Davis v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil Action No.: 15-0135 (RC)
• Citation: 196 F.Supp.3d 106
• Parties: Tracey DAVIS, individually and as parent guardian of A.D., a minor, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

196 F.Supp.3d 106

Tracey DAVIS, individually and as parent guardian of A.D., a minor, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES, Defendant.

Civil Action No.: 15-0135 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed July 20, 2016

Jacob J. Cecere, Spigelman & Cecere, LLC, Rockville, MD, John B. Mesirow, Mesirow & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND/OR CONDUCT DISCOVERY

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Tracey Davis,¹ individually and as parent and guardian of her minor child, A.D., (collectively, "Plaintiff" or "Ms. Davis"), brought this action against the Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). Ms. Davis alleges that a canine owned by the TSA attacked and injured her child, and her Complaint asserts a negligence claim against the TSA under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.

Defendant² has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. Defendant argues that Ms. Davis's Complaint is barred by sovereign immunity and that it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In her opposition to Defendant's motion, Ms. Davis moves for leave to file an Amended Complaint and to conduct discovery. Among other changes, the proposed Amended Complaint would add the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") as a defendant. Defendant argues that the amended negligence count against the United States is futile because it would not survive a dispositive motion and that Ms. Davis has not justified the utility of discovery.

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the independent contractor exception to the FTCA applies to the negligence claim found in the Complaint, and the Court will therefore dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

At this time, the Court finds that it would be premature to determine the application of the discretionary function exception to Ms. Davis's amended claim against the United States. Instead, the Court will grant leave to file the Amended Complaint and permit jurisdictional discovery. Discovery will be limited only to the question of whether a mandatory directive governed the training of the TSA canine and, if such a directive existed, whether TSA employees followed its command. Finally, the Court will permit Plaintiff to amend the complaint to add WMATA as a defendant.

II. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff Tracey Davis and her minor daughter, A.D., attended the presidential inaugural parade in Washington, D.C. on January 21, 2013. See Compl. ¶ 8; Def.'s Mem. at 7, ¶ 3. Following the parade, Ms. Davis and her daughter approached an escalator in a WMATA Metro station to board a train and return home. See Compl. ¶ 9; Def.'s Mem. at 7, ¶ 4. A law enforcement officer was standing in the station handling a canine that was owned by the TSA. See Compl. ¶ 10; Def's Mem. at 7, ¶ 5; Decl. of Matthew DeMoss ("DeMoss Decl.") ¶¶ 11–12, ECF No. 12-1. According to the Complaint, "the K-9 suddenly and ferociously attacked A.D., biting her head and causing her injuries." Compl. ¶ 12; see also Def.'s Mem. at 7, ¶ 6 ("As Plaintiffs were about to step onto the escalator to enter the subway station, A.D. and the K-9 had an encounter, from which Plaintiff asserts injuries.")

Defendant attaches to its motion the Declaration of Matthew DeMoss. See DeMoss Decl.³ Mr. DeMoss is employed by the TSA as a Field Canine Coordinator in the TSA's National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program ("Program" or "NEDCTP"). Id. ¶ 1. At the time of the incident at issue in this case, Mr. DeMoss was the Field Canine Coordinator responsible for the Greater Rochester Regional Airport and the associated canine units handled by the Monroe County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office").See id. ¶ 2. Mr. DeMoss attaches to his Declaration an NEDCTP Cooperative Agreement and a related Statement of Joint Objectives (collectively, the "Agreement"), that defines the relationship between the TSA, the Sheriff's Office, and the Greater Rochester International Airport. See id. ¶ 2; see also Coop. Agreement at 1, ECF No. 12-2; Statement of Joint Objectives ("SOJO") at 1, ECF No. 12-2. The Statement of Joint Objectives is signed by representatives of the TSA and the Sheriff's Office. See SOJO at 10.

