Tyrrell v. BNSF Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. DA 14–0825.,DA 14–0825.
• Citation: 2016 MT 126,373 P.3d 1,383 Mont. 417
• Parties: Kelli TYRRELL, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Brent T. Tyrrell (deceased), Plaintiff and Appellee, v. BNSF RAILWAY CO., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Robert M. Nelson, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. BNSF Railway Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

383 Mont. 417

373 P.3d 1

2016 MT 126

Kelli TYRRELL, as Special Administrator for the Estate of Brent T. Tyrrell (deceased), Plaintiff and Appellee

v.BNSF RAILWAY CO., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellant.

Robert M. Nelson, Plaintiff and Appellant

v.BNSF Railway Co., a Delaware corporation, Defendant and Appellee.

No. DA 14–0825.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Argued and Submitted Dec. 9, 2015.

Decided May 31, 2016.

For Appellant BNSF Railway Co.: Jeff Hedger, Michelle T. Friend, Jesse Myers, Hedger Friend P.L.L.C., Billings, Montana, Randy J. Cox (argued), Scott M. Stearns, Boone Karlberg P.C., Missoula, Montana, Chad M. Knight, Cash K. Parker, Hall & Evans, LLC, Denver, Colorado, Anthony M. Nicastro, Jaclyn S. Laferriere, Hall & Evans, LLC, Billings, Montana.

For Appellant Robert M. Nelson: Bob Fain, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana.

For Appellee Kelly Tyrrell: Fredric A. Bremseth, Christopher Moreland (argued), Bremseth Law Firm, P.C., Minnetonka, Minnesota.

For Amicus Montana Chamber of Commerce: J. Daniel Hoven, Browning, Kaleczyc, Berry & Hoven, P.C., Helena, Montana.

Justice JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 The plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals, Robert Nelson and Kelli Tyrrell (Tyrrell), as Special Administrator of the Estate of Brent Tyrrell (Brent), pled violations of the Federal Employers' Liability Act

(FELA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51

through 60, for injuries allegedly sustained while Nelson and Brent were employed by BNSF Railway Company in states other than Montana. Both actions were brought in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. BNSF moved to dismiss both plaintiffs' claims for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Michael G. Moses, presiding over Tyrrell's action, denied BNSF's motion to dismiss. Judge G. Todd Baugh, presiding over Nelson's action, granted BNSF's motion to dismiss. BNSF appeals Judge Moses' order, and Nelson appeals Judge Baugh's order. The issues on appeal are:

1. Whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the FELA.

2. Whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under Montana law.

¶ 2 We hold that Montana courts have general personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the FELA and Montana law. We affirm Judge Moses' order denying BNSF's motion to dismiss Tyrrell's complaint. We reverse Judge Baugh's order granting BNSF's motion to dismiss Nelson's complaint. We remand both cases for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In March 2011, Nelson, a North Dakota resident, sued BNSF to recover damages for knee injuries

he allegedly sustained while employed by BNSF as a fuel truck driver. BNSF is a Delaware corporation, and its principal place of business is Texas. Nelson's complaint did not allege that Nelson ever worked in Montana or was injured in Montana.

¶ 4 BNSF filed a M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

motion to dismiss Nelson's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Baugh granted BNSF's motion, stating: “I believe 3 Judges in this District have faced similar Motions which they have denied based on applicable precedent. Their rulings seem sound but do not look at whether based on common sense it may be time to reassess FELA cases in Montana which have no forum related connection.” Judge Baugh then relied upon a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Daimler AG v. Bauman, ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 746, 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) (discussed in our resolution of Issue 1), to hold that BNSF's “due process rights prevent this Court from exercising general all-purpose jurisdiction over [BNSF] and this Court does not have specific jurisdiction.” Nelson appeals Judge Baugh's order granting BNSF's motion to dismiss.

¶ 5 In May 2014, Tyrrell sued BNSF for injuries Brent allegedly sustained during the course of his employment with BNSF. The complaint alleged that, while working for BNSF, Brent was exposed to various carcinogenic chemicals that caused him to develop kidney cancer

and ultimately led to his death. The complaint did not allege that Brent ever worked for BNSF in Montana or that any of the alleged chemical exposures occurred in Montana.

