Davis v. Union Pacific R. Co., s. 96-163

• Decision Date: 16 April 1997
• Docket Number: 96-031 and 96-115,Nos. 96-163,s. 96-163
• Citation: 937 P.2d 27,282 Mont. 233,54 St.Rep. 328
• Parties: Nolan C. DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant. Robert W. HULL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Respondent. Michael P. MIESEN, Kyle J. Pointer, and John T. Samter, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 27

937 P.2d 27

282 Mont. 233

Nolan C. DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, Defendant and Appellant.

Robert W. HULL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant and Respondent.

Michael P. MIESEN, Kyle J. Pointer, and John T. Samter, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,

Defendant and Appellant.

Nos. 96-163, 96-031 and 96-115.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Jan. 14, 1997.

Decided April 16, 1997.

J. Daniel Hoven (argued); Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, Helena, and Thomas R. Jayne; Thompson & Mitchell, St. Louis, MO, for appellant Union Pacific Railroad Company.

Jeff Hedger; Kroschel and Yerger, Billings, for appellant Burlington Northern Railroad Company.

Alexander Blewett III (argued); Hoyt & Blewett, Great Falls, and Chas. C. Dearden; Attorney at Law, Whitefish, for appellant Robert W. Hull.

Frank B. Morrison, Jr. (argued) and Larry M. Elison; Morrisons, McCarthy & Moore, Whitefish, and James J. Shea; Bricker, Zakovics & Querin, Portland, OR, for respondents Davis, et al., Miesen, Pointer, and Samter.

Erik B. Thueson (argued), Michael F. Lamb, and John A. Kutzman; Thueson & Lamb, Helena, for respondents Nelson and Carter.

Elizabeth A. Brennan and William A. Rossbach; Rossbach & Whiston, Missoula, for Montana Trial Lawyers Association.

Thomas E. Hattersley and Teri A. Walter; Gough, Shanahan, Johnson & Waterman, Helena, for Pegasus Gold Corporation, TVX Mineral Hill, Inc., Golden Sunlight Mines, Inc., Luzenac America, Inc., Stillwater Mining Company, Phelps Dodge Corporation, and Canyon Resources Corporation.

REGNIER, Justice.

The cases of Davis, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad Company (hereinafter Union Pacific) and Hull, Miesen, Pointer, Samter, Nelson, and Carter v. Burlington Northern Railroad Company (hereinafter Burlington Northern) have been consolidated for our consideration since similar issues are raised in each case. These consolidated appeals involve railroad workers who have sued their employers for personal injuries under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).

The 1995 Montana Legislature amended Montana's venue statutes by adding subsection (2) to § 25-2-122, MCA, which provides specific venues for tort suits brought against nonresident corporations. In each case, the defendant, relying on the amended § 25-2- The following issue is on appeal:

122, MCA, moved for a change of venue. Some district courts have granted the defendants' motions for change of venue and others have denied them, depending upon their respective interpretations of the amended statute.

Does § 25-2-122(2), MCA, providing specific venues for tort suits brought against nonresident corporate defendants, violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection?

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1995, the Montana Legislature amended Montana's venue statutes by adding subsection (2) to § 25-2-122, MCA, restricting the choice of venue for plaintiffs bringing tort suits against nonresident corporate defendants. The statute at issue in this appeal provides:

If the defendant is a corporation incorporated in a state other than Montana, the proper place of trial for a tort action is:

(a) the county where the tort was committed;

(b) the county in which the plaintiff resides; or

(c) the county in which the corporation's resident agent is located, as required by law, or in the first judicial district.

Section 25-2-122(2), MCA.

Before the enactment of the 1995 amendment, § 25-2-118, MCA, the general venue statute, controlled the place of venue for a tort action against an out-of-state defendant, including a corporate defendant. Section 25-2-118, MCA, reads:

Unless otherwise specified in this part:

(1) except as provided in subsection (3), the proper place of trial for all civil actions is the county in which the defendants or any of them reside at the commencement of the action;

(2) if none of the defendants reside in the state; the proper place of trial is any county the plaintiff designates in the complaint....