Under the terms of the Agreement, TSA-certified canine teams, made up of a Sheriff's Office handler and a TSA-owned canine, "will be available to respond to Monroe County Sheriff's Office, 24 hours a day, 7 days per week, with the intent to provide maximum coverage during peak operating hours." Coop. Agreement at 2; see also DeMoss Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. The Agreement lists additional responsibilities for the Sheriff's Office, including that the canine teams will spend at least 80% of their annual duty time "in the transportation environment." SOJO at 3. Although the TSA owns the canines involved in the Program, see id. at 6, the Sheriff's Office maintains day-to-day custody and control over them pursuant to the Agreement. See SOJO at 3–4; DeMoss Decl. ¶ 10. Among other things, the TSA is responsible for training handlers entering the Program, providing a subsequent "[o]n-site training mission" and certification for canine teams, and evaluating the canine teams on an annual basis. See SOJO at 1–2; see also Pls.' Mem. at 4–5.⁴

The Agreement states that the participants may "jointly determine that it is appropriate to use ... canine teams to assist another agency/entity in the event of a critical local, state, national, or international matter." SOJO at 9; see also Pls.' Mem. at 5. Mr. DeMoss asserts that the canine team in question in this case was voluntarily assisting WMATA during the inauguration events in Washington, D.C. on January 21, 2013. See DeMoss Decl. ¶ 11; see also Pls.' Mem. at 5; Am. Compl. ¶ 15, ECF No. 15. The canine handler involved in the incident was a Monroe County Sheriff's Office employee. See DeMoss Decl. ¶ 12; see also Pls.' Mem. at 4; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13–14.

Ms. Davis filed suit in this Court in January 2015, individually and as parent and guardian of A.D. See generally Compl. Her Complaint includes a single negligence count against the TSA, brought pursuant to the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671 et seq.See Id. ¶¶ 13–16. Defendant moves to dismiss Ms. Davis's claim, or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. See Def.'s Mot. Dismiss or for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 12. Specifically, Defendant argues that Ms. Davis's negligence claim is barred by sovereign immunity, see Def.'s Mem. at 8–10, and that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see id. at 11–12. Ms. Davis opposes the motion, and also moves for leave to file an Amended Complaint and to conduct discovery. See generally Pls.' Opp'n. The Court addresses the pending motions in turn.

III. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint on two grounds. First, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Ms. Davis's negligence claim falls within the independent contractor exception to the FTCA and is therefore barred by sovereign immunity. See Def.'s Mem. at 8–10. Second, Defendant argues that the Court should dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Ms. Davis has failed to plead the necessary elements of negligence. Id. at 11–12. In the alternative, Defendant moves for summary judgment. Id. at 1. The Court must begin its analysis by determining whether it has jurisdiction. Because the independent contractor exception to the FTCA applies to Ms. Davis's negligence claim against the United States, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.⁵

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides for the dismissal of an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and the law presumes that "a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction." Rasul v. Bush , 542 U.S. 466, 489, 124 S.Ct. 2686, 159 L.Ed.2d 548 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) ); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA , 363 F.3d 442, 448 (D.C.Cir.2004) ("As a court of limited jurisdiction, we begin, and end, with an examination of our jurisdiction."). It is the plaintiff's burden to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). When considering whether it has jurisdiction, a court must accept "the allegations of the complaint as true." Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham , 798 F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C.Cir.2015) (citing Herbert v. Nat'l Acad. of Sciences , 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.Cir.1992) ). In this context, a court may also "consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts." Id. (quoting Herbert , 974 F.2d at 197 ).

B. Analysis

Defendant argues that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Davis's Complaint because her claim falls under the independent contractor exception to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court agrees and will therefore dismiss the Complaint's negligence claim against the United States pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).

Sovereign immunity shields the federal government and its agencies from suit and is "jurisdictional in nature." Am. Road & Transp. Builders Ass'n v. EPA , 865 F.Supp.2d 72, 79 (D.D.C.2012) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer , 510 U.S. 471, 475, 114 S.Ct. 996, 127 L.Ed.2d 308 (1994) ) (other ...