Davis v. Wells
Decision Date | 30 November 1925 |
Citation | 254 Mass. 118 |
Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Parties | ROBERT D. DAVIS & another v. FRANK O. WELLS. |
September 16, 1925.
Present: RUGG, C.
J., BRALEY, CROSBY CARROLL, & SANDERSON, JJ.
Guaranty. Contract Under seal, Construction, Performance and breach, Alteration.
A salesman made with a corporation an agreement in writing under which the corporation agreed, among other things, to supply the salesman with sufficient samples, stocks of merchandise and catalogues, and the salesman agreed in clause 1 of section 2 of the contract to obtain accepted business in a defined territory to the amount of $20,000 in twelve months, and deposited $1,000 with the company to be retained as liquidated damages in case of his failure to do so. One, who was the president and a director and active in the management and familiar with the business of the corporation, executed a bond in which he guaranteed payment of the $1,000 deposited by the salesman should the salesman
"comply with all the requirements in clause 1, section 2 of said agreement, and all other stipulations of said agreement." Held that the words of the bond, properly construed, meant that if the plaintiff secured orders to the amount of $20,000, or, being ready, willing and able to perform this part of the contract, was prevented from doing so by the company, the "requirements" are complied with.
Where, at the trial of an action by the salesman against the guarantor upon the bond above described, the jury found on evidence warranting the finding that the corporation failed "to perform its contract in such a way as to prevent the plaintiff's fulfilling his contract according to its terms," a further finding for the plaintiff was warranted.
A further provision of the contract between the plaintiff and the corporation above described was that the salesman should secure stocks consigned to him by furnishing the corporation with a surety or other acceptable bond in the amount of $1,000. There was evidence that no goods were consigned to the plaintiff, and that the manager of the company had told the plaintiff, in substance, that the matter of giving a bond could be allowed to go until such time as stock was shipped on consignment, which time, it could have been found, never arrived. Held, that
(1) Such evidence warranted a finding by the jury that the parties modified the contract so far as it related to the giving of a surety bond;
(2) In view of the defendant's intimate knowledge of the business of the corporation and his participation therein, it could have been found that he knew of the modification of the contract and assented to it;
(3) The plaintiff's failure to procure the bond above described did not as a matter of law bar recovery on the defendant's bond.
At the trial above described, it appeared that additional territory was added by the parties for the plaintiff's activities after the defendant had signed his bond, and the defendant contended that there had been a material alteration of the original agreement which he was guaranteeing and that he thereby was discharged as a guarantor. Under appropriate instructions, the judge submitted to the jury a special question as to whether the plaintiff and the company without the defendant's knowledge and consent materially altered the terms of the contract by enlarging the territory in which the plaintiff was to operate; and further instructed them, in substance, that, if the agreement giving the additional territory was not made a part of the original contract, but was made independently of it, it was immaterial; but that, if it resulted in a material change in the agreement as originally made, the defendant was released from liability unless he had knowledge of it and consented thereto. The jury in answer to a question found that the agreement giving the plaintiff additional territory was not made a part of the original contract. Held, that it could not be said that the jury's finding was unwarranted: the plaintiff therefore was not precluded from recovery.
CONTRACT upon the bond described in the opinion. Writ dated August 8, 1922.
In the Superior Court, the action was tried before Whiting, J. Material evidence, special questions submitted to the jury and their answers thereto are described in the opinion. At the close of the evidence, the defendant asked for the following rulings, among others:
"1.
Upon all the evidence the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. "2. Upon all the evidence the plaintiffs have failed to comply with section 2, clause 1, of their contract with the Wells-Holmes Company, Inc., in that they have not sold $20,000 worth of goods within the time specified in the contract, that requirement is a condition precedent to their recovery against the defendant in this case and the verdict should be for the defendant.
The requests were refused. There was a verdict for the plaintiffs in the sum of $1,058. The defendant alleged exceptions.
The case was submitted on briefs. T.R. Hickey, for the defendant.
F.J. Lawler, for the plaintiffs.
This is an action of contract upon a written instrument in which the defendant guaranteed, upon certain conditions, the payment of $1,000 by the Wells-Holmes Company to the plaintiff. The plaintiff is described in the writ as a corporation, but by amendment the names of Robert D. Davis and Edgar B. [P.] Hill, copartners doing business under the firm name of Davis-Hill Company, were substituted as parties plaintiff.
The Wells-Holmes Company, a corporation which acted as selling agent for several manufacturers of taps, dies, tools and similar articles, entered into a contract in writing with the plaintiffs under which the plaintiffs were to represent these several manufacturers in the sale of their products in a certain territory in the southwestern part of the State of Connecticut, particularly described in the agreement. The agreement recited that the plaintiffs agreed among other things: And the Wells-Holmes Company agreed, in part: By its terms the contract was to be in force for a period of one year from June 11, 1921.
The guaranty on which the plaintiffs seek to recover from the defendant is as follows:
To continue reading
Request your trial