Hamilton v. United States

• Decision Date: 16 November 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 19-1105 (RDM)
• Parties: DeAndre Lamont HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

502 F.Supp.3d 266

DeAndre Lamont HAMILTON, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES of America et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-1105 (RDM)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed November 16, 2020

John J. Yannone, Price Benowitz LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Sean Michael Tepe, U.S. Department of Justice, Michelle D. Jackson, U.S. Attorney's Office Homicide Section, Washington, DC, for Defendants United States of America, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency.

Michelle D. Jackson, U.S. Attorney's Office Homicide Section, Washington, DC, for Defendants Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, John Does.

Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, pro se.

John Does, pro se.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RANDOLPH D. MOSS, United States District Judge

This case tragically illustrates the old legal maxim that a misstep, like a rock thrown into a pond, can cause "ripples to spread" such that the "history of that pond is altered to all eternity." Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co. , 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 103 (1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting). In 2016, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted pretrial release to Wayne Wright, on the condition that he stay away from a certain block in Southeast D.C. To ensure Wright's compliance, the court ordered that the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency ("CSOSA") attach a tracking device to his leg. The CSOSA contractor assigned this task mistakenly fixed the device to Wright's prosthetic leg. Wright then switched out the tracked prosthesis for another one, left his home, traveled to the block that he was forbidden to visit, and murdered Dana Hamilton.

DeAndre Hamilton, as the personal representative of Dana Hamilton's estate, brings this lawsuit against the United States of America, CSOSA, Sentinel Offender Services, LLC, and John Does 1–5 for negligently installing the tracking device and thereby causing Dana Hamilton's death. The United States and CSOSA (collectively, "federal Defendants") move to dismiss on multiple grounds. Because the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") does not waive sovereign immunity for suits against federal agencies, the Court will dismiss all claims against CSOSA. And because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for suits against the United States premised on the negligence of independent contractors, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against the United States. Plaintiff may, however, file a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint, as discussed below, within twenty-one days of this decision.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The tragic series of events that led to this lawsuit began on April 30, 2016, when Wayne Wright, also known as Quincy Green, was charged in the Superior Court with unlawful possession of a firearm. Dkt. 1 at 4 (Compl. ¶ 15). A few days later, the Superior Court released Wright pending trial—with certain conditions. Id. (Compl. ¶ 16). The court ordered that a global positioning system monitoring device ("GPS") be affixed to Wright's leg, so that CSOSA could track his location. Id. The Court further ordered that Wright stay away from the 800 block of Chesapeake Street S.E. in the District of Columbia ("Stay Away Order").¹ Id.

CSOSA had contracted with Sentinel to manage electronic monitoring services for defendants who are subject to pretrial release, probation, or parole. Id. (Compl. ¶ 17). As such, it was Sentinel's job to attach the GPS monitor to Wright. Id. at 4–5 (Compl. ¶ 18). Wright has one detachable prosthetic leg and one natural leg. Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 19). Sentinel's agents (named in the complaint as John Does 1–5) put the GPS on Wright's detachable prosthetic leg. Id. at 5 (Compl. ¶ 20). Early in the morning of May 19, 2016, Wright switched out the GPS-tracked prosthetic leg for a spare prosthesis and left home undetected. Id. (Compl. ¶¶ 21–22). At about 2:40 a.m., he then traveled to the 800 block of Chesapeake Street S.E. in violation of the Stay Away Order and killed Dana Hamilton. Id. (Compl. ¶ 22). Within a week, Wright was charged with second-degree murder. Id.

