Davis v. U.S. Dep't of Labor Office of Labor Mgmt. Standards
| Decision Date | 15 August 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-12134 |
| Parties | ROBERT DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR OFFICE OF LABOR MANAGEMENT STANDARDS, ET. AL., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
SENIOR U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE ARTHUR J. TARNOW
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE R. STEVEN WHALEN
Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint on June 10, 2016 [1] against the U.S. Department of Labor Office of Labor Management Standards ("OLMS") alleging various claims of unconstitutional vagueness in 29 USC §504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA"), and a Bivens claim against individual Defendant Ian Burg, the District Director for the Defendant OLMS in the Detroit-Milwaukee District Offices. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment [15], on October 12, 2016. Plaintiff filed a response [19] on November 28, 2016 and Defendant replied [20] on December 9, 2016.
The Court finds the motion suitable for determination without a hearing, in accord with Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), with respect to all of Plaintiff's claims. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment [15] is GRANTED.
Plaintiff was employed by AFSCME Council 25 (AFSCME) as a staff representative. ASFCME is a labor union covered by the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) 29 U.S.C. §504. Plaintiff worked under a union bargaining agreement, signed by AFSCME and his union.
On September 2, 2014, Plaintiff signed a plea agreement in which he admitted guilt to unlawful conversion of program funds and the filing of a false income tax return when he was an elected member of the Highland Park Board of Education. [No. 12-CR-20224 (EDMI) at 62]. On this same day, Plaintiff filed a Motion for an Exemption from Application of Section 504 of the LMRDA because Plaintiff hoped to remain employed with ASFCME. [CR Docket 60]. The United States filed a response in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for an Exemption from Section 504 of the LMDRA on November 13, 2014 [CR Docket at 70] and Plaintiff replied on November 18, 2014 [CR Docket at 71]. OLMS, per agency procedures, completed an investigation of Plaintiff, a report of investigation and an analysis and recommendation memorandum regarding the motion. [See CV Docket 15-2 at ¶7-8; CR Docket at 78, Pg ID 548].
The Court held a hearing on Plaintiff's motion regarding the exemption on November 19, 2014. Plaintiff filed a supplemental brief on November 25, 2014 [CR Docket 72]. On December 18, 2014, Plaintiff was sentenced to serve 18 months in a minimum security camp, and on December 29, 2014, a criminal judgment was signed and entered against Plaintiff. The Court denied Plaintiff's motion for exemption without prejudice on October 20, 2015, stating that allowing Plaintiff to remain employed in the union after pleading guilty to embezzlement would be contrary to the purpose of section 504 and that the request was premature because Plaintiff's rehabilitation was just beginning. [CR Docket 78 at Pg ID 552-553].
OLMS sent Plaintiff a letter on October 22, 2015 from Defendant Ian Burg. [CV Docket 15-3]. In relevant part, the letter stated:
Plaintiff sent Defendant Burg a letter, received on November 19, 2015, requesting that he issue a corrected letter, stating that his date of conviction was December 29, 2014, the date that this Court formally signed and entered his criminal judgment. [CV Docket 15-4]. Defendant Burg responded on November 30, 2015, stating that:
Under the provisions of LMRDA section 504, you may not serve or be permitted to serve in any of the positions or capacities listed in the letter dated October 22, 2015, until 13 years after you conviction, or 13 years after the end of any imprisonment resulting from the conviction, whichever is the late date. Since you were incarcerated some time after sentencing, the bar will begin on the date you are released from incarceration and will run for 13 years. Whether the date of your sentencing was, technically, the date of the hearing...or the date the judgment was signed by the judge and filed...is irrelevant for the purpose of determining the applicable bar period.
[CV Docket 15-5].
Plaintiff was released from prison on February 3, 2016 and placed first in home confinement and then in a halfway house. [CR Docket 79 at Pg ID 557]. Plaintiff filed a renewed motion before the Court on March 18, 2016, once again asking for an exemption from the Section 504 bar. [CR Docket 79]. Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant Burg and Senior Investigator Grant Thomas on March 21, 2016, seeking clarification on when the employment bar began because he was interested in seeking employment within a labor union. Specifically, Plaintiff asked if the bar began on the date he was released from prison, February 3, 2016, or if itwould begin the date that he is released from the halfway house. [15-10767 (EDMI), Docket 76-1]. Defendant Burg replied by email on March 23, 2016, informing Plaintiff that the bar would began the date Plaintiff was released from prison. [Id, Docket 76-2].
The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff's renewed Motion for Exemption from the Employment Bar on March 30, 2016, once again stating that the claim of rehabilitation was premature. [CR Docket 82 at Pg ID 593]. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Sixth Circuit on April 6, 2016. The Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court's decision on February 13, 2017 [CR Docket 94].
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), or in the alternative under Rule 56, for failure to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must "assume the veracity of [the plaintiff's] well-pleaded factual allegations and determine whether the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief as a matter of law." McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 658 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)).
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, showthat there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine issue for trial exists if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
In his complaint, Plaintiff brings seven counts. Counts I thought III allege that Section 504 is unconstitutionally vague. Count IV claims that Section 504 violates Plaintiff's due process rights, Count V asserts that Defendant OLMS exceeded the scope of its statutory authority by enforcing the provisions of the Section 504, which Plaintiff claims are unconstitutional. Count VI seeks aninjunction to bar enforcement of Section 504 against him. Finally, Count VII raises a Bivens claim against Defendant Burg for allegedly violating Plaintiff's constitutional rights by failing to provide him with notice and a hearing before blocking his right to seek union employment, and by instituting a biased investigation.
The Court agrees with Defendants that, for the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed.
Count I alleges that Section 504's use of the term "convicted," as applied to Plaintiff, is unconstitutionally vague. Count II alleges that Section 504, as applied to Plaintiff, is vague as to when the prohibition and bar to continued union employment began. Count IV claims that the agency violated his procedural due process rights by failing to provide notice that his employment ban in union employment began on February 3, 2016, the date of his release from prison, rather than July 1, 2016, the date that he left the halfway house. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment in these claims.
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal courts retain jurisdiction over live, ongoing cases or controversies. Pettrey v. Enter. Title Agency, Inc., 584 F.3d 701, 703 (6th Cir. 2009). If at any point during the pendency of a case, it loses its character as an actual, live controversy, it is said tobe moot and no longer within the jurisdiction of the federal court. Id. "Simply stated, a case is moot when the issues presented are no longer 'live' or ...
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