants on May 8, 1919, in the form of trespass to try title, brought this suit against the appellees to recover "all of the oil, gas, coal, or other minerals in and under" the 76½ acres of land referred to, which they claimed to own in fee simple, together with certain surface rights, including the right of ingress and egress for mining purposes, subject, however, to certain specified reservations, among them one-tenth of all the oil produced and saved upon the premises.
The appellees, who were the defendants below, answered with pleas of not guilty, and specifically pleaded the further defenses relied upon, which included limitation, estoppel, and innocent purchaser. All of them except McGary further set up a cross-action by which they sought a rescission and cancellation of the instruments under which the appellants claimed title.
The cause was tried before a jury, and at the close of all the evidence the court peremptorily directed a verdict in favor of the appellees, which was duly returned, and thereupon judgment that appellants take nothing by their suit, and that the appellees have in their favor a cancellation of the instruments of title declared upon by appellants followed. From that judgment this appeal proceeds.
It was evidently the view of the trial court that this grant from Arnold and wife to Underwood in legal effect was a mere option or right to prospect upon the land and did not invest Underwood or his assigns with the legal title to "the oil, gas, coal, or other minerals in and under the land," and that the long nonuser by them of the property, which is hereinafter more fully referred to operated as a forfeiture or abandonment of any right they might originally have had under that instrument, and such is the contention of the appellees upon this appeal.
The appellants, upon the other hand, insist that there passed to Underwood and his assignees by that instrument, and as a result of their substantial performance of all obligations and duties incumbent upon them thereunder, an interest in the land itself to the extent of "all the oil, gas, coal, or other minerals in or under the land," subject to a reservation of one-tenth of all oil produced and saved upon the premises, and that they showed a regular and sufficient chain of title to it as such, first in time and superior in right, under the common source.
Apart from this difference between the opposing litigants as to the intrinsic nature and consequent legal effect of the quoted contract, the further claims urged in their briefs by the appellees of a failure of right or interest in appellants are: (1) That a release executed January 5, 1909, by A. J. Eilers reinvested the Arnolds with all such title, if any, as at that time remained in the Equitable...
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