¶ 6 BNSF filed a M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2)

motion to dismiss Tyrrell's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. Judge Moses denied BNSF's motion. He adopted and incorporated Montana Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County Judge Gregory R. Todd's ruling on BNSF's M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss in Jesse R. Monroy v. BNSF Ry. Co., Cause No. DV 13–799 (Aug. 1, 2014). In Monroy, Judge Todd found:

BNSF has established 40 new facilities in Montana since 2010 and invested $470 million dollars in Montana in the last four years.... In 2010, Montana shipped by BNSF 35.2 million tons of coal, 8.5 million tons of grain and 2.9 million tons of petroleum.... In the last year approximately 57.0 BNSF rail cars of grain per year rode the rails in Montana and 230.0 BNSF rail cars of coal per year go out of Montana. In October 2013, BNSF opened an economic development office in Billings, Montana, because of the heightened amount of business not only for coal and grain in Montana, but in particular the Bakken oil development.¹

Judge Todd analyzed Montana and United States Supreme Court precedent interpreting the FELA. He concluded that, under Montana's long-arm statute, M. R. Civ. P. 4(b)(1), BNSF “does meet the criteria of being found within Montana and having substantial, continuous and systematic activities within Montana for general jurisdiction purposes.” BNSF appeals Judge Moses' order denying BNSF's motion to dismiss, which adopted and incorporated Judge Todd's analysis in Monroy.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 7 “The existence of personal jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo.” Tackett v. Duncan, 2014 MT 253, ¶ 16, 376 Mont. 348, 334 P.3d 920

.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 1. Whether Montana courts have personal jurisdiction over BNSF under the FELA.

¶ 9 Congress enacted the FELA in 1908. The Act was “an avowed departure from the rules of common law,” in response to “the special needs of railroad workers who are daily exposed to the risks inherent in railroad work and are helpless to provide adequately for their own safety.” Sinkler v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 329, 78 S.Ct. 758, 762, 2 L.Ed.2d 799 (1958)

. In keeping with Congressional intent, “[t]he United States Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that the FELA is to be given a liberal construction in favor of injured railroad employees so that it may accomplish humanitarian and remedial purposes.” Labella v. Burlington N., 182 Mont. 202, 205, 595 P.2d 1184, 1186 (1979) (citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) ; Coray v. S. Pac. Co., 335 U.S. 520, 69 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed. 208 (1949) ; McGovern v. Phila. & Reading R.R., 235 U.S. 389, 35 S.Ct. 127, 59 L.Ed. 283 (1914) ).

¶ 10 When the FELA was initially enacted, “venue of actions under it was left to the general venue statute, 35 Stat. 65, which fixed the venue of suits in the United States courts, based in whole or in part upon the [FELA], in districts of which the defendant was an inhabitant.” Balt. & Ohio. R. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 49, 62 S.Ct. 6, 8, 86 L.Ed. 28 (1941)

(citation omitted). However, “[l]itigation promptly disclosed what Congress considered deficiencies in such a limitation of the right of railroad employees to bring personal injury actions.” Kepner, 314 U.S. at 49, 62 S.Ct. at 8 (citations omitted). Thus, in 1910, Congress added the following language to Section 6 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 56 :

Under this chapter an action may be brought in a district court of the United States, in the district of the residence of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the defendant shall be doing business at the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several States.

See Kepner, 314 U.S. at 49, 62 S.Ct. at 8

(citing Act of Apr. 5, 1910, Pub. L. No. 61–117, ch. 143, 36 Stat. 291).

¶ 11 This language was added to rectify “the injustice to an injured employee of compelling him to go to the possibly far distant place of habitation of the defendant carrier, with consequent increased expense for the transportation and maintenance of witnesses, lawyers and parties, away from their homes.” Kepner, 314 U.S. at 50, 62 S.Ct. at 8

. The amendment was “deliberately chosen to enable the plaintiff, in the words of Senator Borah, who submitted the report on the bill [to amend the FELA], ‘to find the corporation at any point or place or State where it is actually carrying on business, and there lodge his action, if he chooses to do so.’ ” Kepner, 314 U.S. at 50, 62 S.Ct. at 8

(quoting 45 Cong. Rec. 4034 (1910) (statement of Sen. William Borah)). In

Miles v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 702, 62 S.Ct. 827, 829, 86 L.Ed. 1129 (1942), the U.S. Supreme Court explained:

The specific declaration in [45 U.S.C. § 56

] that the United States courts should have concurrent jurisdiction with those of the several states, and the prohibition against removal, point clearly to the conclusion that Congress has exercised its authority over interstate commerce to the extent of permitting suits in state courts, despite the incidental burden, where process may be obtained on a defendant ... actually carrying on railroading by operating trains and maintaining traffic offices within the territory of the court's jurisdiction.

Justice Jackson, concurring, further noted:

Unless there is some hidden meaning in the language Congress has employed, the injured workman or his surviving dependents may choose from the entire territory served by the railroad any place in which to sue, and in which to choose either a federal or a state court of which to ask his remedy. There is nothing which requires a plaintiff to whom such a choice is given to exercise it in a self-denying or

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