Davis v. University of Del.

Decision Date22 March 1968
Citation240 A.2d 583
PartiesC. Jane DAVIS, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, James R. Cunningham, John Hale and Rita Quinlivan, Defendants Below, Appellees.
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware

Frank J. Miller, of Walker, Miller & Wakefield, Wilmington, for appellant.

Alfred M. Isaacs, of Flanzer & Isaacs, Wilmington, for appellees.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice, CAREY, Justice, and SHORT, Vice Chancellor, sitting.

WOLCOTT, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by the plaintiff from the entry of summary judgment by the Superior Court against her in a personal injury action. The action was ordered dismissed as to the University of Delaware, and as to certain of its employees, on the ground that the accident to the plaintiff arose out of and in the course of her employment by the University, which means that the accident falls within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act (19 Del.C., Part II) which, by reason of 19 Del.C. § 2304, is the exclusive remedy of an employee against an employer and fellow employees for such an injury.

The plaintiff's injuries were occasioned by a fall in a dormitory during a fire drill on August 3, 1964. During the drill a large group of students running down the dormitory hall struck the plaintiff, causing her to fall.

The plaintiff, a woman of fifty, was employed by the University as a visual consultant in the Physical Efficiency Research Program at a salary of $1100.00 for eleven months. Specifically, she was employed to make a statistical study of the relationship between the vision of professional athletes and their performance records.

The plaintiff is an optical engineer. She was employed by Baush and Lomb Optical Company, Inc., prior to coming to the University. She left her job and came to the University for less pay in order to obtain a doctorate, one of the requirements of which was a full-time residence at the University of at least one year. In addition, the plaintiff received a 'working grant' from Friends' Foundation which defrayed the cost of her tuition, room and board, upon the University's campus.

At the time of the accident complained of, the plaintiff was a student in the summer session of the University, and was also engaged in work preliminary to the statistical study she was hired to make.

The plaintiff had a desk assigned to her in the research office of the Athletic Department of the University, but she did most of her statistical compilation in her dormitory room. In discharging her duties, she was assigned a task and given a completion date, but thereafter worked independently of any daily output requirement.

Upon this showing, the trial judge held that the relationship between the plaintiff and the University was that of an employee-employer, and that she was injured while in the course of her employment. For this reason, the action was dismissed by summary judgment since exclusive jurisdiction over it was conferred by the Workmen's Compensation Law upon the Industrial Accident Board. *

The plaintiff's argument in this appeal is simply that the record is insufficient to support the finding of the trial judge that the plaintiff at the time of the accident was an employee-resident in the dormitory, thus making applicable the so-called 'bunk-house' rule typified by cases such as Allen v. D. D. Skousen Const. Co., 55 N.M. 1, 225 P.2d 452; Carroll v. Westport Sanitarium, 131 Conn. 334, 39 A.2d 892, and Bass v. Mecklenburg County, 258 N.C. 226, 128 S.E.2d 570.

The disposition of litigation by motion for summary judgment should, when possible, be encouraged for it should result in a prompt, expeditious and economical ending of...

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18 cases
  • State ex rel. Secretary of Dept. of Transp. v. Regency Group, Inc.
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • September 27, 1990
    ...be encouraged, when possible, for it should result in a prompt, expeditious and economical ending of lawsuits. Davis v. University of Delaware, Del.Supr., 240 A.2d 583, 584 (1968). III. ROBERTSON'S The defendants' third party action in the original action in this Court claims Robertson prep......
  • AEROGLOBAL CAP. MGMT. v. CIRRUS INDUSTRIES
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • March 23, 2005
    ...at 477, 105 S.Ct. 2174). 47. Id. at 1124. 48. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Wolcott, 83 A.2d 759, 760 (Del.1951). 49. Davis v. University of Delaware, 240 A.2d 583, 584 (Del.1968). 50. Cross v. Hair, 258 A.2d 277, 278 (Del.1969). 51. Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). 52. Telxon Corp. v. Meyerson, ......
  • Hartman v. Buckson
    • United States
    • Court of Chancery of Delaware
    • June 14, 1983
    ...be disposed of by summary judgment for the result is a prompt and economical way of disposing of litigation. Davis v. University of Delaware, Del.Supr., 240 A.2d 583 (1968). Summary judgment will be granted when there is no reasonable indication that a material issue of fact exists and the ......
  • Asbestos Workers Local Union No. 42 Welfare Fund v. Brewster, C.A. No. 04C-08-210 CHT (Del. Super. 9/25/2006)
    • United States
    • Superior Court of Delaware
    • September 25, 2006
    ...304 A.2d 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); and Shultz v. Delaware Trust Co., 360 A.2d 576 (Del. Super. Ct. 1976). 11. Davis v. University of Del., 240 A.2d 583 (Del. 1968). 12. Del. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(h). 13. See e.g. Bird v. NECA-IBEW Local 176 Health & Welfare Plan of Benefits, 32 EBC 1743 (......
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