On April 18, 2019, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit against the United States, CSOSA, Sentinel, and John Does 1–5. Dkt. 1. The complaint includes five counts, which are confusingly numbered I, II, III, VI, and VII. In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants were negligent for failing to attach the GPS monitor properly, failing to monitor Wright's whereabouts effectively, and failing to train their employees properly. Dkt. 1 at 6–7 (Compl. ¶¶ 26–30). In Count II, Plaintiff contends that the United States, CSOSA, and Sentinel are liable for the acts of John Does 1–5 under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Id. at 7–9 (Compl. ¶¶ 31–37). In Count III, Plaintiff alleges that the United States, CSOSA, and Sentinel were negligent in their hiring, training, and retention of employees. Id. at 9–10 (Compl. ¶¶ 38–46). In Counts VI and VII, Plaintiff asserts separate causes of action against all Defendants for wrongful death and survival. Dkt. 1 at 10–12 (Compl. ¶¶ 47–51).

On October 21, 2019, the federal Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), Dkt. 11, and on November 18, 2019, filed a corrected version of their motion, Dkt. 13-1. On that same day, Plaintiff filed his opposition to the motion. Dkt. 14. On December 20, 2019, the federal Defendants filed their reply brief. Dkt. 17. On January 8, 2020, Plaintiff moved to strike certain arguments in the federal Defendant's reply or, in the alternative, to file a sur-reply brief. Dkt. 18. The Court denied the motion to strike but granted the motion to file a sur-reply. See Minute Order (Jan. 21, 2020). On February 3, 2020, Plaintiff then filed his sur-reply brief. Dkt. 22. The motion to dismiss is now fully briefed and ripe for decision.

B. Statutory Background

Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States may not be sued without its consent. United States v. Mitchell , 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). "A waiver of sovereign immunity ‘cannot be implied but must be unequivocally expressed.’ " Id. (quoting United States v. King , 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 23 L.Ed.2d 52 (1969) ). The government's consent to be sued "must be ‘construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,’ " Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club , 463 U.S. 680, 685, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983) (quoting McMahon v. United States , 342 U.S. 25, 27, 72 S.Ct. 17, 96 L.Ed. 26 (1951) ), and must not be " ‘enlarge[d] ... beyond what the language requires,’ " id. at 685–86, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (quoting E. Transp. Co. v. United States , 272 U.S. 675, 686, 47 S.Ct. 289, 71 L.Ed. 472 (1927) ).

The FTCA, upon which Plaintiff premises his claims against the federal Defendants, provides a limited waiver of federal sovereign immunity. It permits individuals to file suit in federal district court against the United States "for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment." 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA allows suits to proceed "under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." Id.

But the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is subject to several exceptions, at least three of which may be relevant here. First, the FTCA does not permit lawsuits against federal agencies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(a) ("The authority of any federal agency to sue and be sued in its own name shall not be construed to authorize suits against such federal agency on claims which are cognizable under" the FTCA.). Second, the FTCA excludes from its coverage "any contractor with the United States." Id. § 2671. Finally, the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts, including "[a]ny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." Id. § 2680(h). "[A]bsent full compliance with the conditions the Government has placed upon its waiver, courts lack jurisdiction to entertain tort claims against it." GAF Corp. v. United States , 818 F.2d 901, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

When confronted with both a motion to dismiss under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must first consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't , 523 U.S. 83, 94–95, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Federal courts are courts of limited subject-matter jurisdiction and "possess only that power authorized by the Constitution and statute." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction, Kokkonen , 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, and "subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived," NetworkIP, LLC v. F.C.C. , 548 F.3d 116, 120 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

A Rule 12(b)(1) motion may raise a "facial" or a "factual" challenge to the Court's jurisdiction. See Hale v. United States , Civil Action No. 13-cv-1390 (RDM), 2015 WL 7760161, at *3–4 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 2015). A facial challenge to the Court's jurisdiction contests the legal sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations contained in the complaint. See Erby v. United States , 424 F. Supp. 2d 180, 182 (D.D.C. 2006). For a facial challenge, the Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true and must construe "the factual allegations in the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id. ; see also I.T. Consultants, Inc. v. Republic of Pakistan , 351 F.3d 1184, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 2003). In...