In the action against Union Pacific, the plaintiffs allege that due to the negligence of Union Pacific, they have been exposed to loud noise in their workplace resulting in hearing loss. All plaintiffs reside outside of the state of Montana, and none of the acts or occurrences which form the bases of the complaints occurred in Montana. Defendant Union Pacific, is incorporated in the state of Utah, operating its railroad business in several Montana counties and has its registered agent for Montana located in Lewis and Clark County.

Each of the plaintiffs' FELA claims were filed in Silver Bow County, Montana. The defendant filed a motion for a change of venue based on the Legislature's amendment to § 25-2-122(2), MCA. This amendment became effective October 1, 1995. The plaintiffs all filed their complaints in Silver Bow County after that date. The Second Judicial District Court ruled that Silver Bow County was an appropriate venue for their causes of action to be filed. The defendant then filed a motion for reconsideration and request for hearing. Following argument, the District Court reaffirmed the plaintiffs' right to bring the action in Silver Bow County, finding that the 1995 amendment to § 25-2-122, MCA, supplemented the more general venue provisions in § 25-2-118, MCA, to provide additional counties in which to file tort actions against nonresident defendants.

The cases that involve Burlington Northern share a similar procedural history to the Union Pacific cases. In the first case, plaintiff Robert Hull was a resident of Flathead County, where the alleged injury occurred. Burlington Northern is incorporated in Delaware and has its registered agent for Montana located in Lewis and Clark County.

Hull filed his FELA action in Cascade County on August 14, 1995. Burlington Northern filed a motion to change venue under the terms of § 25-2-122(2), MCA. Hull argued that since his complaint was filed prior to October 1, 1995, his case should be entitled to proceed in Cascade County. The Eighth Judicial District Court granted the motion for a change of venue to Flathead County under the terms of § 25-2-122(2), MCA, holding the change in the venue statute was procedural and not substantive. Thus, § 25-2-122(2), MCA, could be applied In the second case, plaintiffs Meisen, Pointer, and Samter filed their FELA actions in Silver Bow County on September 26, 1995. Meisen was a resident of Flathead County, where his alleged injury occurred. Pointer and Samter were not residents of Montana and allege that they were injured in Nebraska and Idaho respectively. Burlington Northern filed a motion to change venue in each case. The Second Judicial District Court denied the motion for a change of venue on the grounds that § 25-2-122, MCA, provided an alternative to the more general venue provisions in § 25-2-118, MCA. On reconsideration, the District Court held that the amendment to the venue statute affected substantive rights and could not be applied retroactively to actions filed before the amendment became effective.

retroactively to a complaint filed before the effective date of the amendment.

In the next case, plaintiffs Donnie Nelson and Larry Carter filed FELA actions against Burlington Northern in Cascade County. Nelson was injured on January 26, 1991, in Hill County, which was also where he resided at the time. Carter was injured on February 9, 1993, in Flathead County where he resided. Nelson filed his lawsuit on May 19, 1995. Carter filed his lawsuit on October 16, 1995. Burlington Northern filed motions to change venue based on the 1995 amendment to § 25-2-122, MCA, in both cases. In Nelson's case, the railroad argued that the 1995 amendment was retroactive and that it applied to Nelson's case, even though that case had been filed prior to the October 1, 1995, effective date. The Eighth Judicial District Court granted the railroad's motions in both cases pursuant to § 25-2-122(2), MCA.

For purposes of the following discussion, Davis, Hull, Miesen, Pointer, Samter, Nelson, Carter, and others will be referred to as "railroad workers." Union Pacific Railroad Company and Burlington Northern Railroad Company will be referred as the "railroad companies."

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A legislative enactment is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld on review except when proven to be unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Lilburn (1994), 265 Mont. 258, 262, 875 P.2d 1036, 1039 (citing City of Billings v. Laedeke (1991), 247 Mont. 151, 154, 805 P.2d 1348, 1349).

There are limitations governing a court's ability to declare a statute unconstitutional. We take cognizance of the following cautions:

[I]t is our sacred duty to measure the Act by the terms of our constitutional limitations, as we interpret them. "It must be evident to anyone that the power to declare a legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the responsibility. The legislative and judicial are co-ordinate departments of the government of equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly or indirectly while acting within the limits of its authority be subjected to the control or supervision of the other without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of governments but it does not make any one of the three departments subordinate to another when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the...